A new legal reality for the fence

[Ophra]

A new legal reality for the fence

With regrettable tardiness, the government has begun to understand and digest the political and legal ramifications of the ruling by the International Court of Justice against the separation fence. The Hague's justices rule that Israel's activities in the territories are a violation of international law and called for an end to the construction of the fence beyond the Green Line, demolition of those parts of the fence already built and compensation for those Palestinian residents whose interests were harmed by the fence. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the court's conclusions, and soon there will be further debates and deliberations at the UN, where Israel will face the threat of sanctions.

The senior-most legal authorities in Israel who studied the ICJ ruling, say the government must treat the court ruling seriously and behave appropriately. Attorney General Menachem Mazuz wrote in an opinion delivered to the prime minister: "It is difficult to exaggerate the negative ramifications of the ICJ's decision." His words were backed up by a report by senior jurists who warned that The Hague decision "creates a new legal reality, which could be a catalyst for accelerating actions against Israel in international forums, up to and including sanctions." Supreme Court President Justice Aharon Barak joined that approach, ordering the government to explain why it should not avoid building the fence beyond the Green Line and saying "at a certain stage we will have to deal with the decision by the court in The Hague." The Foreign Ministry has also announced the route of the fence will be reexamined to make sure it meets the demands of international law and Israel's High Court of Justice decisions.

This is a striking change to the callous approach originally evinced by Israel in its initial response to The Hague's decision. At first, the government tried to ignore the position of the international community and of the Israeli legal system, which called for Israel to respond to the developments in international law. Mazuz has now called on Ariel Sharon to quickly finish the correction of the fence route and to anchor it in a new government decision that would refer to international law. Sharon is the main culprit responsible for the chain of failures in the matter of the fence. He is the one who delayed its construction during the wave of suicide bombings, and he is the one who set the invasive route that harmed Palestinian lives and was perceived by the world as forcibly annexationist. Sharon and the defense establishment tried to move the route east of the Green Line, to protect as many settlements as possible - ignoring the political ramifications of the fence and the failed information campaign around the world, enabling the Palestinians to portray Israel as the accused in the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice. The ICJ ruling not only rejects the route of the fence, but also Israel's very occupation of the territories and the construction of the settlements.

Sharon has already proved that he can change his position, as he did on the matter of the fence and in his decision for the disengagement plan. He must now display similar leadership and dictate a corrected route for the fence that will preserve its security purpose and reduce its harm to Palestinians and its political damage to Israel. The legal opinions all make clear that government does not have much choice and must work quickly, before the expected UN debates over punishing Israel because of the fence.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/467535.html

[Ophra]

First signs of international sanctions against settlers

Over 115 countries may bar settlers from entering

Ilil Shahar

The Organization of Non-Aligned nations, which includes 115 countries has adopted a resolution calling on its members to bar residents of settlements to enter their countries. The decision was taken at a meeting of the organization’s foreign ministers held in Durban South Africa.

The organization includes several countries popular with Israelis, such as Thailand, India, Nepal and Peru.

The meeting called for a series of economic and political sanctions against Israel, specifically targeting settlements and the security barrier. The resolution was adopted in reaction to Israel’s flouting of the ICJ ruling to dismantle the barrier.

The Foreign ministry has said that it is not overly concerned by this development. “Passports do not say where the person lives, only where it was issued”, said a spokesperson. He said that countries requiring visas could be more problematic, since a visa form has to include exact address of applicant.

The ministry is concerned about longer-term implications. The main fear is that the UN General Assembly may adopt a resolution recommending sanctions against Israel, and that many countries will choose to abide by such a recommendation, even though it is not binding.

http://www.maarivenglish.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=article&articleID=10740

[redcake]

There's no way they can check an address for every tourist and verify which side of the Green Line it sits. This is really a trial to see what they can get away with. They'd like to be able to call Tel Aviv residents "Settlers" too.

One only has to look at the list of 115 nations to find how laughable this is....
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Pakistan, Korea, Cuba, Somalia, South Africa, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Rwanda, Libya .... such bastions of freedom are real hot spots for Jews. We air lift them out, they cut off the tourist visas just in case....

[Ophra]

It says First signs ... ... just the first signs ;)

Also says ... "" The ministry is concerned about longer-term implications. The main fear is that the UN General Assembly may adopt a resolution recommending sanctions against Israel, and that many countries will choose to abide by such a recommendation, even though it is not binding. ""

Nobody in their right mind would call "Tel Aviv residents "Settlers" too."...
don't be silly :rolleyes:

[redcake]

WHen has the UN approached the Mid-East conflict with a "right mind"?

[Hisardut]

just once before it was violated by an influx of non-democratic countries.

[Mediocrates]

June 24, 2004: Peacekeeping operations often have unintended consequences. Case in point is the security fence Israel is erecting around the Arab West Bank. In some cases, the fence is going up between an Israeli Arab village and a Palestinian one. Naturally, the Israeli Arabs (who are citizens of Israel, but tend to be pro-Palestinian), protest the erection of the wall. But once the fence is up, two things are noted. First, there’s less crime. That’s because, without the fence, there’s a constant stream of Palestinians trying to sneak into Israel. The Palestinians would often make unwanted passes at local schoolgirls, and steal things (even cars.) With the fence up, all that stopped. And people noticed it. People also noticed that they could no longer go over into Palestinian villages, where many items were cheaper (because they were often smuggled in, and paid no taxes.) So Israeli Arabs had to do all their shopping in Israel. Not so good for the shoppers, but the local merchants noticed. Unfortunately, few Israeli Arabs speak out publicly about the fence related improvements. It is still not considered politically correct for an Israeli Arab to say anything good about the security fence, so this story only leaked out by word of mouth, as people told close friends about the positive changes. For the Israeli government, this side effect has muted the opposition from Israeli Arabs. Even the Palestinians have some good things to say about the fence. Parents of teenage boys no longer have to worry so much about their sons walking across the border with a gun or bomb, and getting killed in the process. About half the Palestinians support the terrorist attacks against Israelis, but far fewer support sending their own kids to do it.

http://www.strategypage.com//fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=HTUN.HTM

[Canajew]

It says First signs ... ... just the first signs ;)

Also says ... "" The ministry is concerned about longer-term implications. The main fear is that the UN General Assembly may adopt a resolution recommending sanctions against Israel, and that many countries will choose to abide by such a recommendation, even though it is not binding. ""

Nobody in their right mind would call "Tel Aviv residents "Settlers" too."...
don't be silly :rolleyes:
Yassir Arafat, Hamas and the rest of the various Palestinian "leadership" calls people living in tel Aviv and other places in Israel proper settlers all the time.

[Mediocrates]

http://www.twq.com/04autumn/docs/04autumn_gavrilis.pdf

From the Washington Quarterly.

Sharon’s Endgame for the West Bank Barrier

George Gavrilis
George Gavrilis is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at the
University of Texas in Austin. The research on which this article is based was completed
with the support of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University,
where the author was a 2003–2004 national security fellow. The author wishes to
thank Taylor Fravel, Ron Hassner, Yonca Köksal, Sean Lynn-Jones, Ed Miller, Steven
Miller, Jennifer Mitzen, Holger Schmidt, Jack Snyder, Maria J. Stephan, Ann Townes,
Alex Wendt, and Chen Zak for their helpful comments and trenchant criticism.
© 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 27:4 pp. 7–20.

<from part 1, article is 19 pages>

Israel’s construction of the West Bank barrier, which broke ground
in the summer of 2002, has proven the country’s single most-enduring controversy.
Composed of chain-link fences, electronic sensors, tracking paths,
barbed wire, and the occasional concrete wall, the barrier is now nearly halfcomplete.

The international community has condemned the barrier for violating
the Green Line, which has divided Israel from the West Bank and
Gaza since 1948 and which the Palestinian Authority (PA) claims as the
rightful border of a future Palestinian state. Most condemnation additionally
targets the humanitarian suffering the barrier causes Palestinian populations,
such as the restriction of movement between Palestinian towns made
enclaves by the barrier, the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) confiscation of land
and property in the barrier’s projected path, and the fact that large numbers
of Palestinian farmers now have to cross the barrier circuitously to tend to
their crops on the other side.1

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claims that the barrier is a sad
necessity, designed to prevent Palestinian suicide bombers from infiltrating
Israeli population centers and Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Despite
the barrier’s frequent incursions into Palestinian territory, MFA officials insist
that it does not represent a permanent border. They recently renamed
the barrier from the “Security Fence” to the “Anti-terrorist Fence.”2
Palestinian officials vehemently disagree, arguing that what they call the
“Annexation Fence” or “Apartheid Wall” is nothing short of a brazen attempt by Israel’s prime minister, Ariel Sharon, to confiscate land, depopulate
Palestinian areas near the Green Line, facilitate the expansion of Israeli
colonies, and unilaterally redraw borders, leaving the Palestinians with less
territory than previous peace plans envisioned. Once completed, they argue,
the barrier will annex nearly half of the West Bank’s land and most of the
area’s precious aquifers to Israel. Given these high stakes, the PA neglected many of its routine administrative tasks for months on end to prepare its legal case against the barrier at the February 2003 International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearing.

Most world leaders and analysts agree with the Palestinian perspective, believing that Sharon is using the Israeli public’s desire for security to build a fence that will attach to Israel land intended for a future Palestinian state. According to the Arab League, European Union leaders, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the confiscation of land required to build such a barrier and the fence’s obstruction of
free movement can only worsen the economic plight of the Palestinians, spur more violence, and scuttle the chances for peace.3 In July 2004, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion describing the fence as an illegal act and, subsequently, a UN General Assembly vote overwhelmingly called for Israel to take down the barrier.

Yet, contrary to international opinion, the barrier will not prove counterproductive
to overall and final peace between the two sides. The fence is a tool of grand strategy that holds great potential for resolving the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

The barrier isolates outlying and ideologically extreme Jewish settlements in
the West Bank. It excludes them from the fence’s protection and symbolically
places them outside of Israel’s future boundaries. Although these settlements will
temporarily receive IDF protection, the barrier enables their dismantlement.
Moreover, the fence will facilitate the creation of an interim Palestinian state. As Israel completes the fence and removes settlements from the West Bank, the IDF will be able to pull back from substantial portions of that territory, giving the PA political control over largely contiguous territory for the first time in its existence.

The barrier thus makes possible the current disengagement plan and
avoids the mistakes that plagued past peace plans, which called for Israel to
dismantle illegal settlements and for the Palestinians to suppress extremist
groups simultaneously. These terms were unenforceable and hopelessly reciprocal,
providing settlers and extremist groups alike ample incentive and opportunity either to mobilize political opposition or commit acts of violence to derail peace initiatives. The barrier and disengagement plan promise to dispense with such complications and unilaterally remove settlements, reduce terrorism, and enable a provisional Palestinian state. Thus, despite common claims that the fence threatens to retard any progress that has been made toward peace thus far, this controversial mechanism in fact stands the greatest chance of speeding Israel and the Palestinians toward simplified negotiations in the medium term over the singular issue of affixing
final borders.

There is, however, more to the barrier and disengagement plan than the
potential for resolving conflict between the two sides. Although it holds the
key to a Palestinian state, the route of the fence also prejudices the future
boundaries of Israel in a very specific way. In effect, Sharon’s fence not only
might provide the ticket to a final peace but also, as it liberally pierces into
the West Bank, will ensure Israel has a maximalist bargaining position when
final-status negotiations begin. Sharon’s strategy may not be intended, as
many insist, to retain major settlement blocs, but rather to secure the possibility
that Israel can exchange such blocs for the greater Jerusalem area.

[insight]

http://www.twq.com/04autumn/docs/04autumn_gavrilis.pdf

From the Washington Quarterly.

Sharon’s Endgame for the West Bank Barrier

George Gavrilis
George Gavrilis is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at the
University of Texas in Austin. The research on which this article is based was completed
with the support of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University,
where the author was a 2003–2004 national security fellow. The author wishes to
thank Taylor Fravel, Ron Hassner, Yonca Köksal, Sean Lynn-Jones, Ed Miller, Steven
Miller, Jennifer Mitzen, Holger Schmidt, Jack Snyder, Maria J. Stephan, Ann Townes,
Alex Wendt, and Chen Zak for their helpful comments and trenchant criticism.
© 2004 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 27:4 pp. 7–20.

<from part 1, article is 19 pages>

Israel’s construction of the West Bank barrier, which broke ground
in the summer of 2002, has proven the country’s single most-enduring controversy.
Composed of chain-link fences, electronic sensors, tracking paths,
barbed wire, and the occasional concrete wall, the barrier is now nearly halfcomplete.

The international community has condemned the barrier for violating
the Green Line, which has divided Israel from the West Bank and
Gaza since 1948 and which the Palestinian Authority (PA) claims as the
rightful border of a future Palestinian state. Most condemnation additionally
targets the humanitarian suffering the barrier causes Palestinian populations,
such as the restriction of movement between Palestinian towns made
enclaves by the barrier, the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) confiscation of land
and property in the barrier’s projected path, and the fact that large numbers
of Palestinian farmers now have to cross the barrier circuitously to tend to
their crops on the other side.1

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claims that the barrier is a sad
necessity, designed to prevent Palestinian suicide bombers from infiltrating
Israeli population centers and Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Despite
the barrier’s frequent incursions into Palestinian territory, MFA officials insist
that it does not represent a permanent border. They recently renamed
the barrier from the “Security Fence” to the “Anti-terrorist Fence.”2
Palestinian officials vehemently disagree, arguing that what they call the
“Annexation Fence” or “Apartheid Wall” is nothing short of a brazen attempt by Israel’s prime minister, Ariel Sharon, to confiscate land, depopulate
Palestinian areas near the Green Line, facilitate the expansion of Israeli
colonies, and unilaterally redraw borders, leaving the Palestinians with less
territory than previous peace plans envisioned. Once completed, they argue,
the barrier will annex nearly half of the West Bank’s land and most of the
area’s precious aquifers to Israel. Given these high stakes, the PA neglected many of its routine administrative tasks for months on end to prepare its legal case against the barrier at the February 2003 International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearing.

Most world leaders and analysts agree with the Palestinian perspective, believing that Sharon is using the Israeli public’s desire for security to build a fence that will attach to Israel land intended for a future Palestinian state. According to the Arab League, European Union leaders, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the confiscation of land required to build such a barrier and the fence’s obstruction of
free movement can only worsen the economic plight of the Palestinians, spur more violence, and scuttle the chances for peace.3 In July 2004, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion describing the fence as an illegal act and, subsequently, a UN General Assembly vote overwhelmingly called for Israel to take down the barrier.

Yet, contrary to international opinion, the barrier will not prove counterproductive
to overall and final peace between the two sides. The fence is a tool of grand strategy that holds great potential for resolving the long-standing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

The barrier isolates outlying and ideologically extreme Jewish settlements in
the West Bank. It excludes them from the fence’s protection and symbolically
places them outside of Israel’s future boundaries. Although these settlements will
temporarily receive IDF protection, the barrier enables their dismantlement.
Moreover, the fence will facilitate the creation of an interim Palestinian state. As Israel completes the fence and removes settlements from the West Bank, the IDF will be able to pull back from substantial portions of that territory, giving the PA political control over largely contiguous territory for the first time in its existence.

The barrier thus makes possible the current disengagement plan and
avoids the mistakes that plagued past peace plans, which called for Israel to
dismantle illegal settlements and for the Palestinians to suppress extremist
groups simultaneously. These terms were unenforceable and hopelessly reciprocal,
providing settlers and extremist groups alike ample incentive and opportunity either to mobilize political opposition or commit acts of violence to derail peace initiatives. The barrier and disengagement plan promise to dispense with such complications and unilaterally remove settlements, reduce terrorism, and enable a provisional Palestinian state. Thus, despite common claims that the fence threatens to retard any progress that has been made toward peace thus far, this controversial mechanism in fact stands the greatest chance of speeding Israel and the Palestinians toward simplified negotiations in the medium term over the singular issue of affixing
final borders.

There is, however, more to the barrier and disengagement plan than the
potential for resolving conflict between the two sides. Although it holds the
key to a Palestinian state, the route of the fence also prejudices the future
boundaries of Israel in a very specific way. In effect, Sharon’s fence not only
might provide the ticket to a final peace but also, as it liberally pierces into
the West Bank, will ensure Israel has a maximalist bargaining position when
final-status negotiations begin. Sharon’s strategy may not be intended, as
many insist, to retain major settlement blocs, but rather to secure the possibility
that Israel can exchange such blocs for the greater Jerusalem area.


dear Mediocrates....hugs to you...!!!

So you believe in a possible peace ......the fence is necessary absolutely......in my crystal globe....I don't see peace ......but who nows ...even the ussr has recently changed his name.......and Jerusalem will be a hard day night discussion with every one in the world will struggle in order to keep privileges....and not in favor of Israel.......

love you all.....!

Insight

[Mediocrates]

http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/newscontent.php?artid=9787

Gazans Mum On Leaving

Those who would go without a fight stay quiet for fear of reprisals.

Joshua Mitnick - Israel Correspondent

Rafiah Yam, Gaza Strip — Hundreds of Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip would be willing to leave their homes peacefully if Prime Minister Ariel Sharon were to obtain final approval for the move, residents here said, but few are willing to speak openly for fear of being ostracized by neighbors and losing jobs with the local government.

They believe that leaders of Gush Katif want to stifle the voices of residents who are ready to evacuate.

“It’s a definite risk to speak to the media. It means being boycotted,” said Avichai Cohen, a 37-year-old renovation supervisor who said he could be at risk because he is indirectly employed by the regional council on building projects.

“What’s going on here is the opposite of the way it’s being portrayed in the newspapers,” he said. “The spokesperson, the head of the council and his deputies are putting out press statements that no one in Gush Katif is interested in disengagement. That’s not correct.”

The 8,000 Jewish residents living in Gaza have been left dangling by the Sharon government. Although thousands of them have actively protested the government decision, many are resigning themselves to leave even if they are reluctant.

On Sunday, Sharon signaled that he would push ahead with the withdrawal plan despite political difficulties by opening up a new agency to discuss compensation packages for evacuees.

Two days later, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said the army would finalize its plan for the withdrawal by September.

But the government has yet to formally give the green light for the disengagement plan.

That uncertainty is keeping many residents quiet. Last week the danger of coming out openly in favor of disengagement was made starkly clear to Cohen when he attended a parlor meeting sponsored by Shuvi (“come back” in Hebrew), an Israeli activist group that supports a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

The meeting was hosted by Avishai Nativ, a neighbor at the seaside settlement of Rafiah Yam, and was filmed by a camera crew from Israel’s Channel 2 News. When Nativ’s neighbors noticed the unusual number of vehicles parked outside his house, they alerted the regional council.

Within a few minutes, several hecklers outside Nativ’s house shouted “Shuvi, go home!” witnesses said. Policemen also arrived on the scene, complaining that the visitors had parked illegally outside the house.

When the meeting ended and the Shuvi activists set out to go home, Gaza settlers who oppose the disengagement barricaded the entrance to Rafiah Yam and the two sides started scuffling.

Now Nativ, 49, finds himself facing a communitywide boycott.

To be sure, it’s not the first time he’s been at loggerheads with the Gush Katif municipality. Nor is it the first time he’s been ostracized. For years he pursued a lawsuit against the regional council because of a dispute over ownership of his four-bedroom house.

But the day after the parlor meeting, an unsigned leaflet announcing the boycott was posted on public buildings throughout the Gaza settlements. The flier accuses Nativ of slandering the Gaza settlers and falsely claiming that most would elect a voluntary evacuation.

In the leaflet, Nativ’s statements are compared to the biblical spies who spoke disparagingly of the land bequeathed to the ancient Israelites.

The multi-level houses in Rafiah Yam cling to the top of sand dunes and are bracketed by the sea to the north, the Egyptian border to the west and the Palestinian town of Rafah to the south. Nativ, a father of three and a 14-year resident of Rafiah Yam, runs one of three pizzerias in the settlement bloc. But on Sunday night, he received just one pizza order — from soldiers.

“Now we are feeling the results” of the boycott, Nativ said.

Other Gush Katif residents have called his family traitors, his daughters are afraid to leave the house, and his wife, Viviane, is reluctant to discuss the possibility of evacuation out of concern that she could get fired from her job as a caregiver with the regional council.

Eran Shternberg, a spokesman for the Gush Katif municipality, defended settlers who protested the meeting.

Shternberg explained that Shuvi angered local residents several months ago by publishing the telephone numbers of residents who the organization claims would like to leave.

“They can’t expect that they’ll be welcomed with flowers,” said Shternberg, who claimed that 99 percent of the settlers want to stay. “They are media terrorists.”

Shternberg said that if the withdrawal activists were delayed upon leaving the settlement, it was “a mistake” and lasted no more than 15 minutes.

Shuvi spokesman Tom Wegner said they were stranded for approximately three hours in a hostile environment. But any settler who openly talks of evacuation lives with a similar fear on a daily basis.

“There is an air of threat. It’s very hard to explain,” Wegner said. “It’s a small settlement. Everyone knows each other. Everyone is either employed directly or indirectly by the regional council.”

Socrate Shushan and his wife, Brigitte, watched the parlor meeting confrontation develop from their house across the street. They said they were curious to hear from the Shuvi representatives, but stayed away when they realized the meeting was going to be on camera.

The Shushans said they believed that by bringing the media, the pro-withdrawal organization was exploiting local residents for their campaign. But they said they feared of social pressure.

“If I want to say ‘I want to leave,’ no one would buy my fish,’’ said Shushan, a fisherman.

Though Shushan prefers to stay put, he would leave if ordered to do so because he believes the withdrawal will benefit Israel in the long run. But Shushan isn’t calling the government agency to discuss financial compensation just yet.

Instead, he’s investing in his house. Out back, a Palestinian Bedouin lays out ceramic tiles for a patio on a wet bed of cement.

“We’re continuing as normal,” Shushan said. “Who knows if there will even be an evacuation?”

[Mediocrates]

Fence to include major settlement blocs

http://web.israelinsider.com/bin/en.jsp?enZone=Security&enDisplay=view&enPage=ArticlePage&enDispWhat=object&enDispWho=Article^l4102

After reviewing proposals for the revised route of Israel's security barrier, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon instructed the defense establishment to include Maale Adumim, Ariel and Gush Etzion on the "Israeli side" of the fence, media sources reported. Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz yesterday reviewed the proposals, which took into account recent High Court of Justice rulings. In some areas the fence will closely following the 1967 Green Line border.

Yesterday, media sources reported that Sharon instructed the defense establishment not to make substantial changes to the fence's route without government approval. The revised route is due to come up for cabinet approval once all preparatory work is completed.

Sharon apparently gave defense planners specific instructions yesterday to include the major settlement blocs on the "Israeli side" of the barrier. Sharon and Mofaz have repeatedly promised to include Maale Adumim inside the fence. "Plan everything with Maale Adumim inside, and we'll decide later," Sharon reportedly said at the meeting, according to a Haaretz report.

According to Maariv, it has not yet been decided if certain Israeli communities near Maale Adumim, including Kfar Adumim and the Mishor Adumim industrial zone, will be included inside the fence's route. According to Maariv, in certain areas there will be a double fence, with one route following the Jerusalem municipal boundaries and a second fence constructed to enclose Maale Adumim.

In the Gush Etzion area, all Jewish settlements will be included within the fence's route, Sharon and Mofaz decided yesterday. But in the southern Hebron Hills, the fence will more closely follow the 1967 Green Line border, possibly leaving the communities of Carmel, Maon and Sussiya outside the fence.

In the Ariel area, the United States had objected to Israel's construction of "fingers" that reached deep into the West Bank to include Ariel, Immanuel, Kedumim and Karnei Shomron. At yesterday's meeting, Sharon reportedly said, "It's not yet clear how big the finger will be, but Ariel will remain in the fence."

According to Maariv, no decision was reached yesterday regarding the fate of Highway 443, which connects Modiin with northern Jerusalem. Security officials said, however, that there would be no resort but to leave part of the highway outside the fence and to construct special security barriers along its route to protect travelers from stone-throwing attacks, which have increased in recent months.

Security officials said that in yesterday's meeting, no decisions were reached regarding those sections of the fence's route which are considered "controversial" and are being held up due to petitions presented to the High Court of Justice, Maariv reported. These decisions will be reached at a later date, the paper said.

"The security fence is a national project," Mofaz reportedly said at yesterday's meeting. "We must speed up the legal procedures in order to get back to work as soon as possible."

[Mediocrates]

From last month's Hadassah magazine
http://www.hadassah.org/pageframe.asp?section=news&page=per.html&header=per&size=50

Israeli Life: Fencing and Foils
By Rochelle Furstenberg

While the global community rages over Israel’s security barrier, for Israelis the main question is what route the wall will take.

August 9

Yossi Mendellevich, a systems engineer, has come down from Haifa to guide journalists around the security fence. Standing on a grassy lookout point, he points to the barrier stretching between the hills of the Israeli town of Kfar Saba and the Palestinian town of Kalkilya.

It is a quiet, pastoral scene. There is no sign that this is the notorious wall that has been at the center of local and international attention, anathema both to right-wing Israelis fearing the fence will exclude settlements and to Palestinians, who see it as a way to annex land and establish facts on the ground.

In contrast to popular belief, only 5 percent of the barrier is high wall. Most of it is an area of separation about 18-feet wide, with a dirt road for army patrols enclosed by barbed wire and an electronic fence with sensors that record trespassers. Only in places where the residential areas are in range of Palestinian snipers are bordered by a concrete wall. (For more information on the barrier and its route look at www.seamzone.mod.gov.il.)

The fence also signals the end of Israel’s dream that it can live with its neighbors without walls or barriers. Everyone rejoiced in 1967 when the barriers between East and West Jerusalem came down. The Oslo agreements symbolized a new Middle East, but terrorism and the intifada have shattered these illusions. As Amotz Asa-El, executive editor of The Jerusalem Post, has written, “Israelis are building a physical wall because their neighbors will not tear down their mental walls.”

The important thing is that the fence has proven effective; although only a third of it has been built, its presence has already reduced terrorism. The largest section, from Salem near Afula to Elkana near Rosh Ha’ayin, was finished in October 2003 and then extended to Beit She’an in early 2004. And, reports Danny Atar, chairman of the Gilboa regional council, over the past approximately eight months there have been no terror attacks in that region or in the north, no vandalism of agricultural equipment or livestock thefts, and break-ins have dropped to near zero.

“No suicide bombers have succeeded in getting into Kfar Saba, Hadera and Netanya, areas that were…easy targets, since the fence has been built,” says Mendellevich.

Mendellevich’s youngest son, Yuval, was murdered by a suicide bomber on a Haifa bus on March 5, 2003, half a year after his bar mitzva. “Yuvali lost his life because a killer was able to easily make his way around Israel,” says Mendellevich. “He came from Hebron to Abu Dis near Jerusalem. From there he was driven to Haifa to wreak destruction on a bus packed with children coming home from school.

“Yuvali’s death left me with a vacuum,” he says, “a sense of the waste of it all. If I can help get the security fence up and save other lives, then Yuvali’s death was not for nothing.”

Recalls Mendellevich, “Yuvali was a bright, feeling child. On that day, he called me from the bus to tell me he was on his way home. I told him a joke and he said, ‘I love you, Abba.’ Then there was silence. I thought his battery had run out on the cell phone. Then I heard that there had been a suicide bomber on a bus on Moriah Street.

“I traced the Arab boy who had killed him. He came from a respected Hebron family. His mother celebrated her son’s death four days. She received 10,000 Euros from a French Muslim organization. What kind of a monster is she, that she hated my son more than she loved her own?”

The security fence has become the new rallying point for anti-Israel propaganda. The Palestinians brought the issue to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, the legal forum of the United Nations. And in a document that blurs the line between political and legal arguments, the court ruled that the fence is not legitimate and must be torn down. Only one line of its report was devoted to the issue of terrorism.

In a ruling a week earlier, the Israeli Supreme Court, under Aharon Barak, had demanded that 18 miles of the fence northwest of Jerusalem, from Maccabim to Givat Zev, be rerouted because of the Palestinian need for access to agricultural lands, schools and medical facilities. “A balance between humanitarian and security needs must be found,” the ruling advised. Similar cases are pending, and the court will probably demand other changes. But in contrast to the international court, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the barrier is a legitimate means of defense.

Alexander Jacobson, a historian at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, points out that if there had been no terrorism, no attempt to kill as many Israelis as possible, there would be no fence and no inconvenience.

“It’s because [Yasser] Arafat has promoted terrorism,” he says. “There are conflicting rights here, but the ultimate right is the right to life.”

[Mediocrates]

The Palestinians ignore issues of terrorism, focusing instead on the difficulties and changes the barrier has made in the lives of those near its borders, particularly around Jerusalem.

At A-Ram, northwest of Jerusalem, the road to Ramalla is broken up. People wait in long traffic jams as a wall is laid down the center of the road. Ha’aretz writer Danny Rubinstein recently described how 200,000 Palestinians will be forced to go around the wall to checkpoints to get to Jerusalem and neighboring Arab areas. It will be difficult for them to get to family, medical facilities and natural business networks.

A similar problem exists on the southern side of Jerusalem. At the Arab Israeli town of Jabal Mukabar there is a high wall dividing it from Abu Dis, which is in Palestinian territory. A small grocery store sits close to the wall on the Jabal Mukabar side. For all practical purposes, these two towns were one community until last year, with residents from Abu Dis crossing the street to shop at the grocery store or visit friends. Residents from Abu Dis often work in Jerusalem. They must now go around and pass through a military checkpoint to conduct everyday business. The fence was supposed to be built along a municipal border determined in 1967, but the situation became complicated because Arab townships have grown beyond their original borders. Many Palestinians came to Jerusalem for jobs and the social and health benefits.

The grocery store owner does not want to discuss the wall that towers over him. But he has a way of dealing with it; he flashes two identity cards, a blue Jerusalem one and a beige Palestinian Authority card. A Palestinian from Beit Hanina, north of Jerusalem, who has a blue Jerusalem identity card has come to visit his parents in Abu Dis. “I have ways of getting in,” he says. “There are still breaks in the wall or I climb over. I’m 30 and I’ve had to deal with this conflict all my life. My father is 85 and he’s known it all his life, too. But now, my parents are too old and sick and can’t be disconnected from us, so we’re trying to get them permission to move into Jerusalem.”

Major General (Res.) Uzi Dayan, head of the Security Fence Movement, had recommended building a barrier in 2001 when he was national security adviser to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He feels the government has weakened its position by not being sensitive to the disruptions in Palestinian life.

It has alienated us internationally, Dayan explains, and it will delay the building of the fence, since parts have to be rerouted. “It will take time, and time can be blood,” he adds.

Marc Luria, a computer expert, drives to Har Homa every day, where an approximately 20-yard security area, similar to the one at Kalkilya, divides Jerusalem from Bethlehem. He is a strong advocate of the fence—a friend’s daughter was killed at a restaurant bombing—but feels that technology can solve many of the problems.

Luria envisions crossing points where Palestinians can go back and forth with a magnetic card or handprint. “[They] should have been installed along with the fences,” he says. “It would have created a different psychological atmosphere.”

But it’s not just a matter of inconvenience. Palestinians claim the barrier is part of a land grab, that it will not allow for a contiguous Palestinian state. But a glance at the map indicates that this is not true. Eighty percent is within three miles of the Green Line. The problem arises with the zigzags and proposed extentions around the Ariel and Karnei Shomron settlement blocs, which divert the route 12 miles from the Green Line.

Another heated issue is how many Palestinians will remain on the Israeli side of the barrier. Presently, 3,500 Palestinians and 1.5 percent of their land are on the Israeli side of the fence. However, if the fence extends to include Ariel, then 15,000 more Palestinians and 6 percent of West Bank land will be on the Israeli side—not including the 180,000 Palestinians remaining in Jerusalem.

While Israel’s Supreme Court warned “that the fence should not be established for political or diplomatic reasons” and “cannot determine borders,” it would be disingenuous not to acknowledge that the fence will influence the eventual boundaries of the country. It might even be seen as preparing Israelis for borders closer to the pre-1967 line, an eventuality that has loomed over the country since former Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered to consolidate settlements into two large blocs.

Dayan emphasizes that the security fence is part of a larger strategy of disengagement and separation of the Palestinian and Israeli populations. Strangely, disengagement will have far-reaching consequences for Israeli Arabs, whether their primary loyalty is to Israel or the Palestinian Authority.

Some residents of the Israeli Arab town of Umm el Fahm have expressed relief that Palestinians can no longer come across from the territories.

“They stole from us as they did from the rest of the Israelis,” said Tawfiq Karaman, city manager of Umm el Fahm, in a Jerusalem Post interview. “They...used Umm el Fahm as a launching pad for terrorism.”

Another effect of the disengagement is that Israeli Arabs can no longer buy goods in Palestinian towns and have started to rebuild the economy in their own communities. There are also plans to develop industrial parks for Israeli Arabs and Jews.

According to polls, 50 percent of Israeli Arabs concede the need for a fence and 80 percent of the Jewish population support it. Despite the broad support, there is still much debate over the barrier’s route, both because it may include Palestinian areas within its walls and the unnecessary hardships it causes in some places.

The Palestinians claim that the fence will prevent future negotiations. But Dayan sees it as a precondition for any negotiations. “The trust necessary for negotiations can only come when there is no more terror,” he says. “And the fence helps deter terror.”

“We have to be divided from the Palestinians for many years,” Mendellevich insists. “There must be a cooling-off period.”