second_coming
02-08-2009, 05:43 PM
The Israeli government should have made 2 objectives from the Op, even if it did not make them publiclly the way Olmert did in the 2006 War:
#1) Remove Hamas from power, and replace it with a new, home-grown local authority similar to the way the US instated the new, democratically elected government of Iraq.
Removing Hamas from power should have absolutely been the primary purpose of the operation, since in a few months' time hamas would re-group and would continue to fire rockets into Israel.
Creating a new government that actually took responsibility for governing the strip would have authorized an internal Gazan entity with the task of stopping the rockets and other terrorist attacks.
Of course, it would not have been possible to eliminate EVERY Hamas fighter, but at the least, liquidating the entire leadership should have been the minimally acceptable accomplishment from the operation, so even if a new authority formed that continued to be hostile to Israel, it would understand that further attacks would result in its destruction.
#2) Acquisition of Gilad Schalit. As a deterrant to further kidnappings, nothing works better than a commando operation to recover POWs.
In summary, the operation hammered the Gaza hamas movement, slowed it down a bit, but in the larger context, failed miserably. It also failed by damaging relationships with allies such as Turkey, and sullied its already lukewarm-at-best PR image by using white phospherous in civilian areas.
If nothing else, rather than killing the hamas leadership, it could have embarrassed the UN/ICC lackeys by arresting the major leaders after killing most of the others, and demanding that the ICC/Hague try the senior leaders for Crimes Against Humanity/War Crimes for firing rockets into civilian areas. This would have been a fine opportunity to expose and humiliate the UN/ICC supporters since it is likely they would have refused to place the hamas leadership on trial, showing that the ICC has no interest in justice.
If there is any positive that I can offer with respect to this operation - they handled it better than the 2006 disaster, which is hardly saying much.
#1) Remove Hamas from power, and replace it with a new, home-grown local authority similar to the way the US instated the new, democratically elected government of Iraq.
Removing Hamas from power should have absolutely been the primary purpose of the operation, since in a few months' time hamas would re-group and would continue to fire rockets into Israel.
Creating a new government that actually took responsibility for governing the strip would have authorized an internal Gazan entity with the task of stopping the rockets and other terrorist attacks.
Of course, it would not have been possible to eliminate EVERY Hamas fighter, but at the least, liquidating the entire leadership should have been the minimally acceptable accomplishment from the operation, so even if a new authority formed that continued to be hostile to Israel, it would understand that further attacks would result in its destruction.
#2) Acquisition of Gilad Schalit. As a deterrant to further kidnappings, nothing works better than a commando operation to recover POWs.
In summary, the operation hammered the Gaza hamas movement, slowed it down a bit, but in the larger context, failed miserably. It also failed by damaging relationships with allies such as Turkey, and sullied its already lukewarm-at-best PR image by using white phospherous in civilian areas.
If nothing else, rather than killing the hamas leadership, it could have embarrassed the UN/ICC lackeys by arresting the major leaders after killing most of the others, and demanding that the ICC/Hague try the senior leaders for Crimes Against Humanity/War Crimes for firing rockets into civilian areas. This would have been a fine opportunity to expose and humiliate the UN/ICC supporters since it is likely they would have refused to place the hamas leadership on trial, showing that the ICC has no interest in justice.
If there is any positive that I can offer with respect to this operation - they handled it better than the 2006 disaster, which is hardly saying much.