Modernization and the peace process

[Jorge]

"The big story of global politics is modernization- a process that begins with economic development and brings in its wake democracy and a kind of cultural convergence. It's replaced the cold war as the basic structure of world politics. There are those societies that participate in it, those who would like to participate in it and can't and others that reject it powerfully."

The above lines are quoted from an interview that Francis Fukuyama gave to Time Magazine on June 17. Mr. Fukuyama is the chap that caused quite an stir about 10 years ago with an essay called The End of History and is still arising controversies.

On reading his statements, it occurred to me that they could be particularly relevant to the general background of the Israeli Arab conflict and that it would be worthwhile to start a New Thread where we could discuss its implications to the peace process that concerns this Forum.

In our case we have two societies placed in a conflicting situation: the israeli society which is well ahead in the process of modernization and the palestinian
society, which is placed at its starting point . Israeli society may be characterized as well advanced in the road to economic development and democracy and with a culture that converges rapidly with the American-European one. Palestinian society
on the other hand, has not started any significant economic development, is far from being a democratic society and its culture, while differing widely from the western one, is converging with it at a very slow rate.

From the point of view of modernization as defined by Fukuyama, we have thus
two societies at different points in History, with a wide time-gap between them. Plenty of examples of this around today's world but, in this particular case, these two societies happen to have claims to the same land. In order to bridge the conflicting claims, those peoples have to find a way of talking over the time gap and that's not an easy matter.

A further complicating factor is that Palestinian society is torn between two fractions that, following Fukuyama, may be described as a fraction that would like to participate in the modernization process and another that strongly rejects it. The latter is made up of radical Muslims that reject the key aspects of Western culture and consider the modernization process as a danger to their religious way of life. They are not fighting Israel only as a colonizer but as a beach head of an infidel (western) culture that
could literally pollute their way of life. The former fraction, may be loosely identified politically with the PLO which, being essentially secular in outlook, is willing to go along and promote modernization.

The existence of two societies at a different point in History living in the same land is not, of course, the source of the israeli-palestinian conflict but is significantly relevant to the peace process. Although negotiations are conducted by the nation's leaderships, they need the backing of their respective societies. In this context, it is important for both peoples, not so much to love each other, but to develop some degree of mutual understanding. To reckon with this time-gap and to look for ways to bridge it, is in my view, an essential step in the rapprochement process.

Several questions arise within the above context . One of them is, whether the present stand of both the Israeli and US government, namely, pressing for reforms leading to democracy while ignoring the economic development aspect, is the right policy to be pursued. Democracy cannot be created overnight and more so when there is no previous political structure, no tradition of civil service and not even an State. Israel is probably one of the few examples in History whether this sudden jump was carried out successfully; the conditions ,however, were unique and it's more an exception than the rule among emerging states.

Another question relevant to the peace process is whether Israel shouldn't do efforts to support and strengthen the PLO rather than actively trying to undermine it. The secular elements within palestinian society are the only ones that may support and carry out a modernization process and also the ones closer to an understanding that economic cooperation in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence are vital in that process. The policies of Mr. Sharon's government so far have conducted to a clear strengthening of those fundamentalist Muslim fractions which fervently support terrorism and oppose modernization because of all that it implies.

If we accept the idea that the first step in the modernization process is economic development, perhaps the most important question that arises is how Israel and other countries interested in the conflict can help in starting this development.

[dafka]

A book that sheds a lot of light on this issue is Samuel Huntington's "Political Order in Changing Societies. " Huntington (author of the more recent "The Clash of Civilizations") wrote this book in the 1960's, but it's still very relevant today.

His basic thesis is that modernizing societies are subject to enormous strains and political instability. That is because of a number of factors. Two of the main factors are: a) industrialization brings terrible social dislocation (think of the unrest in Europe during the Industrial Revolution) and b) traditional elites cling to power while Western ideas of democracy undermine their legitimacy.

Huntington notes that the biggest cleavages and civil wars tend to be between traditionalists based mainly in the countryside and urbanized elites. When you think about it, many recent civil wars fit this pattern. In the former Yugoslavia, the Muslims were mainly urbanized and the Serbs were mainly rural traditionalists. We can see the triumph of the religious traditionalists in Iran in the same light. And how about the Palestinians and Israelis? We could see it as a traditional society battling a modern urbanized society.

[Vic]

Have you seen this thread http://www.israelforum.com/board/showthread.php3?s=&postid=14772#post14772 , Jorge?

[Mediocrates]

dafka

I appreciate Huntington's analysis but I think he falls into the same traps as Fukyama and D'Souza. The American revolution was fought over ideas. Colonists were in little physical danger but what they objected to was being treated the way they were, while at the same time being British Subjects. The British army would have never treated the colonists the same way had the colonists lived in Birmingham or Sheffield. The arc of civil wars and revolutions since then has followed more or less the same logic.

It's with the failure to thrive of all of the post-colonial societies that we witnessed a new thrust for civil wars and revolution. In many cases pseudo countries made up of synthetic accretions of smaller communities beagan to tear apart precisely because one group physically threatened another and not just through quasi legal force such as one tribe or religion rising to the top ranks of government. All over Africa, 'The Brush Wars of Nationalism' were about persecution, famine, slaughter, extinction - literally.

Each group has managed at one time or another to frame this 'nationalism' "Biafra for the Ibo". Ok, but they broke away because they were probably going to be invaded and slaughtered by their own country shorty after the President of Nigeria was assassinated. Similarly in Congo, Sudan , Angola, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda.....

Now Islamic Fundamentalism introduces a new factor - extreme conservatism and 'virtue' cloaking a naked grab for totalitarian power. The Algerian war is not about industrialization or the failure of industrialization to deliver on its promises and its not about Fundamentalism becoming the answer to capitalism either. It's fascism in different garb. So in the Algerian case the two basic forces are a somewhat 'moderate' political state by Arab standards, such as they and the other force is a not a return to anyting so much as moving foward to religiously justified brute force. There is nothing revolutionary about it. There is nothing to conclude that a Fundamentalist Algeria would be any less 'modern' , 'industrial' or 'technocratic' than a non fundamentalist Algeria - such is the case of Iran already.

[Jorge]

To Vic:

Yes, I have read the thread you mention. Actually, I think that most of the commens posted there are quite good and above the general level of other threads.

The reason why I started a new thread, instead of continuing the one about democracy, is because I'm inclined to think that the process of democratization is just one aspect of a more inclusive one, namely, modernization. Let's say something like a plattform sustained by three legs: economic development, democratization and cultural convergence. If we isolate the political structures from the economic and cultural ones we may get a somewhat inclomplete picture of the situation.

[Mediocrates]

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/404jmnev.asp


This piece lays out a plan that focuses on economic development not political processes. The justification for this is that economic development, at a low level was working before Oslo and so should be tried again. Read it before you comment.


<snip>

Most Arabs were reluctant to join in Arafat's war. Most, after the occupation of the disputed territories in 1967, constituted a silent majority who preferred accommodation with Israel. Even now, when Arabs feel great anger about Israeli military incursions, few express their fury in violent actions. In Jerusalem, Arabs have remained moderate in the face of numerous PLO provocations because they benefit greatly from the commerce generated by tourism, which depends on peace. And in Gaza, the hotbed of radicalism, Palestinian workers last Thursday showed their priorities when tens of thousands mounted an unprecedented "Hunger March" against the Palestinian Authority, demanding that it stop violence against Israel so they could go back to work there and earn money to support their families.

</snip>

[Jorge]

To dafka:

Thanks for bringing Huntington's piece to my attention. His basic thesis, that is:

modernizing societies are subject to enormous strains and political instability.
appears quite applicable to the palestinian society now and, may be, for years to come. Political instability would obviously be extremely damaging to the palestinians and to the peace process. There is however a way to avoid paying the penalty of political instability and that is by conducting the process under an authoritarian government instead of a democratic one. This is after all the model followed by Turkey with some success and by Egypt with some reservations. I admit this is quite a thorny issue that has troubled social philosophers for a long time without yet leading to a clear-cut answer.

However, although I agree with the relevance of Huntington's basic thesis, his two main factors are not, in my opinion, applicable to the present conjecture of palestinian society.

a) industrialization brings terrible social dislocation (think of the unrest in Europe during the Industrial Revolution) and b) traditional elites cling to power while Western ideas of democracy undermine their legitimacy.

In the present post industrial period the role of industry in economic development is much less predominant than it used to be, whilst the service sector (including trade, communications, tourism, etc) acquires an equal or larger importance. It appears that work in the service sector may be less alienating than factory work so that social dislocations may be less severe. Workers in the services sector require
usually a higher educational standard than industrial ones and hence considerable investments in the educational infrastructure are required to jump over the industrialization period. It remains to be seen whether palestinian leaderships would measure up to the challenge.

Regarding point b) about traditional elites clinging to power: It is hard to discern weighty traditional elites in the Palestinian society so that this factor may not be so relevant. Powerful hamullas have lost much of their influence and the only
elite might be a political one, the so called Tunisian leadership, but this is hardly a traditional one.

Huntington notes that the biggest cleavages and civil wars tend to be between traditionalists based mainly in the countryside and urbanized elites.

I wouldn't say that the main cleavage line in the Palestinian case is between traditionalists and urbanized elites but rather between secular sectors and radical fundamentalists one. The power basis of the former appear to be concentrated in
large towns and of the latter in refugee camps.

I wouldn't go as far as Mediocrates when he claims that Huntington fell into some sort of trap together with Fukyyama and others. Huntington's views reveal considerable insight in social transformations. The two main factors quoted above have been key factors in the modernization processes of South American countries and some in Central Asia. That his descriptions and theories have not universal applications do not decrease his merits as a social scholar. After all it took the genius of a Karl Marx to propose a theory of social processes which could be applied to every country in the world and even his showed a number of shortcomings, because of factors he could not have foreseen.

The fact is that the palestinian situation as a modernizing society is unique in a number of ways so that social theories which attempt generality should be considered
with extreme caution. This uniqueness stems partly from the large proportion of refugees, the political role of religion, the lack of tradition as a nation and the presence of an occupying power in its mist. This very uniqueness may require
that the modernization process may be followed along rather unorthodox lines and the least favorable aapproach is for the interested powers to be dogmatic about it,
as Israel and US governmental current positions appear to be.

[dafka]

Thank you Mediocrates for the reference to the Daniel Doron article. I think the following passage is particularly relevant to our discussion.

Employment in and trade with Israel were major reasons for the dramatic improvement in the Palestinian standard of living. But they also had unintended consequences, some painful. They brought Arab traditionalists into intimate contact with a modern society and acquainted them with the workings of a boisterous democracy. This forced adjustments in Palestinian family and clan structure and authoritarian political frameworks. So did the violent struggle against Israel, which offered lower-class youths adventure and an avenue for rapid upward mobility through accomplishments in terrorist exploits.

The prosperity enjoyed by tradesmen stirred resentment among the Arab bureaucratic and intellectual elites. They had earned up to four times as much as workers under Jordanian rule, but now saw unskilled laborers in Israel earning far more than they could. Contact between the Arabs' almost medieval ethos of loyalty to location and clan and the Israelis' super-modern, sometimes brazenly liberal ethos exacerbated the religious and national conflict. Confronting modernity caused deep anxiety--notably among students whose parents could now send them to Israeli universities, where they were indoctrinated by radical leftist Israeli academics promoting Palestinian statehood with greater fervor than most Arabs. Soon, the newly established colleges and universities in the disputed territories were hotbeds of radicalism, first Marxist, then Islamic fundamentalist.

Here we see examples of the social discontent and dislocation caused by modernization that Huntington was describing. Young people go to school and learn strange new ideas, and begin to doubt the wisdom of their elders. Meanwhile, new sources of wealth appear (in this case, employment in Israel) that allow new groups to challenge the traditional elites.

Huntington's book is of course much more complex than I could convey in a few sentences in my earlier post. An additional point he makes is that democracy is rarely, if ever, a suitable political system for a modernizing society. That's because these societies lack the institutions, such as political parties, that allow groups to participate in the political process without using violence. Without such institutions, modernizing societies often descend into chaos, which is then followed by military coups.

Thus, the democratic reforms that the Americans are demanding are unlikely to be the magic ticket for Palestinian society.

[Mediocrates]

In my own simplistic way I call that the emergence of a middle class. And as Edmund Burke indicated, all successful revolutions arise from there.

I tend to believe this - that and that the only lasting hope for Palistinian stability is economic development regardless of the political terrain. In fact they are more likely to achieve economic stability under the politics of a Singapore than a democracy. Anyway gotta go now -

[Jorge]

To Mediocrates:

Thanks for pointing out to us Mr. Doron's article on the weekly Standard. The article left me with rather mixed feelings about its contents. On the one hand I felt that his stress on economic development as a key factor is quite sound. I strongly concur with his summing up:
Quote:

Prolonged national conflicts are not susceptible to quick fixes. It took Europe centuries to overcome intractable national and religious conflicts. Economic cooperation and growth were essential to resolving them. New interests and benefits created by economic integration helped people transcend the old barriers and made some of them irrelevant. This can happen in the Middle East.
Recent world history has indeed repeatedly shown that traditional barriers may be overcome through through economic integration. There's no real reason why the same path couldn't work in the Middle East, as Mr. Doron also hopes. Israel and Palestine are natural trading partners because of their geographical configuration and economic cooperation, followed by integration are geopolitical imperatives for the social and economic development of both.
But, as I said, I had mixed feelings about the article: although the conclusions are sound, his approach to the underlying economic and political events is, in my opinion, inadequate.
Mediocrates, I know from your comments in other threads that the mere mention of post-colonialism steps up your metabolism to discomfiture levels. I tend to agree that the concept has been much abused, but Mr. Doron's piece is a good example of what the proponents of the concept are talking about. His account of late 20th century history goes essentially like this: natives going happily around, pursuing their daily life, most doing manual work at our farms and industries for low salaries (although high by their standards), others in colorful markets selling
fruits and vegs. ( but mostly spare parts and other goods of dubious provenance). As the story goes, everyone was prospering, we, of course,
getting a larger share than the natives, until one day instigators managed to convince the populace that they should fight for independence. Nevertheless, the status quo could have been preserved, but the Oslo agreements, "by concentrating primarily in politics" disrupted the whole pastoral existence . The natives unreasonably expected that we would follow the letter of the agreements, became impatient and from there
on debacle ensued in place of the law and order we had imposed previously. End of story in the meantime.

Anyway, as Mr. Bush once said: "enough is enough" so, let'
s turn the page. In your second note you write, (quote:)

In my own simplistic way I call that the emergence of a middle class. And as Edmund Burke indicated, all successful revolutions arise from there.

I recollect that we started to discuss you ideas about the middle class in another thread and for some reason the discussion was discontinued
(probably we disgressed into the pros and cons of Arafat). I think that is an interesting idea worth developing in further detail in the particular context of the palestinian society. I'd like to entice you to do so because I think that the general idea is sound but I fail to see the procedure to put it in practice in the present conjecture.

[Mediocrates]

I scratched out some ideas based on my knowledge of the French, American and 1848 Revolutions and came to the somewhat cursory conclusion that sometimes the middle class is a successful impetus and sometimes it is not.

We could start backwards. In every case the 1848 Revolutions lead by the liberal middle classes failed and conservative sometimes monarchical power was restored. The history tells us this was cause by middle class distrust of the working classes and a failure to cooperate at the most critical times. In France's case the peasantry already owned some land and so did not share the mercantile goals of the middle class.

Here is a summary of that.

http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/revolution1848.html
http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/1871/section1.html

If we look futher back at the American revolution we can point to Edmund Burke again who lobbied unsucessfully for the position that England had more to gain from a free America than from exploiting them as colonies. The Colonies had become at least potentially economically self sufficient and the English, could at least guess that they had little to fear from any economic relationships between America and France.

a gloss is provided here:

http://sophies-world.com/SophieText/enlightenment.htm

We can take that conservative 'social order' thesis of Burke's and apply it to the Palistinians. Who better has the tools to deal with the mechanics of a modern state? Not the dictators. Not the 'refugees', the poor, the illiterate, the hungry. Who better has a reason to engender stability? The poor want bread. The middle class wants a stable mercantile economy.

So in this scenario the drivers become: an educated, entrepeneurial technocratic middle class and the impetus for revolution, for turning out the scoundrels is one not that much different from the reason the middle classes turned out the States-General in France or why the colonists rose up against the Intolerable Acts. Middle class values and security and wealth. I think that if I had to capture it in two sentences I'd say that successful revolutions exploit the force of middle class conservatism. Unsuccessful revolutions exploit the force of unbridled radicalism.

I haven't spent any time thinking about how this works in practice because I can't decide which is more critical; politics or economics. But I'll dwell on that some more.

[Mediocrates]

I'll throw this in a side issue which is, 'are there or what are the' socio economic forces behind antisemitism?

Here is great short essay by a man named Theo Pavlidis who gets it as right as anyone:

http://home.att.net/~t.pavlidis/antiSemitismV01.htm

"...George Orwell wrote that revolutions are not the actions of the poor against the rich but of the middle class against the rich. Both of these two groups try to obtain the alliance of the multitude of the poor. If the middle class succeeds in obtaining the alliance of the poor, a successful revolution occurs. On the contrary, the rich can forestall revolutions by turning the poor against the middle class. This is where Orwell's discussion ends. However a consequence of Orwell's observation is that it would be helpful for a ruling class if the people of the middle class were (entirely or mostly) members of a minority population. Such a composition can be assured by discouraging members of the majority population from acquiring an education or engaging in certain activities. This was certainly the case in the Middle Ages in Europe.

Because Jews are a distinct group ........."

[Jorge]

To Mediocrates:

Some interesting variations on the historical themes you describe are provided by reform movements in South America
in the 20th century:

In the 1960's and early 70's a number of groups in South America undertook the task of promoting radical changes in the socio-economical structure of their respective countries. Issues like agrarian reform, nationalization of foreign industries and banking systems, together with educational reforms were expected to induce a redistribution of wealth and transfer power to the working classes. In the forefront of these movements were
the socialist and comunist parties with the backing of industrial
workers and peasants. In the end all these movements were
defeated without acomplishing their goals; they were defeated by an alliance of the higher class, the army and the US government. Military dictatorships ensued (the bloodiest of them in Chile and Argentine) that wiped out not only the said leftist
parties but any traces of worker's unions and organizations.

A number of historians of the period concur on the idea that
the main reason why those movements were defeated lies in the role played by the middle classes of those countries. In all of them leftist parties managed to alienate the middle class instead of forging an alliance between it and the working class.
Instead of drawing the line between salaried workers and owners of the means of production, the line was drawn between manual workers and petite and grand bourgeosie. This was largely due to a dogmatic and short sighted application of marxist ideology. The richer classes managed to ally themselves with the middle class which didn't oppose and even approve of the take-
over by the military dictatorships.

In South America, the middle classes, which carried there significant weight, were at the forefront of the process of
modernization we are discussing. At the crucial moment, regrettably, they failed to help to conduct the process to its
culmination: real democracy and social justice.

[pierom]

To Mediocrates:

I take the opportunity created by your side issue to dive back into this ng from which I have been absent for some time.

I agree with Theo Pavlidis' comments on the issue and would like to add the following considerations:

- all minorities tend to be treated as scapegoats when times get rough. I've read an interesting history of the Waldensians [a protestant religious group] in the Piedmont/Savoy region. They suffered almost identical persecutions as the Jews at recurring times - mainly when the economy was in a downturn or when the kings needed to woe the Pope's support. On the other hand, unlike the Jews, they were geographically more concentrated in certain valleys and could move and often escape in larger groups

- the Jews suffered from being the dark shadow of Christianity, the embarassing mother, that Christianity had to grow free of. The unique condition that makes the Jewish status so different from that of other minorities lies in the embarassing closeness of the two religions. Almost all of the evil that the Jews have suffered from throughout modern history was at the hands of Christians. There would be no Jews, as a people apart, had there been no Christians. The Jews would have simply disappeared as did ancient peoples like the Egyptians or Persians.

- also the particular case of Jewish intellectual achievements is, in my humble opinion, due to the unique stimuli that Jews "enjoyed" from in the Diaspora from being a minority, which caused them to have to struggle harder for reaching social improvement.
I would wager that if Israel became a "normal" country, in a couple of generations we would see a decline in the number of its Nobel Prize winners

[elke]

Quoted from the article:

Also assimilation cannot be protection against persecution. Such protection can be provided only by eliminating social stratification as much as possible and encouraging social mobility in real terms .
emphasis added

This may explain the relative peace Jews have enjoyed in the US.

[Jorge]

Quote from Mediocrates #11:

I haven't spent any time thinking about how this works in practice because I can't decide which is more critical; politics or economics

A tentative answer: may be it depends to a large extent
on the degree of stability of a country or society. In stable countries, like the US or the UK, economics appears to dictate the rules of the game or the constraints within which political decisions are taken. A political course of action that could seriously damage the economy( or the interests of the groups that control it) will not be pursued. In such countries,
economics seem to acquire a superior or supreme role so that any other social considerations became subordinate to it.

Alternatively in unstable, underdeveloped countries or societies, economical considerations appear to be subordinated to political ones. The example of emerging countries in Africa
comes to my mind and, of course, the one we are debating:
the palestinian society. There it is political actions that are critical, since they will determine the outcome of the process.

The rationale behind this may very well be that, if the economic infrastructure is yet to be created and roles of the
individuals or groups within it not yet clear, members of those societies tend to think that they could fashion the future attributes of the State through political decisions.

In between those extreme examples we may include the rest of countries or societies where the critical role of politics or economics may fluctuate according to conditions.

In my next note I intend to develop these arguments in connection with the case of palestinian society.
palestinian society

[Mediocrates]

I would put Palistinian society midway between tribalism and autocracy. It's organized in a top down function but in a feudal way. Local power is dependent on Arafat for the maintenance of that power and flow of funds to maintain it. But organizationally the local groups don't interlock with one another or share tactics or much of anything else. There really is no central civic order or infrastructure. Token central authority jobs like minister of education are handed out to manage a fluid pecking order and control monies.

At the same time the PA itself is run via a Politburo with Arafat as the Maximum Leader at the top. This way each of the 12 or so security organizations under Arafat compete with but can't extinguish or sell out, each other.

Ok so that's what the structure looks like to me. Now for economic development to reach the Palistinians you have to disassemble this feudal structure. You need a structure which is even cable of making economic or political decisions, good or bad. As it is they can't do that. You need to create an environment where not only the local strongman gets his share but that also it doesn't degenerate into baksheesh and greed and corruption to the point where nothing gets done.

I look to Afghanistan for kind of model. The country which was never a strong Federalist structure is developing along the lines of a somewhat distant central government that gives an awful lot of autonomy to the trobal warlords, the Emirs. Some of the do a good job, collecting taxes, maintaining a civil police force not going to war with each other too much. The role of Kabul is to coordinate roles, work with outside agencies &, NGOs, maintain a Federal army to some extent and keep the Emirs from dominating one another and start the activities of developing and coordinating legislation.

This kind of charter doesn't seem out of reach as plausible model for the Palistinians. But it's a model. Who knows if anyone can be found to fill the roles. One key difference is that Afghanistan kicked out the scoundrels. The Palistinians have yet to do that (and no I don't mean the IDF).

At that point it's possible to inject capital into the system to start developing a viable economy. As I said earlier on, I think in practical terms the direction the Palistinians should take is a services based ecomony like gambling, banking, 'leisure'. They could become a kind of Bahrain-lite for the Arab world. Services don't need massive capital infusions like cement factories or hordes of engineers and so on. But that is far off; first they have to build roads and water systems and clear out the rubble.

I think it could be done in 10 years after dismantling the PA and getting rid of the top two-three tiers of murderers in the PA & co. (by any means necessary). Some would say that there would be no one left to run the country but I don't believe that either. I don't believe it's that hard to start from scratch and do a C+ to B- job with anyone you can find. Most of this is process and dedication and focus following basic rules.

[Vic]

The other difference between the Afghans and the Palestinians is that Afghanistan used to be a functioning state. It was long ago, under the Shah, but there are still people around who remember it. It used to be nearly a democracy, Kabul an enjoyable modern city (there are beautiful photos from the 50ies to the mid-70ies), until some idiots decided that they could manage the country's affairs better.

Maybe I'm mistaken, but there seem to be more responsible Afgans than Palestinians around too. At least in the West, the Afghans never succumbed to the boundless hate and self-pity of the Palestinian variety. They mostly make a very dignified impression, with their strong authentic identities rooted in old cultural traditions rather than in hatred of "the Other".

Oh, and during the - extremely brutal, btw., nothing that Israel would even dream of - Soviet occupation they never (with one exception, I believe) attacked Soviet civilians. Indeed, many view the Palestinians with great disdain precisely because of this.

[Vic]

Originally posted by pierom
- also the particular case of Jewish intellectual achievements is, in my humble opinion, due to the unique stimuli that Jews "enjoyed" from in the Diaspora from being a minority, which caused them to have to struggle harder for reaching social improvement.True, but not only this. There is also a tradition of very intensive learning starting at early age.I would wager that if Israel became a "normal" country, in a couple of generations we would see a decline in the number of its Nobel Prize winners If this is the prize for "normalcy", than it is worth it.

[pierom]

I agree. I have realised that my post was in fact diverting attention from a very interesting debate, on which I can only be a very attentive listener. Yet I was intrigued by this theme. I probably ought to start a separate thread on the subject, that could simply be called: Jews and Christians.

I was brought up as a Catholic but have long ago taken a very critical stand against this, as well as other organised religions in fact. A couple of years ago I read a great book, Jesus the Jew, by Geza Vermes, which I felt explained all I had yearned to understand about the historic and unbiased truth about Jesus, which I have found apparently impossible to get from Christian authors.

As a consequence of this reading I developed this view, which I tried to explain in my post, and which I don't pretend to sell as something unheard of. I would call the concept somehow as: "jewishness", the other side of the moon of Christianity. By this I don't intend to be in any way reductive of the Jewish heritage. What I mean is that jewishness is something hardly independent from the Western heritage and this means from Christian society. Now my idea is that at the heart of this separateness lies the initial rift between the two religions started by Saint Paul, etc.

Maybe a scaled down model of this can be found in the particular view in which the Catholic Church was held in Protestant society at certain times of history. Such derogatory terms as the "catholic superstition", "the whore of Babylon" and the like, were used to define a church in which the Protestant movement had its undeniable roots

Obviously the similarity stops here, because the Catholics had a much mightier presence and influence outside the Protestant area. The Jews instead lost their state at a very early stage but still clung to their religion. In a nutshell, and paradoxically: "jewishness" is nothing but a product of Christianity

PS Please bear in mind that this is just a tentative and condensed explanation and that I cannot unfortunately boast a great reading in Jewish history.

[cerulean]

Originally posted by Vic
Maybe I'm mistaken, but there seem to be more responsible Afgans than Palestinians around too. At least in the West, the Afghans never succumbed to the boundless hate and self-pity of the Palestinian variety. They mostly make a very dignified impression, with their strong authentic identities rooted in old cultural traditions rather than in hatred of "the Other".


I really do not have enough knowledge of enough people to make any definitive statement, but the only Afghan man I have spoken to at length in person and who I see frequently around the neighborhood appears to reflect beliefs that seem to be prevalent in Afghanistan, although he personally fled persecution. He forbids his wife, who dresses in hijaab, to drive a car for one thing. (I don't know her opinion of hijaab, but I somehow doubt she can just give it up if she wants.) He hates the United States (justifably or not?) and sees the US as responsible for 9/11. Outwardly he appears very westernized in appearance and behavior.

Otherwise I can sum up by saying that I know at least some Muslims of varying ethnicities who do not want to import a lifestyle and philosophy that oppresses women, but I can't make any ethnic generalizations about who is doing "best" in this respect.

[Jorge]

In my last post I advanced the idea that, in the situation prevailing in palestinian society, political decisions largely determine economic prospects and not the other way round.

A report prepared by the World Bank titled: Fifteen Months- Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis ¡VAn Assessment, and published January 2002, illustrates quite clearly the above ideas. The full report can be accessed at the WB Web site using Adobe Reader. The following are some quotes:

THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2002-3
Three Scenarios

5.1 Three illustrative scenarios have been developed by the World Bank, and these clearly show the impact of political developments on the economic prospects for the West Bank and Gaza.

„«ƒnThe first scenario assumes a continuation of the status quo pertaining for much of the intifada ¡V i.e. an equivalent level of closure and confrontations with restricted movement of goods and people still possible, continued access by 50,000 laborers to Israel, donor budget support maintained at projected levels (c. US$64 million per month), and no payment of tax revenues due the PA by Israel
.
„«ƒnThe second scenario assumes that there is an early political rapprochement - - leading to a cessation of hostilities, a lifting of closure and a resumption of revenue transfers by Israel.


„«ƒnThe third scenario assumes harsher closure , with armed confrontation resulting in considerable additional physical damage and heavy disruption of trade and movement, along with a virtual closing off of any labor access to Israel and the settlements. Donor budget support would continue at projected levels and there would be no payment of tax revenues due the PA by Israel.

5.2 Several conclusions arise from this exercise. First, a continuation of current
circumstances would further erode the living standards of the population, albeit at a slower pace than during the last year. Second, a lifting of closure would have an immediate and significant economic impact. Third, even if closure is lifted and relations normalize, per capita income will take at least two years to return to pre-intifada levels, and will only do if private sector confidence in the future of the economy can be significantly restored; it would take much longer than two years to restore the real per capita income levels prevailing in
1994. And fourth, a further radical tightening of closure, with or without the demise of the PA, would push the Palestinian economy in a poverty trap in which any prospect of recovery can be forgotten for a long time.

End of quote.

Needless to say, they are not talking here of economic development, that is relevant to the modernization process, but of mere survival of the economy.

The report goes on to analyze in more detail the three scenarios. It does so mainly by inserting into a quantitative economic model that the WB developed, the estimated parameters for the three. This of course is not the place to describe the model and the interested reader is referred to the original publication.

There isn't much point to refer to the first two scenarios because sadly, the development of circumstances led the situation to the third one. Thus we are reduced to compare the predictions of the study with what is actually taken place.
However interesting this academic exercise may be it is immensely regrettable in human terms.

Quote from the World Bank report , pp76:

The Tightened closure/ Pessimistic Scenario

5.9 This is not a sustainable economic scenario in any conventional sense, and would lead in all probability to a gradual fragmentation and dissolution of normal civil governance, capital flight and a reversion from modern business activity into barter trade and subsistence farming.

Donor fiduciary standards would become harder to maintain. Dependence on food aid would grow, as under such conditions a monetized economy has decreasing relevance for many (thus dampening the impact of many conventional donor contributions). Unemployment could climb to over 40 percent by the end of 2002, poverty rates could reach 60 percent of the population, and GNI per capita could fall a further 30 percent, to only half the pre-intifada level.
Considerable physical damage and a dramatic drop in investment would significantly reduce the stock of productive assets, and in turn the ability of the Palestinian economy to recover when the crisis eventually ends.

Fifteen Months ¡V Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis ¡V An Assessment
end of quote

The report goes on to examine a fourth scenario which has even more disastrous economic consequences: number three plus a collapse of the Palestinian Authority.

I'll go into this on another post because this one is becoming a bit too long.

[Mediocrates]

Thank you that was interesting. Not to be discounted is the relative utility of closures. By that I mean, what is the political intent? There are different answers to that. One is "security" close the borders and make it harder for the rats to escape. OK I'll accept that. But Israel also has more far reaching rationale; to disrupt the internal structures in the disputed lands. Apply political pressure through economic pressure.

Where I think people get it wrong is to assume that there is some racial/bigoted/hateful reason behind that. There is not. Its intent is not to torment each and every Palistinian per se but to apply enough pressure to them that will pressure the PA to back down. A kind of blockade if you will. There is a problem with this though and the problem is the trap that your opponent cares as much as you do (Can you imagine a Saddam opening his palaces like Joseph in Egypt to feed the famine ravaged country?, Can you imagine an Arafat prying loose money to improve the lives of the Palistinians?). The PA can outwait any political pressure from the inside based solely on discontent if they believe that the Israelis will never stand to see the Palistinians actually starve - which is actually quite true.

It would take something literally akin to the Romanian uprising where thousands broke into the armories and took the weapons themselves and turned them on the army and on the Communist leaders. Like that's a bad thing. It was over in a month. For a month maybe it's worth it to topple the PA.

Anyway....so closures and economic pressure server a number of purposes; security and pressure (BTW there are still ~50k Palistinians who work on the other side of the Green Line, probably more since there are some who sneak in, down from 150-180k on a daily basis - so it's not a case where the borders are ironclad and shut. It takes much longer and more people are turned back. Also the daily situation is such that cross points open and close at random times).

But this really is the wrong question. The future, whether it's development or mere survival does not lie with a cheap labor economy. A great deal of that cheap labor has been replaced by the Israelis with Thai labor. A very hard lesson I guess for the Palistinians to learn is that the worst sin (for them) in capitalism is to be replaceable. It really doesn't matter how fair you think you should be treated or how special you think your skills are. There is no due. So the key is not to be cheap fungible labor. Even though they enjoyed a better than average standard of living because of it, it doesn't last.

[minusthejihad]

He hates the United States (justifably or not?) and sees the US as responsible for 9/11.

Why the hell do these people get to live here. Including Americans who "hate" America. Move away. Let others who love this country work and enjoy it here. Go away!

[Mediocrates]

Oh who cares. Change the channel. There have been people like that for decades who see everything wrong in the world as something uniquely America's fault. It's a kind of raducalism for the sake of bein radical. They never offer much in the way of alternatives or compromise and carry on endlessly about how the world would be perfect if we just stopped being Americans or eating meat or driving cars or watching TV or growing bug resistant corn or voting or eating or buying clothes made in Malaysia or a million other things that make THEM feel good about THEMSELVES. I listen all day to the long boring reason why I'm supposed to be brow beaten into submission to liberate the lives of cats!! Or why steel workers in Pittsburgh are the reason a single mother in Costa Rica has to go to bed hungry - problem is it's all simplistic narrowminded childish horse****.

Activism is a great thing and we should all feel we can do something about something we care about. I have trouble with the uninformed making irrational statements to the indifferent.

[Jorge]

Continuation of my post # 22

The fourth scenario deals with the financial repercussions of an eventual collapse of the Palestinian Authority. We have to keep in mind that the Report was released in January 2002 ; five months later we are facing a situation where the PA has almost ceased to function, so that this scenario is approximating the actual situation.

Quote from the World Bank Report:

The “Fourth Scenario”/PA Collapse

5.10 While this scenario has too many speculative elements to be worth formally modelling, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the PA might cease to govern. Should this occur, the donors would lose their main conduit for support – the budget channel through the Ministry of Finance. The consequences of a simultaneous collapse of the administration, incomes and
demand would set the peace process back many years and would undo almost all of the post-Oslo economic and institutional gains. While donors would presumably switch their efforts into
emergency support, humanitarian relief and small- scale infrastructure delivered through a mix of
UNRWA, NGOs and local governments, it would not be possible to transfer the same sums as under the first three scenarios.
End of quote.

The Report does not consider the eventuality of a situation whereby it would be up to the Israeli army to carry up the municipal, public health and communication tasks essential for the daily life of the population. This possibility is presently under discussion by the israeli government since the PA is not in a position to carry them out effectively.

It appears unlikely that the "donors" mentioned (EU, UN, Us and other governments and NGO's) would agree to channel their relief funds through Israel. Since Israel is currently facing a serious economic crisis of its own, the State is not in a position to finance the above mentioned tasks. To use an unacademic expression, this is a "hot potato" situation
that nevertheless needs to be tackled urgently, since you cannot leave the local inhabitants in their present state for much longer.

It is sadly ironic that the title of this Thread is the Modernization and the Peace Process; in the light of the events of the last month may be we need another Thread entitled Social Regression and the Peace Process . The opening remarks of that thread could be section 5.9 of the WB report.

Requote:

The Tightened closure/ Pessimistic Scenario

5.9 This is not a sustainable economic scenario in any conventional sense, and would lead in all probability to a gradual fragmentation and dissolution of normal civil governance, capital flight and a reversion from modern business activity into barter trade and subsistence farming.
End of quote.
How does this scenario affects an eventual peace process?

[Gilgamesh]

1. Ani Yehudi me'Israel. Uvda she'Ani Kotev Ivrit
àðé éäåãé îéùøàì. òåáãä ùàðé ëåúá òéáøéú
(I'm a Jew from Israel. Fact is that I write hebrew).

Can "Jorg" too?

2. The financial crisis of the Palstinian is not MY major consern, nor do I think that the world and co. will allow Israel to effectivly menage the civilian life of the Palestinains.

The "palestinian poverty" is not a new one, It was preserved so for centuries by crule and unfit leaders. Poverty is a powerful tool in undemocratic societies, and is a fact.

On top of all, I do not recognize the so-called Palestinains as a seperate national entity, defined and seperated from other nation of the Arab world. The poof is that the PA can not and will not accept centralize "national" goverment, never did, never will. They are nothing but a collection of calns and millitias.

Last but not least: Had the so called Palestinians cared about their own wellfare, they wouldn't start a fight and wouldn't support it for long. If there was peace i.e. not bombings, there would never a need for road blocks and curfews and mass arests of targeted killings of chief terrorists.

Had they really cared about their wellfare and economey, the Arabs would not support curropt and ill functioning ragim. If all fails, they could've revolt against Arafat, start a new.

What ever their "sufferings" are, the could've been prevented by not killing Jews in more then two years of hate crimes of mass murder. The so-called Palsetinians brought their own misforture upon their own heads, and they alone to blame.

As for the peace process, I reckon it won't be done with a single entity, but with a con-federations of towns and villigas and Arab clan leaders, each will have a seperate "Peace treaty" with us Jews.

P.S.

The Arabs condtions are not half the way it depicted. Arab economy is primitive and self-sufficient, they store rain water on roof tops and drink well waters, no many factories, but many work shops and small businesses. The are capeable to supplay most of their simpler need of food by herding sheeps, goats and small scale agriculture: hens and cows in the yards, several dozen olives, a plot of land for weat and barley, things like that. I mean, they are NOT supermarket dependent society: They slay a cow a sheep or a hen when ever they're in need for meat. (Where I must buy me some). Arabs don't "stave".

[Jorge]

To Gilgamesh:
quotes from your post # 27

. The financial crisis of the Palstinian is not MY major consern, nor do I think that the world and co. will allow Israel to effectivly menage the civilian life of the Palestinains.

Allow me to disagree with you in that, as an israeli, the financial crisis of the palestinians should be your major concern. If the "donors" mentioned in the World Bank report I referred to in my former posts, were to stop contributing money to the palestinians, Israel would have no alternative other than "to foot the bill". As long as the Army is occupying the towns and controlling access roads, the welfare of the civilian population is our responsibility as occupying power.
According to General A. Gilad ,head of the (Israeli) Civil Administration in the territories, reinstating military government in the West Bank and taking responsibility for supplying the needs and services of the local population will cost the State treasury between 1 and 2 billion dollars per year. Where is this money going to come from? A fair guess is: additional cuts in education, social welfare, public health, etc. and from higher taxes. In short, from your pocket and from the pockets of the middle class workers. So, you see, it should be really one of your major concerns. (I'm assuming you're middle class and not one of those millionaires who don't have to worry about budget cuts, please correct me if I'm wrong).

The "palestinian poverty" is not a new one, It was preserved so for centuries by crule and unfit leaders. Poverty is a powerful tool in undemocratic societies, and is a fact.
On this I tend to agree with you. There is probably some link between poverty and democracy or the lack of it. As a matter of fact at the beginning of this thread
we started on this connection based on ideas from Fukuyawa and those of Huntington's brought by dafka . Somehow we disgressed from the subject and may be it's high time to get back to it if you're willing.

What ever their "sufferings" are, the could've been prevented by not killing Jews in more then two years of hate crimes of mass murder. The so-called Palsetinians brought their own misforture upon their own heads, and they alone to blame.

Even if we agree on that "they alone are to blame" which of course I don't; where does this lead up to? What do we do next? If we look forward can we see a glimpse of hope? What concrete practical measures could be taken to improve upon the present situation? I think that it would be a good idea to have some threads where those questions are discussed constructively without so much finger- pointing and name- calling.
. This approach may sound a bit technocratic but, After all we have plenty of other threads where we could let run freely our sentiments and prejudices.

[SteveMetch]

Jorge Wrote

“A further complicating factor is that Palestinian society is torn between two fractions that, following Fukuyama, may be described as a fraction that would like to participate in the modernization process and another that strongly rejects it. The latter is made up of radical Muslims that reject the key aspects of Western culture and consider the modernization process as a danger to their religious way of life. They are not fighting Israel only as a colonizer but as a beach head of an infidel (western) culture that could literally pollute their way of life. The former fraction, may be loosely identified politically with the PLO which, being essentially secular in outlook, is willing to go along and promote modernization.”

The heart of the conflict is radical Islam. All talk of peace will be pointless until radical Islam is reduced to less than 10% of the Arab population. For example, the Nazis took over Germany with only 30% of the popular vote. Violent ideologies don’t need a majority to rule vast numbers of generally peaceful or neutral people. Any suggestions on how to reduce the appeal and number of adherents to radical Islam?

[pierom]

Originally posted by SteveMetch

The heart of the conflict is radical Islam. All talk of peace will be pointless until radical Islam is reduced to less than 10% of the Arab population. For example, the Nazis took over Germany with only 30% of the popular vote. Violent ideologies don’t need a majority to rule vast numbers of generally peaceful or neutral people. Any suggestions on how to reduce the appeal and number of adherents to radical Islam?

While I cannot pretend to have any magical solution, I think we have a similar - I dare say successful - example with the IRA in Northern Ireland. Now, after thirty odd years, they are admitting that they were wrong, etc. In Italy we had, in a much smaller scale, a problem of terrorism too.

On the whole, I think that the policiy must necessarily be a clear balance of reward and punishment, with an uninterrupted channel of communication along with it. I think that the battle will be won for Israel if it will succeed in "drying up the water in which the terrorists swim", as the phrase was in Italy.

Now this brings the discussion to the nature of the water in which terrorists swim. I have always felt that all "creative" effort should be dedicated to devising a system of rewards for the Palestinians who accept to denounce terrorism. On the other hand, I believe that heavy repression, involving civilian population, keep the aforesaid "water" flowing and abundant for the terrorist fishes to swim in.

[Jorge]

Quote from Steve Metch post #29:

The heart of the conflict is radical Islam. All talk of peace will be pointless until radical Islam is reduced to less than 10% of the Arab population. For example, the Nazis took over Germany with only 30% of the popular vote. Violent ideologies don’t need a majority to rule vast numbers of generally peaceful or neutral people. Any suggestions on how to reduce the appeal and number of adherents to radical Islam?
The above question may require two separate sets of answers : one regarding to the appeal
and the other to the number of adherents. I don't have an answer to the second and I don't think there is one. Radical Muslims are, by definition, deeply religious people whose radicalism is ingrained in their system of beliefs; moreover it is, in my view, religion at its lowest level. No ethical, philosophical or theological arguments could convince them that they are wrong, no more than you can persuade people from other religions that their beliefs are false. It's after all a question of faith and no persuasion or menaces can work against it.
My negative views however, do not imply that we have to abandon the idea of peace negotiations. We'll just have to device ways of pursuing peace in spite of a substantial influence of radicalized Moslems.

With regard to how to reduce the appeal of radical Islam I think we have more plausible courses of action, since we are talking about people who are not yet converted. These may be secular individuals or non-radicalized Moslems ( I can't think of a proper antonym for radical). The general approach could be on the lines of Pierom's post # 30:

On the whole, I think that the policiy must necessarily be a clear balance of reward and punishment, with an uninterrupted channel of communication along with it. I think that the battle will be won for Israel if it will succeed in "drying up the water in which the terrorists swim", as the phrase was in Italy.
Whatever the actions required, the uninterrupted channel of communication" mentioned above is essential; after all the idea is to convey messages of some sort and messages
need an open channel to be conveyed. It is regrettable that most of the channels that were open after the Oslo agreements are nowadays closed so that the dialogue between the israeli and palestinian societies is practically non-existent. Probably the most fruitful way of conveying messages back and forth is through non-governmental bodies on both sides. Within this context the initiative of the EU of awarding grants for projects of NGO's that could foster dialogue and common actions is an example of concrete steps that may be taken without delay. Further details can be read at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/cgi/frame12.pl

The other essential requirement for "drying up the water" is for information to flow both ways. Messages coming from the palestinian side are of extreme importance for us to gain a greater understanding about their present day society. I am of the opinion that one of our main disadvantages in the present conflict is our ignorance about the processes taking place in the palestinian society. Even worse is the pretentious conviction that"we think we know " and,hence, there is not much point in trying to understand them, since we already do. To give an example close to us, the pages of this Forum are crowded with statements about what the palestinians believe, what are their feelings or motivations and so on; it baffles me how people can acquire such an insight about the inner workings of palestinian minds without ever meeting and talking to some of them.


The former considerations are particularly applicable to the subject of radical Islam. To us westerners,
Moslem religion is essentially foreign; to understand what makes someone to become a Moslem radical, we ought to understand first what is a Moslem. In the West, learned Jews
and Christians can manage to understand the tenets of each other's religions; we have even somehow become acquainted with Hinduism and Sintoism through Yoga, Meditation, Chinese medicine and whatnot. The Way of Life by Lao-Tzu (an admirable book by the way) is far more read in the West than the Koran, to give just one example. In my view one important role of an open channel of communication could be to enable us to hear, from the palestinians themselves, about their various religious attitudes.
Last but not least, when talking about containing radical Islam in Palestine we have to be aware that this is essentially an internal process that, to succeed, has to be carried out
by the palestinians themselves . The role of Israel, other Arab and western countries should be to carry out policies designed with the purpose of helping progressive elements within that society to prevail. Of course this is really an external manipulation of another society but since those radical elements "are out to get us" it should be taken as be taken as self-defence .

To be continued…

[pierom]

One of the problems in dealing with Muslim society is that it is so variegated and has no official head. There is often in the West an instinctive association of the Muslims with the Arabs, and this is obviously wrong. Equally wrong would be to assume that radical Muslims, while apparently converging in their struggle against the western - and first of all the American - influence, are strictly tied to each other.

So. when we talk about radical Muslims, we are really putting together many separate tribes. In Italy, where we have little past experience of Muslim influence, we are now having to reckon with a growing community -mostly from North African countries- that has made this religion by far the second in size, after the Catholics. I believe that great part of these people are a peaceful lot and, if I were to judge by similar processes of assimilation and integration, I would expect that, unless their numbers were to grow out of control, the religious influence would be bound to decline in time. This would probably not be the case if we were to experience massive and uncontrolled immigration, but I do not really anticipate this.

I am writing this because I am trying to apply these categories to the Palestinian society, of which I know very little. There are 2 important differences, however: 1) the Palestinians are experiencing, I am told, a sharp population growth, making this situation more explosive and 2) there is a direct political confrontation with Israel. I think that the first issue is closely tied to the economic conditions, which have been abundantly discussed in this thread, while the second could be addressed by renewed peace talks. I think that the removal of Arafat or at least a reshuffle of the political leadership of the PLO would bring more influential counterparts to the top, which would contribute to the emersion of new visions in the Palestinian society.


I would welcome a participation in this Forum of Palestinians, who could throw more insight into their society and needs.

[Vic]

Jorge,

when you read a report like thisA bomb-making facility was found and destroyed in Jenin, and around 20 Palestinians were detained in raids and operations conducted by the Israel Defense Forces across the West Bank yesterday. One IDF officer sustained light injuries in yesterday's operations.

The bomb factory was uncovered in the morning in the Palestinian legislative council building in Jenin. About 300 kilograms of the TATP compound used in manufacturing explosives was found, along with dozens of containers of acid compounds used for the same purpose. The weapons plant was destroyed by an IDF engineering unit.

http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=192956&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y would you still consider the PA/PLO or anyone "loosely associated" with it a positive force?

[Jorge]

To Vic:

Some time ago you acccused the members of the israeli left
of being insensitive to the killings of isaeli civilians perpetrated
by terrorists.
I told you then that your remarks were particularly offfensive and asked you to withdraw them.
Until you do please refrain from from posting comments
addressed to me because I'll keep ignoring them.

[Vic]

Not an intelligent interpretation of the post, Jorge, but there is nothing I can do about it.

[Jorge]

Continuation from my post #21

In another Thread, Cerulean drew attention to an article from Bernard Lewis entitled
The Roots of Muslim Rage (The Atlantic on line, Sept.,1990) The article makes very interested reading and here are some quotes relevant to the matters we are discussing:

ULTIMATELY, the struggle of the fundamentalists is against two enemies, secularism and modernism. The war against secularism is conscious and explicit, and there is by now a whole literature denouncing secularism as an evil neo-pagan force in the modern world and attributing it variously to the Jews, the West, and the United States. The war against modernity is for the most part neither conscious nor explicit, and is directed against the whole process of change that has taken place in the Islamic world in the past century or more and has transformed the political, economic, social, and even cultural structures of Muslim countries. Islamic fundamentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbed them of their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent even their livelihood.

Extending the above arguments, the declared war of the fundamentalists against Israel is most likely motivated not only by the israeli occupation of the territories but by israelis being perceived (and rightly so) as agents of secularism and modernization. Even if Israel were to withdraw from the territories and a peace process initiated, terrorist attacks would continue, since the perceived menace would still be actual.

Secular elements within the palestinian society, on the other hand, should not have any quarrel with Israel as an agent of modernization. In their case the conflict with us is essentially political and it may reasonably be expected that their support or approval of terrorism will stop in the event of a peace process being re-started. Even more, those same secular sectors within the palestinians are likely to become victims in case the fundamentalists were to gain control of the society.

Within this context, the failure of the policies of Mr. Sharon's government has been to induce those secular elements to ally themselves with the fundamentalists against Israel.
Nothing else could be expected from a policy directed primarily against the PA and based primarily on the use of brute force as opposed to diplomatic initiatives. A more farsighted policy could have resulted in an alliance between palestinian progressive sectors agains a common enemy: radical Islam. This of course would have required an end to occupation and agreements on other issues, that our present government would not even consider.
Thus, at the end of the day, the only victorious parties are the fundamentalist sectors who have managed to unite under their wings both moderate Moslems and secular elements. This through no particular merit of political leadership but mainly because of shortcomings of the israeli policies.

[Jorge]

Since some time has elapsed since the initiation of this thread, I would like to recall one of its main propositions, namely, that the struggle against modernization is a central factors of the arab-israeli conflict. If this is correct, the issue woul split palestinian society in two factions: one, including fundamentalist groups and their supporters,for whom that struggle is one of the main issues and another, including secular elements of the society and some orthodox religious groups, willing to accept and even promote modernization.
Were it not for the active intrusion of Israel, who has managed to unify both factions against it, this conflict would manifest itself as an internal struggle between both sectors of palestinian society.
Regarding the internal struggle just referred to, the following quotes from B. Lewis (from the same Atlantic Monthly article referred to in my post #36), seem quite to the point:

The movement nowadays called fundamentalism is not the only Islamic tradition. There are others, more tolerant, more open, that helped to inspire the great achievements of Islamic civilization in the past, and we may hope that these other traditions will in time prevail. But before this issue is decided there will be a hard struggle, in which we of the West can do little or nothing. Even the attempt might do harm, for these are issues that Muslims must decide among themselves. And in the meantime we must take great care on all sides to avoid the danger of a new era of religious wars, arising from the exacerbation of differences and the revival of ancient prejudices.

To this end we must strive to achieve a better appreciation of other religious and political cultures, through the study of their history, their literature, and their achievements. At the same time, we may hope that they will try to achieve a better understanding of ours, and especially that they will understand and respect, even if they do not choose to adopt for themselves, our Western perception of the proper relationship between religion and politics.

[Mediocrates]

In a synthetic way that is true. One need look no further than any Arab country to see where the main fault lines are.

In 'secular' countries like Syria there is little internal religious struggle, ostensibly held down by force yet the effect of moderization is the struggle for the trappings of westernism; media, education, job mobility, middle class economics.

In less secular countries the struggle is between either a secular government that fights the fundamentalists who fight modernity. What is the nature of that modernity there? It is different it is not about 'people' people are largely left out of the equation (I think). Modernity here equals power, influence, trade with the west, equipment, armies, technology transfer. The fundamentalists are seen as basically primitives who just want a rollback of the last few centuries (Egypt? Algeria?)

Or the other case is where a religious government struggles to maintain their status as the arbiters of truth, virtue and that which is not contaminated by modernity and their opposition is a proto middle class that already has and wants to keep that modernity (I'm thinking of Iran). There is no further goal than that.