... and the knowledge of the truth shall set you free.

[Johnny Yuma]

An extract of Bernard Lewis’: The Political Language of Islam, pp.72-73

In general, while the sacralization of places is common and widespread in the Islamic world, the sacralization of living persons and human actions is not practiced by Muslims. In particular, the collocation of the adjective “holy” and the substantive “war” does not occur in classical Islamic texts. Its use in the modern Arabic is of recent and extraneous origin.
While, however, the translation “holy war”, like “holy law” is in some measure a distortion, it is by no means, as are some other such attributions, a mere invention. Both renderings, “holy war” and “holy law”, rest on a certain basis of fact. In Western parlance, the adjective “holy”, preceding the word “law”, is necessary, since there are other laws of other origins. In Muslim parlance, the adjective is tautologous. The shari‛a is simply the law, and there is no other. It is holy in that it derives from G_d, and is the external and unchangeable expression of G_d’s commandments to mankind.
It is on one of these commandments that the notion of holy war, in the sense of a war ordained by G_d, is based. The term so translated is jihâd, an Arabic word with the literal meaning of “effort”, “striving”, or “struggle.” In the Qur' ân and still more in the Traditions, commonly though not invariably followed by the words “in the path of G_d,” it has usually been understood as meaning “to wage war.” The great collection of hadîth all contain a section devoted to jihâd, in which the military meaning predominates. The same is true of the classical manuals of shari‛a law. There were some who argued that jihâd should be understood in a moral and spiritual, rather than a military, sense. Such arguments were sometimes put forward by Shi‛ite theologians in classical times, and more frequently by modernizers and reformists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The overwhelming majority of classical theologians, jurists, and traditionists, however, understood the obligation of jihâd in a military sense, and have examined and expounded it accordingly.
In the law books, elaborate rules are laid down governing the initiation, the conduct, and the termination of hostilities, and dealing with such specific questions as the treatment of prisoners and of conquered populations, the punishments of spies, the disposal of enemy assets, and the acquisition and distribution of booty. While the regulations show a clear concern for moral values and standards, it is difficult to accommodate them in a moral and spiritual interpretations of jihâd as such.
According to Muslim teaching, jihâd is one of the basic commandments of the faith, an obligation imposed on all Muslims of G_d, through revelation. In an offensive war, it is an obligation of the Muslim community as a whole (fard kifâya); in a defensive war, it becomes a personal obligation of every adult male Muslim (fard ‛âyn). In such a situation, the Muslim ruler might issue a general call to arms (nafîr ‛âmm). The basis of the obligation of jihâd is the universality of the Muslim revelation. G_d’s word and G_d’s message are for all mankind; it is the duty of those who have accepted them to strive ( jâhada ) unceasingly to convert or at least to subjugate those who have not. This obligation is without limit of time or space. It must continue until the whole world has either accepted the Islamic faith or submitted to the power of the Islamic state.
Until that happens, the world is divided into two: the House of Islam ( dâr al-Islam ), where the Muslims rule and the law of Islam prevails; and the House of War (dâr al-Harb ), comprising the rest of the world. Between the two there is a morally necessary, legally and religiously obligatory state of war, until the final and inevitable triumph of Islam over unbelief. According to the law books, this state of war could be interrupted, when expedient, by an armistice or truce of limited duration. It could not be terminated by a peace, but only by a final victory.



Bernard Lewis is the Cleveland E. Dodge Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.

[Johnny Yuma]

... more from Mr. Lewis:

Of immediate relevance to the political language of Islam is the legal classification of enemies, against whom it is legitimate to wage war. They are of four kinds: the unbeliever, the bandit, the rebel, and the apostate.
Of the four, the unbeliever is, in principle though not always in practice, by far the most important. It is against him that the jihâd par excellance is waged; it is with him that jurists and historians alike are primarily concerned, in their discussions of relations with the foreigner, the outsider, the enemy. The unsubjugated unbeliever is by definition an enemy. He is part of the Dâr al-Harb, “the House of War,” and is designated as a harbî, an attributive form of the word for war. He is sharply differentiated from the dhimmî, the unbeliever who submits to Muslim rule, accepts Muslim protection, and pays the poll tax to the Muslim state. This term derives from the dhimma, a kind of contract between the Muslim state and the leader of a non-Muslim community, by which members of that community are granted certain status, with certain duties and privileges, under Muslim authority.
Between the harbî and the dhimmî, there is a musta`min, a harbî who lives for a while in a Muslim country as a temporary visitor. He is granted safe conduct, allowed to practice his religion, and is exempted from the payment of the poll tax and other disabilities imposed on the dhimmîs. He may enjoy a modified form of the autonomy allowed to the dhimmîs, and band together with others of his own nation to form an autonomous community, subject to their own laws, under governance of a consul appointed by their own ruler. The musta`min is so called because he is the holder of an amân, a “safe conduct”, for entry and temporary residence, issued to a harbî by the Muslim authorities. The amân may be personal, granted to a single individual. It may be collective, granted to a foreign state, which may then extend this privilige to its own citizens traveling abroad. The growth in the later Middle Ages of resident communities of European merchants from Venice, Genoa, and other Christian states was made possible by this procedure.
According to the jurists, the natural and permanent relationship between the world of Islam and the world of unbelievers was one of open or latent war, and there could, therefore, be no peace and no treaty. Truces and temporary agreements were, however, possible, and for these the jurists found precedent in the Qur' ân. The legal term for truce is hudna, from a root meaning “calm” or “tranquillity.” Another term for truce or armistice is sulh. This occurs in the Qur'ân in the sense of a composition or settlement in a dispute over property, and it retains this meaning in later Islamic law. In Islamic law and usage, the status of the conquered lands and peoples depended, in certain significant respects, on whether they had been brought into the House of Islam ‘anwatan, i.e., “by force”, “by assault”, or sulhan, i.e., “by agreement,” which in practice meant “by surrender on terms.” In the form sulha, the latter term figures prominently in Bedouin customary law, to denote the settlement of a tribal feud. In Ottoman texts, sulh was the term commonly used to denote the kind of peace that is concluded between governments.

[Mediocrates]

I deleted the rest of the thread by request. Please start over. Thanks.

[Johnny Yuma]

... continued:


It is now common usage to apply the term “fundamentalist” to a number of Islamic radical and militant groups. The use of this term is established and must be accepted, but it remains unfortunate and can be misleading. “Fundamentalist” is a Christian term. It seems to have come into use in the early years of this century, and denotes certain Protestant churches and organizations, more particularly those which maintain the literal divine origin and inerrancy of the Bible. In this they oppose the liberal and modernist theologians, who tend to a more critical, historical view of the Scripture. Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur'ân, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur'ân, are in principle at least fundamentalists. Where the so-called Muslim fundamentalists differ from other Muslims and indeed from Christian fundamentalists is in the scholasticism and the legalism. They base themselves not only on the Qur'ân, but also on the Traditions of the Prophet, and on the corpus of transmitted theological and legal learning. Their aim is nothing less than to abrogate all the imported and modernized legal codes and social norms, and in their place to install and enforce the full panoply of the shari‛a – its rules and penalties, its jurisdiction, and its prescribed form of government.

[Johnny Yuma]

.... continued:

The distinction between church and state, so deeply rooted in the West, did not exist in Islam, and in classical Arabic, as well as in other languages which derive their intellectual and political vocabulary from classical Arabic, there were no pairs of words corresponding to spiritual and temporal, lay and ecclesiastical, religious and secular. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and then under the influence of Western ideas and institutions, that new words were found, first in Turkish and then in Arabic, to express the idea of secular. Even in modern usage, there is no Muslim equivalent to “the Church,” meaning “ecclesiastical organization.” All the different words for mosque denote only a building which is a place of worship, not an abstraction, an authority, or an institution. One might perhaps discern , in the postclassical evolution of the professional men of religion, some approximation to a clergy, and such terms as “ulema” and “mollahs” almost acquire this sense. But there is no equivalent to the term “laity,” a meaningless expression in the context of Islam. At the present time, the very notion of a secular jurisdiction and authority – of a so-to-speak unsanctified part of life that lies outside the scope of religious law and those how uphold it – is seen as an impiety, indeed as the ultimate betrayal of Islam. The righting of this wrong is the principal aim of Islamic revolutionaries and, in general, of those described as Islamic fundamentalists.

[Johnny Yuma]

... continued:

The fourth category of enemy against whom it is lawful to make war is the apostate – and war against him, unlike the bandit and the rebel and unlike the unbeliever, can rank as jihâd. The unbeliever, kâfir, is anyone who has never accepted Islam. The apostate, murtadd, is one who had been or had become a Muslim, and then had abandoned Islam and adopted another faith or, more commonly, reverted to his previous or ancestral faith. By so doing, he has renounced his allegiance to the Muslim state, and thus has become an enemy against whom it is legitimate, even obligatory, to wage war. It is in this last sense, commonly used of collectivities more than individuals, that the term acquires political significance.
The rules of warfare against the apostate are very much harsher than those governing warfare against the unbeliever. He may not be given quarter or safe conduct, and no truce or agreement with him is permissible. If captured, he is not a prisoner of war. He cannot become a dhimmî, nor can he even hope, like other captives of jihâd, to live on as a slave. The only options before him are recantation or death. He may choose to return to Islam, in which case his offenses commmitted during his apostasy will be pardoned and his confiscated property-or what remains of it- be returned to him. If he refuese, he must be put to death by the sword. The only belligerent right which he shares with other types of enemy is that of sending ambassadors, whose status and immunity are recognized by the law.
Of far greater inportance, of course, are the charges of apostasy leveled against regimes and governments.
In the fourteen centuries of Islamic history, few Muslim governments adhered strictly to shari‛a. But where they failed to conform to the shari‛a, it was by error or avoidance, not by direct challenge, and in certain important areas, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and family life, shari‛a law has generally been applied and enforced in Muslim lands. In the Mongol and Mongol-influenced states of the later Middle Ages, and still more in the modernized Muslim states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, shari‛a law was not merely neglected or tacitly disregarded; it was, in certain important areas, repealed and replaced by other systems of law, of non-Islamic and therefore, by Muslim definition, nondivine origin.
This, from the traditionalist point of view, is the ultimate betrayal, the worst of all disasters, worse even than infidel conquest and rule, since, under a semblance of Islam, it seeks to subvert the loyalty of the Muslims and destroy the faith and law by which they live. Those who impose infidel laws are infidels; if they are or claim to be Muslims, then they are apostates, and must be treated as such.
In 1981, President Anwar al-Sadat, of Egypt, was murdered by four members of an Islamic fundamentalist group. Their case against Sadat is clearly made in their statements during interrogation and the literature produced by their and other similar groups. Sadat, according to them, was a Muslim only in name. By setting aside the shari‛a and its true exponents, and introducing Western and therefore infidel system of law and adjudication, society and culture, he had proved himself to be an apostate.
The apostate is worse than the usurper, worse than the tyrant, worse even than the infidel ruler, in that there are no circumstances in which his rule may be accepted and his orders obeyed. The penalty for apostasy is death, and the basic Muslim duty of “doing what is right and preventing what is wrong” requires the enforcement of that penalty. Similar arguments were used to justify the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, and are being used against other governments in Muslim countries which do not accept the radicals’ interpretation of Islam.
The classical Islamic discussions of the justified war and the laws which regulate its conduct relate almost entirely to struggles against external enemies. The principle of war against the apostate, however, opened the possibility of legitimate, indeed obligatory, war against an enemy at home, which in modern times has been developed into a doctrine of insurgency and revolutionary war as a religion obligation and a form of jihâd.

[Johnny Yuma]

So what does all this have to do with the Road Map to Peace? Peace of what? It’s a piece of sh.t. That’s what it is. It’s worth less than the paper it’s printed on.

1) In Islam, the “struggle” (read “jihad” or “war”, whichever suits you, they mean the same thing) for the conversion and control of the world must continue until the goal is attained. “……this state of war could be interrupted, when expedient, by an armistice or truce of limited duration. It could not be terminated by a peace, but only by a final victory.”
2) “…..the natural and permanent relationship between the world of Islam and the world of unbelievers was one of open or latent war, and there could, therefore, be no peace and no treaty.”
3) “Their aim is nothing less than to abrogate all the imported and modernized legal codes and social norms, and in their place to install and enforce the full panoply of the shari‛a – its rules and penalties, its jurisdiction, and its prescribed form of government.”
4) “……in the modernized Muslim states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, shari‛a law was not merely neglected or tacitly disregarded; it was, in certain important areas, repealed and replaced by other systems of law, of non-Islamic and therefore, by Muslim definition, nondivine origin. This …… is the ultimate betrayal, the worst of all disasters, worse even than infidel conquest and rule, since, under a semblance of Islam, it seeks to subvert the loyalty of the Muslims and destroy the faith and law by which they live. Those who impose infidel laws are infidels; if they are or claim to be Muslims, then they are apostates, and must be treated as such.”
5) “The apostate is worse than the usurper, worse than the tyrant, worse even than the infidel ruler, in that there are no circumstances in which his rule may be accepted and his orders obeyed. The penalty for apostasy is death, and the basic Muslim duty of “doing what is right and preventing what is wrong” requires the enforcement of that penalty. Similar arguments were used to justify the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, and are being used against other governments in Muslim countries which do not accept the radicals’ interpretation of Islam.”
6) “The principle of war against the apostate, however, opened the possibility of legitimate, indeed obligatory, war against an enemy at home, which in modern times has been developed into a doctrine of insurgency and revolutionary war as a religion obligation and a form of jihâd.”



That is the only place the “Road Map” will lead; straight to war. And if you go too far using this "Road Map", before you stop and realize where it's leading you, well, it will cost more lives than if you stop right now....

[rferry]

christians, too, are called on to convert the entire world. a number of religions have launched 'crusades', peaceful and violent, to extend their reach worldwide. they can't quite compete forever. one side must win and i fear that might be atheism. it's sad that they can't recognize the destruction they causing the world and go the route of judaism (or the bahai's) and only request that one special area be for a seven simple laws. but it seems very few are willing to accept people as fellow humans worthy of being protected from violence and all things hateful and selfish, but they use this term 'tolerance' which pretty much means i hate you, but i'll live with you until i or someone else will murder you.

[Johnny Yuma]

Originally posted by rferry
christians, too, are called on to convert the entire world. a number of religions have launched 'crusades', peaceful and violent, to extend their reach worldwide. they can't quite compete forever. one side must win and i fear that might be atheism. it's sad that they can't recognize the destruction they causing the world and go the route of judaism (or the bahai's) and only request that one special area be for a seven simple laws. but it seems very few are willing to accept people as fellow humans worthy of being protected from violence and all things hateful and selfish, but they use this term 'tolerance' which pretty much means i hate you, but i'll live with you until i or someone else will murder you.

I am not a Christian, just to set the record straight, but I was raised in a Christian paradigm, so I can tell you that you are wrong about them being called on to "convert" the world. All they are called on to do is "spread" the gospel; people still retain the choice to accept or reject it, without the penalty of death for the latter. True, in the past, there were crusades, inquisitions, witch hunts, along with poison drinking and snake handling move to Guyana and commit mass suicide lunatic fringe sects, but the reality is that the death penalty for rejection of the Christian message is not canonized as an article of faith in their book.

Otherwise, yes. I believe you are correct on the other point. Tolerance is just a ruse, and if this plays out in the situationally foreclosed Islamic way, it's going to be a very bloody future for the planet Earth. And if you'd like my prediction of which will be the first country in Europe to fall to Islam, without a shot being fired, not that they would try to stop it anyway, it will be France.

In 1995 (8 years ago), already, there were in excess of 5 million Muslims in France. Half of them were ethnic Algerians. Imagine how many there are today. Picture how many will be there in another 10 years. In the not too distant future, France will be a nation of the Maghreb. That might be an improvement.... ;)

[rferry]

France may have a 7% muslim population but it has a rigid tradition of separation of 'church' and state uniting around the french language that will be held on dearly. the Netherlands, on the other hand, is a small socially liberal country with a 5% muslim population. i'd put my bets on France returning to civil war before a Dutch court invokes sharia though.

[Am Yisrael]

In 1995 (8 years ago), already, there were in excess of 5 million Muslims in France. Half of them were ethnic Algerians. Imagine how many there are today. Picture how many will be there in another 10 years. In the not too distant future, France will be a nation of the Maghreb. That might be an improvement.... ;) [/B]

Well I doubt we will be seeing Takeo and Yehudi on this board often. They could have their hands chopped off for taking part on a pro-Israel board.

[Johnny Yuma]

Originally posted by Am Yisrael
They could have their hands chopped off for taking part on a pro-Israel board.

I think this is the most significant aspects of Islam that is being ignored. It is the very essence, above and beyond any socio-economic catalyst, or geographical impetus, for violence against other non-Muslims.

Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur'ân, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur'ân, are in principle at least fundamentalists. Where the so-called Muslim fundamentalists differ from other Muslims and indeed from Christian fundamentalists is in the scholasticism and the legalism. They base themselves not only on the Qur'ân, but also on the Traditions of the Prophet, and on the corpus of transmitted theological and legal learning. Their aim is nothing less than to abrogate all the imported and modernized legal codes and social norms, and in their place to install and enforce the full panoply of the shari‛a – its rules and penalties, its jurisdiction, and its prescribed form of government.

Trying to equate the word nation, when talking about Islam, in comparison with the occidental meaning - i.e., a country with borders, representative government, etc. - flies in the face of the precepts of the faith, because:

".....the very notion of a secular jurisdiction and authority – of a so-to-speak unsanctified part of life that lies outside the scope of religious law and those how uphold it – is seen as an impiety, indeed as the ultimate betrayal of Islam."

The only acceptable form of government outside shari‛a, albeit a temporary one, is the subjugated peoples under the mastery of a Muslim authority. It's just a loophole to excuse having a Las Vegas nearby; a place where they can go and let their hair down, yet still be able to return to their own place and behave piously. Many of us have seen the closed circuit camera footages of those terrorists from 911 in the bars of Key West. How many other times have the rest of us seen other self-proclaimed "devout" Muslims who come to our countries and party their brains out with liquor and the women? There's an old archetype expression that's commonly used in America: Pray on Sunday, sin on Monday.....

[andak01]

Here is a very interesting aside. Professor Lewis has lost a case for being a holocaust denyer, in this case the holocaust of the Turks upon the Armenians.

http://users.ids.net/~gregan/lemd_eng.html

[yehudi]

Originally posted by Am Yisrael
Well I doubt we will be seeing Takeo and Yehudi on this board often. They could have their hands chopped off for taking part on a pro-Israel board. Or, if some kind of Senator McCarthy came back, they could get jailed as communist/terrorists if they lived in the US...

[andak01]

I find the article is informative although somewhat leading.

An extract of Bernard Lewis’: The Political Language of Islam, pp.72-73
In the Qur' ân and still more in the Traditions, commonly though not invariably followed by the words “in the path of G_d,” it has usually been understood as meaning “to wage war.”

This is an assumption. The word has two meanings which for any phrase it is used in, could have one or the other or both.

The great collection of hadîth all contain a section devoted to jihâd, in which the military meaning predominates.

And other sections, totally ignored by modern commentators, where it doesn't. Sharia law is supposed to be all inclusive of any action or state of mankind. War is such a state, therefore it is logical that rules would be applied to this state as well as others in an inclusive system. We don't find it at all strange that the international community has gathered to create a set of rules pertaining to conflict in modern times. Having rules of engagement is an indicator of restraint, not barbarism.

In the law books, elaborate rules are laid down governing the initiation, the conduct, and the termination of hostilities, and dealing with such specific questions as the treatment of prisoners and of conquered populations, the punishments of spies, the disposal of enemy assets, and the acquisition and distribution of booty. While the regulations show a clear concern for moral values and standards, it is difficult to accommodate them in a moral and spiritual interpretations of jihâd as such.

That is patently obvious [these passages refer to warfare], but even Professor Lewis states what I have said all along.

According to Muslim teaching, jihâd is one of the basic commandments of the faith, an obligation imposed on all Muslims of G_d, through revelation. In an offensive war, it is an obligation of the Muslim community as a whole (fard kifâya); in a defensive war, it becomes a personal obligation of every adult male Muslim (fard ‛âyn).

Here we go. The basic commandments of Islam are contained in the five pillars. Jihad IS NOT one of the five pillars. The subject doesn't appear in Bukhari until the 52nd book of Hadith. It isn't understood to BE an offensive war. He certainly cannot produce a verse from the Qur'an or from authenticated sunnah to state that it is.

Until that happens, the world is divided into two: the House of Islam ( dâr al-Islam ), where the Muslims rule and the law of Islam prevails; and the House of War (dâr al-Harb ), comprising the rest of the world.

Small problem, this concept is alien to the Qur'an. It appeared in medieval Islamic philosophy long after the death of Prophet Muhammad (SAW).

[andak01]

Except that the sources for these concepts, which Lewis fails to give are no more related to the religion of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) than the anti-Semitic rantings of Martin Luther are related to the Bible. And as below, he must go all the way to Ottoman texts to find anything to support his arguments. It is certain and agreed upon that the Ottomans had a very different and politicized understanding of Islam than their predecessors.

Originally posted by Johnny Yuma
... more from Mr. Lewis:
In Ottoman texts, sulh was the term commonly used to denote the kind of peace that is concluded between governments.

[Johnny Yuma]

Originally posted by andak01
Here is a very interesting aside. Professor Lewis has lost a case for being a holocaust denyer, in this case the holocaust of the Turks upon the Armenians.

http://users.ids.net/~gregan/lemd_eng.html

The judge certainly didn't think much of the injuries supposedly sustained by the Armenians in reference to the ridiculous charge leveled against Lewis. They definitely didn't have an ambulance-chasing attorney representing the case.

The article and reference thereto are laughable, and are in no way relevant to this thread, with the exception that a charge was put against Lewis in a Kangaroo Court....

Why don't you, instead, address the premises in the text of the opening of the thread, if you have something pertinent to add to this discussion?

[andak01]

Originally posted by Johnny Yuma
... continued:
Their aim is nothing less than to abrogate all the imported and modernized legal codes and social norms, and in their place to install and enforce the full panoply of the shari‛a – its rules and penalties, its jurisdiction, and its prescribed form of government.

The only problem with this statement is that certain Shari'a laws dictate against overthrowing governments and legal systems on a whim. That is one of the reasons that secular states, even oppressive ones, were not overthrown.

As long as Muslims are allowed to practice their religion, there is no problem with the state. Muslims, as they generally do in America and elsewhere can be productive members of Western societies.

[Johnny Yuma]

Originally posted by andak01
The only problem with this statement is that certain Shari'a laws dictate against overthrowing governments and legal systems on a whim.


Be specific as to the wording of the Shari'a law/s you refer to. I, for one, am not willing to "take your word for it." As I understand it, no government outside of one totally Shari'a can be deemed legitimate by faithful Muslims. I welcome and invite you to prove me wrong.

[Johnny Yuma]

Originally posted by andak01
Except that the sources for these concepts, which Lewis fails to give are no more related to the religion of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) than the anti-Semitic rantings of Martin Luther are related to the Bible. And as below, he must go all the way to Ottoman texts to find anything to support his arguments. It is certain and agreed upon that the Ottomans had a very different and politicized understanding of Islam than their predecessors.

Wrong-o..... Absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. Lewis does give his sources (the appendix is as verbose as the body of the text), along with commentary, in minute detail, along with more in-depth discussion of Islam and its effects on not only the Ottomans, but others as well. Go read the book yourself. "The Political Language Of Islam", by Bernard Lewis, The University of Chicago Press.

[Johnny Yuma]

What you will learn, if you actually take the time to read this book (no boys, it's not just some article that I snipped out of some web site), is that Mr. Lewis' goal is not a condemnation of Islam. On the contrary, he speaks of it in simple, factual and respectful terms; glowing terms. I was, frankly, disappointed that he didn't say, "it's evil", or that "it's a bad thing." He goes into great depth as to the rich history and influences on the political language of Islam that come from within and without the Muslim world. His conclusion, at the end of the book involves the difficulties the "moderate" Muslims will have/are having, trying to create tolerant constitutional governments in a secular world and, at the same time, attempting to maintain the law of Islam (shari'a), and of the historical and recent attempts at doing so, and of their outcomes, with fundamentalists movements.

MY conclusion is that it is not possible. His does not go that far....... He simply ends the book by saying, "..... a new Islamic political language is emerging, which owes an unacknowledged debt to the westernizers and secularists of the past century and their foreign sources, as well as to prophetic and classical Islam. Much will depend on their ability to harmonize these different traditions."

Personally, I was disappointed. :rolleyes:

[rferry]

like judaism, much of the development of Islam was formed much later. the diffwerence is that it was formed when they were rich sovereign kingdoms whose culture was well accepted by much of the known world. Muslims that turn to the extrabiblical commentaries will come away with a nationalist feel that is not quite productive in a world where they do not amass the power they once did and their culture is even be renounced by the younger generation. a Islam acceptable for the modern world can happen with much work and dedication. a modern world for Islam as it is now in practice can't.

[Johnny Yuma]

Originally posted by rferry
like judaism, much of the development of Islam was formed much later. the diffwerence is that it was formed when they were rich sovereign kingdoms whose culture was well accepted by much of the known world. Muslims that turn to the extrabiblical commentaries will come away with a nationalist feel that is not quite productive in a world where they do not amass the power they once did and their culture is even be renounced by the younger generation. a Islam acceptable for the modern world can happen with much work and dedication. a modern world for Islam as it is now in practice can't.

I see more problems integrating into a secular world coming from those that feel disenfranchised, than coming from the middle classes or wealthy Muslims. Still, even if some sort of system could be set up where those disenfranchised had more self-esteem, it cannot be denied that there are "the crazies" that are always going to be there to incite the "have-nots", and those that "don't have as much", and those that are easily manipulated, into militants. That, IMO, is the hardest part of this proposed peace.