cerulean
03-04-2003, 04:47 PM
Reading Saddam's Mind
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/03/international/worldspecial3/04GORDON.html?pagewanted=1
KUWAIT CITY — Saddam Hussein's decision last week to move the Adnan Republican Guard division from its base near the northern city of Mosul toward central Iraq has provided the final clue. If attacked, the Iraqi leader does not plan to mount a determined defense of his borders. He plans to make his stand in Baghdad, playing the starring role in a drama that is designed to portray his regime as a victim holding out against an advancing American Army.
It is as much a political strategy as a military one. The regime's political calculation is that it can use a prolonged siege of Baghdad to stir up opposition on the Arab street and in European capitals to the Bush administration's crusade to topple the Iraqi leader. Baghdad's residents, in effect, would be pawns in the game. Their plight would be exploited to elicit the world's sympathy and complicate United States efforts to take the city.
...
There is a cautionary lesson in that experience. Capt. Will Dewes, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Shiloh, offered a wise word of counsel when I visited his Aegis cruiser in the Persian Gulf in October. "The main Iraqi threat as far as I am concerned is something we haven't thought about," he said.
...
"His attitudes toward his own territory and resources are different," Mr. Lang said. "You have to take seriously how he sees himself. What he is working on is building a legend in Arab history, that for 1,000 years Arab schoolchildren will write poetry about him." . . .
It's important to keep in mind Saddam's objectives might not make sense by Western standards. He wants to be a latter-day Saladin, it would seem. He wants to cause suffering to Iraqis, not minimize it. He's the enemy of his own people, and would sacrifice them for victory quite easily.
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/03/international/worldspecial3/04GORDON.html?pagewanted=1
KUWAIT CITY — Saddam Hussein's decision last week to move the Adnan Republican Guard division from its base near the northern city of Mosul toward central Iraq has provided the final clue. If attacked, the Iraqi leader does not plan to mount a determined defense of his borders. He plans to make his stand in Baghdad, playing the starring role in a drama that is designed to portray his regime as a victim holding out against an advancing American Army.
It is as much a political strategy as a military one. The regime's political calculation is that it can use a prolonged siege of Baghdad to stir up opposition on the Arab street and in European capitals to the Bush administration's crusade to topple the Iraqi leader. Baghdad's residents, in effect, would be pawns in the game. Their plight would be exploited to elicit the world's sympathy and complicate United States efforts to take the city.
...
There is a cautionary lesson in that experience. Capt. Will Dewes, the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Shiloh, offered a wise word of counsel when I visited his Aegis cruiser in the Persian Gulf in October. "The main Iraqi threat as far as I am concerned is something we haven't thought about," he said.
...
"His attitudes toward his own territory and resources are different," Mr. Lang said. "You have to take seriously how he sees himself. What he is working on is building a legend in Arab history, that for 1,000 years Arab schoolchildren will write poetry about him." . . .
It's important to keep in mind Saddam's objectives might not make sense by Western standards. He wants to be a latter-day Saladin, it would seem. He wants to cause suffering to Iraqis, not minimize it. He's the enemy of his own people, and would sacrifice them for victory quite easily.