Mediocrates
09-21-2003, 07:13 AM
http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA14703
On the Refugee Issue and the Right of Return
Ahmad Qurei' - Abu 'Alaa: A Brief Political Profile of the Nominated Palestinian Prime Minister
By: Y. Yehoshua and B. Chernitsky
On September 7, 2003, the Central Council of the Fatah Movement and the PLO Executive Committee approved the appointment of Palestinian Legislative Council Chairman Ahmad Qurei', also known as Abu 'Alaa, to the post of Palestinian prime minister.
Abu 'Alaa's appointment came days after the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) in the wake of severe internal disputes within Fatah. Unlike Abu Mazen's appointment, which followed external pressure and was resented by Yasser Arafat, Abu 'Alaa's appointment was Arafat's choice. The following is a brief political profile of Abu 'Alaa focusing on his positions regarding the conflict with Israel, the peace process, and final status issues:
The Political Process
The Oslo Accords
Abu 'Alaa, one of the architects of the Oslo accords, believes that "the first Intifada is the one that brought Oslo, and this is an important and great accomplishment since it brought achievements without us giving anything in return." [1]
Despite the Al-Aqsa Intifada, he explained, the Oslo accords are still relevant: "The flaw is not in Oslo but in the Israeli policy that is incapable of implementing Oslo and therefore cannot comply with U.N. resolutions…
"Oslo is not dead and it is not ended, because if it were dead or ended, all trace of it would have disappeared. It is true that Israel is trying, and has already tried in the past, to evade all its obligations, but it [Oslo] still is a source of authority and a basis, and still exists and influences Palestinian-Israeli relations, despite Israel's aggression and violations." [2]
Camp David and the Clinton Plan
As a member of the Palestinian negotiating team, Abu 'Alaa discussed the July 2000 Camp David summit on numerous occasions. In an interview with the PA daily Al-Ayyam, Abu 'Alaasaid: "No new Israeli position was presented at the Camp David negotiations. On the contrary; the same unacceptable positions presented in [previous] negotiations were presented [again]." [3]
According to a report by the Omani daily Al-Watan, Abu 'Alaa asserted that he would not agree to what the Israelis proposed at Camp David with the understanding of the Americans "even if it were to be proposed in another 100 years from today, because what is required is a comprehensive and viable peace agreement that provides stability and security for both peoples equally… Barak wanted to reach an agreement with the Palestinians and look like a hero to his people. But his proposals were in no way sufficient for achieving such an agreement. He had illusions that inviting President Arafat to [such] a summit would make him and the Palestinian leadership accept what was offered to them. This did not happen and will not happen." [4]
In an interview with the Lebanese daily Al-Nahar, Abu 'Alaa said that he had anticipated the failure at Camp David and had even tried to get out of participating in it: "There is no doubt that President Clinton was determined to reach a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and invested unusual efforts [in trying to do so], and to this I am a witness. But there was no serious Israeli partner.
"Prior to Camp David, there were serious negotiations in Stockholm. I personally held these negotiations, with [then-Israeli foreign minister] Shlomo Ben-Ami. We did not attain the necessary success, but we made much progress. For example, we agreed that the eastern border of the Palestinian state would run from Beit She'an in the north, to the Dead Sea in the south. Then we turned to the west, and almost reached [an agreement] regarding the western borders. We set out the principle that says that the borders are the 1967 borders with mutual adjustments. This is the first time I am speaking of this matter, because I want to talk about Camp David.
"Twenty days before Camp David, Shlomo Ben-Ami came and said: 'We must go to the Camp David summit.' I said to him: 'If the gap between us is not clear – [even] if the gap is small – it will lead to disaster. It is inconceivable that the leaders will come to the summit to talk about the matter from beginning to end. But if we go to the summit with clear positions – this is another matter.'
"We went to Camp David without clear positions and this is what caused the disaster. I said these things in public after they announced the [American] invitation to Camp David. I tried to get out of participating in the summit, but I went [anyway], and I participated, and there were problems there. The Israelis and the Americans suggested nothing at all to which the Palestinians could have said 'yes,' on various issues, and therefore the summit failed. But this does not mean that we can be blamed for the failure of the summit. Our rights are sacred and we cannot relinquish them. Had Camp David been [just] one round of negotiations, then I would say it was excellent. But as a summit where decisions are made, it was a failure." [5]
On the continuation of the negotiations after the failure of Camp David, he explained: "In order for an additional summit to be convened, the Israeli position must come closer to the Palestinian position, rather than the other way around, because the Palestinians are not the party that surrenders to pressure." He said that the Palestinians wanted to resume the talks "from where they left off," and asserted that the conditional concessions retained their validity. [6] He also said, "The rules of the game have changed. Now there is a need to implement the legitimate international decisions and not return to negotiations according to their former rules… After Camp David, we became convinced that the Israeli government would try to impose its position on the Palestinian side by force. But the experienced Palestinian people thwartedBarak's attempts by adhering to its national principles." [7]
The Palestinian position of rejecting the December 2000 Clinton peace plan was also supported by Abu 'Alaa: "We refused to recognize the Clinton initiative as a basis for negotiation. The Israelis said that it should be seen as a basis [for negotiation], but we rejected this and therefore when Clinton says that 80 percent of the settlers should be absorbed [in the settlement blocs], we ask: According to what standard?! According to what logic? These standards are meaningless and therefore we do not see them as a basis [for negotiations]. The basis, as far as we are concerned, is international legitimacy." [8]
The Final Status Issues
The Permanent Settlement of the Jerusalem Issue
According to Abu 'Alaa, east Jerusalem as a whole, and Al-Haram Al-Sharif in particular – the area of the mosques on the Temple Mount – must be under sole Palestinian sovereignty: "Jerusalem is the most important cause for the Palestinian leadership," he said, "and there can be no peace without Jerusalem, whose return [to the Palestinians] was explicitly mentioned in the international resolutions." [9] He further said, "The Israeli government and its officials must know that the Palestinian state, in the eyes of all the Palestinians in the West Bank, the [Gaza] Strip, and the diaspora – is Jerusalem. The state means Jerusalem, and a state of which Jerusalem is not the capital will not be a state." [10]
East Jerusalem, according to Abu 'Alaa, must be under Palestinian sovereignty and must include Jewish neighborhoods too, such as French Hill and Ramat Eshkol. [11] "When Jerusalem comes up for discussion," he asserted, "the Palestinian side will discuss the Palestinian assets in west Jerusalem, such as Ein Kerem." [12]
In August 2000, Abu 'Alaa claimed that accepting the Israeli compromise proposal at Camp David – according to which there would be Palestinian sovereignty above Al-Haram Al-Sharif and Israeli sovereignty below it – was a betrayal of the faith: "[At Camp David], the Israelis offered Palestinian sovereignty over the ground and Israeli sovereignty underneath the ground. Who would agree to this? They also offered Palestinian sovereignty, and Israeli super-sovereignty. There is no precedent for such a thing. They also offered Palestinian control under Israeli sovereignty, in a sort of diplomatic representation, similar to the status of a Palestinian embassy on Israeli land. Whoever agrees to such offers betrays the faith. They spoke of dividing the city into quarters: the Christian Quarter, the Muslim Quarter, the Jewish Quarter, and the Armenian Quarter. The city has never been divided into quarters as they proposed. If one Israeli soldier stands at one of the gates to the Old City, talk of Palestinian sovereignty is emptied of all substance." [13]
In July 2000, Abu 'Alaa told thePalestinian daily Al-Ayyam: "Jerusalem is presently in danger. A smell of scheming [aimed at] imposing new facts in the city emanates from the American and Israeli proposals, and therefore it is necessary to support the Palestinian position by means of a [united] Islamic decision [by the Islamic states]." [14]
On the Refugee Issue and the Right of Return
Ahmad Qurei' - Abu 'Alaa: A Brief Political Profile of the Nominated Palestinian Prime Minister
By: Y. Yehoshua and B. Chernitsky
On September 7, 2003, the Central Council of the Fatah Movement and the PLO Executive Committee approved the appointment of Palestinian Legislative Council Chairman Ahmad Qurei', also known as Abu 'Alaa, to the post of Palestinian prime minister.
Abu 'Alaa's appointment came days after the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) in the wake of severe internal disputes within Fatah. Unlike Abu Mazen's appointment, which followed external pressure and was resented by Yasser Arafat, Abu 'Alaa's appointment was Arafat's choice. The following is a brief political profile of Abu 'Alaa focusing on his positions regarding the conflict with Israel, the peace process, and final status issues:
The Political Process
The Oslo Accords
Abu 'Alaa, one of the architects of the Oslo accords, believes that "the first Intifada is the one that brought Oslo, and this is an important and great accomplishment since it brought achievements without us giving anything in return." [1]
Despite the Al-Aqsa Intifada, he explained, the Oslo accords are still relevant: "The flaw is not in Oslo but in the Israeli policy that is incapable of implementing Oslo and therefore cannot comply with U.N. resolutions…
"Oslo is not dead and it is not ended, because if it were dead or ended, all trace of it would have disappeared. It is true that Israel is trying, and has already tried in the past, to evade all its obligations, but it [Oslo] still is a source of authority and a basis, and still exists and influences Palestinian-Israeli relations, despite Israel's aggression and violations." [2]
Camp David and the Clinton Plan
As a member of the Palestinian negotiating team, Abu 'Alaa discussed the July 2000 Camp David summit on numerous occasions. In an interview with the PA daily Al-Ayyam, Abu 'Alaasaid: "No new Israeli position was presented at the Camp David negotiations. On the contrary; the same unacceptable positions presented in [previous] negotiations were presented [again]." [3]
According to a report by the Omani daily Al-Watan, Abu 'Alaa asserted that he would not agree to what the Israelis proposed at Camp David with the understanding of the Americans "even if it were to be proposed in another 100 years from today, because what is required is a comprehensive and viable peace agreement that provides stability and security for both peoples equally… Barak wanted to reach an agreement with the Palestinians and look like a hero to his people. But his proposals were in no way sufficient for achieving such an agreement. He had illusions that inviting President Arafat to [such] a summit would make him and the Palestinian leadership accept what was offered to them. This did not happen and will not happen." [4]
In an interview with the Lebanese daily Al-Nahar, Abu 'Alaa said that he had anticipated the failure at Camp David and had even tried to get out of participating in it: "There is no doubt that President Clinton was determined to reach a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and invested unusual efforts [in trying to do so], and to this I am a witness. But there was no serious Israeli partner.
"Prior to Camp David, there were serious negotiations in Stockholm. I personally held these negotiations, with [then-Israeli foreign minister] Shlomo Ben-Ami. We did not attain the necessary success, but we made much progress. For example, we agreed that the eastern border of the Palestinian state would run from Beit She'an in the north, to the Dead Sea in the south. Then we turned to the west, and almost reached [an agreement] regarding the western borders. We set out the principle that says that the borders are the 1967 borders with mutual adjustments. This is the first time I am speaking of this matter, because I want to talk about Camp David.
"Twenty days before Camp David, Shlomo Ben-Ami came and said: 'We must go to the Camp David summit.' I said to him: 'If the gap between us is not clear – [even] if the gap is small – it will lead to disaster. It is inconceivable that the leaders will come to the summit to talk about the matter from beginning to end. But if we go to the summit with clear positions – this is another matter.'
"We went to Camp David without clear positions and this is what caused the disaster. I said these things in public after they announced the [American] invitation to Camp David. I tried to get out of participating in the summit, but I went [anyway], and I participated, and there were problems there. The Israelis and the Americans suggested nothing at all to which the Palestinians could have said 'yes,' on various issues, and therefore the summit failed. But this does not mean that we can be blamed for the failure of the summit. Our rights are sacred and we cannot relinquish them. Had Camp David been [just] one round of negotiations, then I would say it was excellent. But as a summit where decisions are made, it was a failure." [5]
On the continuation of the negotiations after the failure of Camp David, he explained: "In order for an additional summit to be convened, the Israeli position must come closer to the Palestinian position, rather than the other way around, because the Palestinians are not the party that surrenders to pressure." He said that the Palestinians wanted to resume the talks "from where they left off," and asserted that the conditional concessions retained their validity. [6] He also said, "The rules of the game have changed. Now there is a need to implement the legitimate international decisions and not return to negotiations according to their former rules… After Camp David, we became convinced that the Israeli government would try to impose its position on the Palestinian side by force. But the experienced Palestinian people thwartedBarak's attempts by adhering to its national principles." [7]
The Palestinian position of rejecting the December 2000 Clinton peace plan was also supported by Abu 'Alaa: "We refused to recognize the Clinton initiative as a basis for negotiation. The Israelis said that it should be seen as a basis [for negotiation], but we rejected this and therefore when Clinton says that 80 percent of the settlers should be absorbed [in the settlement blocs], we ask: According to what standard?! According to what logic? These standards are meaningless and therefore we do not see them as a basis [for negotiations]. The basis, as far as we are concerned, is international legitimacy." [8]
The Final Status Issues
The Permanent Settlement of the Jerusalem Issue
According to Abu 'Alaa, east Jerusalem as a whole, and Al-Haram Al-Sharif in particular – the area of the mosques on the Temple Mount – must be under sole Palestinian sovereignty: "Jerusalem is the most important cause for the Palestinian leadership," he said, "and there can be no peace without Jerusalem, whose return [to the Palestinians] was explicitly mentioned in the international resolutions." [9] He further said, "The Israeli government and its officials must know that the Palestinian state, in the eyes of all the Palestinians in the West Bank, the [Gaza] Strip, and the diaspora – is Jerusalem. The state means Jerusalem, and a state of which Jerusalem is not the capital will not be a state." [10]
East Jerusalem, according to Abu 'Alaa, must be under Palestinian sovereignty and must include Jewish neighborhoods too, such as French Hill and Ramat Eshkol. [11] "When Jerusalem comes up for discussion," he asserted, "the Palestinian side will discuss the Palestinian assets in west Jerusalem, such as Ein Kerem." [12]
In August 2000, Abu 'Alaa claimed that accepting the Israeli compromise proposal at Camp David – according to which there would be Palestinian sovereignty above Al-Haram Al-Sharif and Israeli sovereignty below it – was a betrayal of the faith: "[At Camp David], the Israelis offered Palestinian sovereignty over the ground and Israeli sovereignty underneath the ground. Who would agree to this? They also offered Palestinian sovereignty, and Israeli super-sovereignty. There is no precedent for such a thing. They also offered Palestinian control under Israeli sovereignty, in a sort of diplomatic representation, similar to the status of a Palestinian embassy on Israeli land. Whoever agrees to such offers betrays the faith. They spoke of dividing the city into quarters: the Christian Quarter, the Muslim Quarter, the Jewish Quarter, and the Armenian Quarter. The city has never been divided into quarters as they proposed. If one Israeli soldier stands at one of the gates to the Old City, talk of Palestinian sovereignty is emptied of all substance." [13]
In July 2000, Abu 'Alaa told thePalestinian daily Al-Ayyam: "Jerusalem is presently in danger. A smell of scheming [aimed at] imposing new facts in the city emanates from the American and Israeli proposals, and therefore it is necessary to support the Palestinian position by means of a [united] Islamic decision [by the Islamic states]." [14]