The Consensus

[Mediocrates]

A brilliant cold eyed analysis of the situation by George Friedman.

THE GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT


The Bush-Kerry Consensus

October 12, 2004



By George Friedman



During the two presidential debates held so far, we have learned three

things. First, that George W. Bush never made a mistake. Second, that John

Kerry would never have made any of the mistakes Bush made, and that he does

not intend to make any mistakes in the future. Third, and most important,

that there is precious little substantial disagreement between the two

candidates on war strategy going forward. Whatever Kerry has had to say about

Bush's execution of the war in the past, he has made it clear that he will

continue what Bush calls the "War on Terror" and that he will not abandon the

war in Iraq.



This last is by far the most important thing to have emerged during the

campaign from a geopolitical and strategic point of view. However much the

candidates argue over who would be better at fighting the war, it has become

clear that the war will go on regardless of who is elected or re-elected --

and that that includes the Iraq campaign. Neither is promising a radical

redefinition of the war. Each is claiming simply to be the more effective in

executing the war.



Therefore, on this fundamental level, the election has become unimportant.

What is important is how the war will be executed after the election. Neither

candidate has been particularly enlightening on this subject. There has been

no substantial discussion of follow-on campaigns or operations either in the

general war or in Iraq. From an American point of view, this should be

comforting. Underneath the storm and stress, the two parties have -- as

unbelievable as this might sound -- agreed that the war must continue

unabated. They have also agreed, in effect, that discussing war plans during

a debate would not serve anyone's interest. For whatever reason -- patriotism

or political expediency -- the campaign is being carried out within careful,

prudent boundaries. The future of the war is not being debated. The campaign

is being confined to vicious personal invective.



Since we know that the war will continue, it falls to us to consider how it

will be executed after Nov. 2. One fundamental fact must be borne in mind:

Since the war will not be abandoned, it will be the war, not the candidates,

that will determine the course of events. What we mean is simply this: The

war has an inherent logic that constrains policymakers. If you continue to

fight this war, there are certain things that you must do, and certain things

that are impossible. The choices are much fewer than what one might imagine.

Therefore, having agreed on the basic strategy that the war will continue,

most of what follows from this decision will apply to either a President Bush

or a President Kerry. If you are going to make fried chicken, there aren't

that many ways to do it.



U.S. and al Qaeda War Aims



The primary American war aim is simple: The United States wants to secure its

homeland against any further attacks by al Qaeda or any other group using its

tactics. It is a clear and simple war aim. The goal is easy to define, but

far more difficult to achieve. The United States is full of potential

targets, and al Qaeda is a very small and dispersed group. Defending the

homeland -- in the sense of physically preventing the penetration of the

United States by al Qaeda operatives -- is difficult to achieve, and it is

even harder to know whether you have achieved it. Since al Qaeda is a global,

sparse network consisting of covert operatives skilled at evading U.S.

intelligence, an offensive strategy is equally difficult to execute. It is

not merely a question of destroying al Qaeda. It is more a matter of knowing

when you have destroyed all of al Qaeda that you need to destroy. At this

point in the war, no reasonable person would claim the United States has

achieved its primary war aim.



Al Qaeda's war aim is more complex. Its goal is to trigger a massive uprising

in the Islamic world that will sweep away at least one and preferably several

existing Muslim governments, replacing them with jihadist regimes. These

countries would serve as the nucleus for the restoration of the Islamic

Caliphate that would both restore the authority of Islamic law -- understood

in al Qaeda's terms -- while setting the stage for the political

reconstruction of Islamic greatness.

[Mediocrates]

Thus far, al Qaeda has failed in its war aim. Contrary to dire forecasts, the

single most important fact of the war has been a negative: There has been no

rising in the Islamic streets of sufficient substance to endanger any

established Islamic government (Iraq is excluded inasmuch as it lacks an

established government). Not a single Islamic government has shifted its

stance in support of al Qaeda while many -- some overtly like Libya, some

covertly like Syria -- have moved toward suppressing al Qaeda on their

territory.



Since al Qaeda initiated the war, it is critically important to understand

that it has completely failed to achieve its strategic goals. From a purely

political standpoint, the war has thus far been a disaster for al Qaeda. At

the same time, assuming that al Qaeda has not lost the ability to carry out

operations, the United States has not yet secured the homeland from follow-on

attack. This is more a military-security failure than a political one, but it

remains a failure. To this moment therefore, al Qaeda is losing the war from

a political point of view, while the United States has failed to win the war

from a military point of view.



Strategies



The American strategy has been driven by a realization that the United States

does not by itself have the intelligence and covert capabilities needed to

destroy the al Qaeda network. Without the active support of Muslim

governments, such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the United States

cannot hope to destroy al Qaeda and secure the homeland. By the same token,

many of these countries have little appetite for a vicious back-alley war

with al Qaeda. Such a war threatens the survival of their regimes by

increasing the chance that either al Qaeda will strike directly at the

political leadership, or that the covert war will trigger a backlash that

will create an uprising among the masses.



U.S. strategy has therefore focused on inducing or coercing these governments

not only to strike out at al Qaeda and jihadists in general, but also to have

them work in tandem with U.S. intelligence so their combined capabilities can

be that much more effective. In order to do this, these countries had to

become certain of three things: First, that the United States would punish

them severely if they did not cooperate; second, that they had more to fear

from the United States than from al Qaeda; and finally, that the United

States was willing to bleed with them.



We can argue endlessly at this point about the wisdom of the Iraq campaign or

about the Bush administration's justifications for it. Stratfor readers know

our view of this well. This fact, however, is incontestable: Prior to the

Iraq campaign, the key country, Saudi Arabia, was not cooperating with the

United States in trying to crush al Qaeda. After the Iraq campaign the Saudis

did begin to cooperate with increasing intensity, the proof of which has been

the jihadist attacks in Saudi Arabia. There were not attacks before the war.

There were increasing attacks after the war. Clearly the Saudis were taking

actions that the jihadists didn't like.



What we are seeing is coalition warfare in the fullest sense. However, it is

not the "traditional allies" (France and Germany) that can bring the needed

resources to bear. It is the Islamic countries whose intelligence services

have the most knowledge of jihadist networks, and who are the most valuable

allies in this war. Coalitions change depending on goals, and in this war

that means joining with Islamic powers.



This is not a coalition of the eager, or even of the willing. In many cases

it is a coalition of the blackmailed, bullied and coerced. Some countries,

like Egypt, are deeply hostile to al Qaeda and the jihadists. Others, like

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, have little appetite for this conflict and will

cooperate only to the extent that they are forced and induced to do so. Al

Qaeda can be crushed only to the extent that these countries are induced to

cooperate. At this moment, most Islamic countries -- even Syria and, at

times, Iran -- have with great reluctance done what they were forced to do.

[Mediocrates]

President Bush or Kerry, if he chooses to continue to prosecute the war, will

have to continue to carry out a strategy of coercion against those Islamic

countries whose participation is essential. It is a fantasy to believe that

countries like Saudi Arabia will risk their internal tranquility on behalf of

the interests of the United States. Their interests diverge from America's.

Therefore, all strategies will have to focus on maintaining the pressure for

cooperation. Kerry will have an opportunity for a few months of creative

diplomacy before returning to this course; Bush will simply continue this

course. But in the end, the United States will have to frighten these

countries more than al Qaeda does, while demonstrating its ability and

willingness to protect the regimes.



If the United States were to simply withdraw from Iraq at this point, it

would undermine U.S. credibility with these regimes. Therefore, as both Bush

and Kerry have stated, they will remain in Iraq. Bush's rhetorical flights

notwithstanding, this will not be about building democracy. The one obvious

lesson learned in Vietnam is that you do not do nation-building in the midst

of a guerrilla war. The purposes of remaining in Iraq now are:



1. Creating a psychological atmosphere in which Islamic countries do not

doubt American will.



2. Setting rational, achievable goals.



3. Matching goals with resources.



Leaving Iraq is not an option. Defining the mission effectively is an option.

The United States will neither bring an end to the guerrilla war, nor will it

bring democracy to Iraq. However, the actual intensity of the guerrilla war,

compared to such wars in Vietnam or Algeria, is much lower. The United States

has -- in about 18 months -- lost fewer than 2 percent dead compared to

Vietnam. The goal for the United States in Iraq is not to end violence but to

reduce U.S. casualties even further. That means reducing the exposure of U.S.

forces by reducing their security responsibilities.



This does not require fully trained Iraqi troops to take the place of U.S.

forces. Since violence cannot be eliminated, trading somewhat higher levels

of violence for lower U.S. casualties is clearly the option that will be

pursued. Bush is currently mounting an offensive to set the stage for this by

attacking guerrilla strongholds. This offensive will create a temporary

window that will allow the United States to become less intrusive; however,

the guerrillas appear to have substantial recuperative powers, at least at

the relatively low levels of effectiveness at which they are currently

operating.



The need to reduce the exposure of U.S. forces by withdrawing to bases -- as

in Afghanistan -- or to the west of the Euphrates is not simply conditioned

by Iraqi reality. It is also conditioned by the U.S. force structure. The

first problem either Bush or Kerry will face as president is the fact that

the U.S. military -- particularly the Army and Marine Corps -- is too small

for the war. A mistake was made under the Bush administration, and will not

be rectified by either president. This will not mean a draft. Apart from

political consequences, this is not World War II. The kind of troops needed

take a long time to train and mature. They need to be highly motivated and

capable. The volunteer force will have to be massively expanded through a

vast increase in the defense budget. Kerry or Bush will propose this early

on.

[Mediocrates]

There is no choice, particularly because al Qaeda's strategy must now be to

counter the United States in the Islamic world. As the attacks in Egypt last

week showed, jihadists are expanding operations in the Islamic world. If they

cannot topple the Saudi, Pakistani or Egyptian governments through an

uprising, they will try to sap their strength through ongoing, low-grade

conflict. At a certain point -- and the point is unpredictable -- the United

States might have to suddenly intervene in any of a host of Islamic countries

in order to stabilize exhausted regimes. At this moment, the United States

does not have the manpower to do so. The expectation that the United States

will have the option of whether to intervene is unrealistic. Events will

determine what the United States has to do, and al Qaeda -- having failed

thus far -- is not giving up. It intends to shape events. This excludes the

possibility that a U.S.-Iranian confrontation might suddenly explode.



If all goes well -- and it has not gone nearly as badly as some would say --

there remains the endgame, in which the United States destroys the command

cell of al Qaeda. That cell is by all reports in northwestern Pakistan, and

the Pakistanis show no appetite for going in and getting it. The United

States will have to commit forces to the task in the end, and right now the

forces aren't there.



Having agreed that the war will continue and that there will be no withdrawal

from Iraq, these things simply follow. The pressure on reluctant allies in

the Islamic world will continue. The United States will not leave Iraq, but

will reduce its exposure. Forces must be held in reserve for al Qaeda

countermoves. Kerry might well hold a meeting with the French. Bush will

undoubtedly make speeches about building democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Politicians must be granted their little pleasures. Democrats seem to love

European summits, which seem to remind them of John F. Kennedy or something.

Republicans love to call things evil, which seems to remind them of evil.

Neither French help nor rhetorical gestures will make the slightest

difference. Whether they know it or not, Bush and Kerry have agreed on one

thing: The only thing they have to offer is blood, toil, sweat and tears.



(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.



http://www.stratfor.com



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(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.





George Friedman is the chairman and chief intelligence officer of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996 that has pioneered the field of private intelligence. As chief intelligence officer, Dr. Friedman guides the strategic vision of the Stratfor intelligence group, helping shape the long-range forecasts as well as overseeing and tasking tactical intelligence operations. His analyses have been widely circulated and are read at the highest levels of governments and military worldwide. He is the author of several books, including The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. He has appeared as a national security and intelligence expert on all major networks and on Lou Dobbs Moneyline and National Public Radio. He has been featured in Barron’s, Time magazine, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times Magazine and many others. Friedman holds a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University.

[Binyamin]

Since we know that the war will continue, it falls to us to consider how it will be executed after Nov. 2. One fundamental fact must be borne in mind: Since the war will not be abandoned, it will be the war, not the candidates, that will determine the course of events. What we mean is simply this: The war has an inherent logic that constrains policymakers. If you continue to fight this war, there are certain things that you must do, and certain things that are impossible. The choices are much fewer than what one might imagine. Therefore, having agreed on the basic strategy that the war will continue, most of what follows from this decision will apply to either a President Bush or a President Kerry. If you are going to make fried chicken, there aren't that many ways to do it."If you continue to fight this war..." There will be a difference here based on why the war is being continued, and with what attitude. If Kerry continues the war only because he knows that he cannot pull out, then he will only be fighting on the lowest possible level. He will not pursue it as far and as strongly as possible. Bush, on the other hand, will fight as much as necessary to attain his goals, and not just hard enough to not lose.

The article seems to consider the war in Iraq and the war on terror interchangable. The analysis it gives treats Iraq as a part of the overall war, and assumes that by staying in Iraq it will be necessary to continue the other areas of the war on terror. Bush would share this viewpoint. Kerry, however, is only committed to sticking it out in Iraq, but he will not be seeing it as part of a larger picture. What he has to do he will do (stay in Iraq), but anything more than that he will deal with independently and with his own approach, i.e. diplomacy.



The technicalities of how to fight the war are not useful campaign material. Much of it would be useless or iincomprehensible to most people. The only important issue is the candidates attitude about the war. Is he going to pursue it proactively? Does he agree in principle? Will he do as much as possible, or as little as possible?

[philingraham]

If it is true that all the candidates have to offer is "blood, sweat, toil and tears" then it will take an unprecedented change of attitude in the mind of the American People. To get the sheer number of "volunteers" the author is talking about could only happen if we were attacked with nuclear weapons in multiple cites with casualties in the millions. But then we are talking about a draft on the scale of WWII, not volunteers. Short of this, no amount of patriotic jawboning about the War on Terror will produce the manpower needed to police the World.

[Mediocrates]

Any plausible tactical approach to the 'war' on terrorism would require highly specialized, trained and positioned special-ops type troops. These are not people you get in any draft. The US has about 48,000 of these kinds of troops. Figure that cross training two Marine Expeditionary units you could get another 4,800.


These groups require a great deal of training, teamwork and motivation. Dropout rate for volunteers is as high as 60%. Ordinary recruits would not do well and it is probably a waste of time and effort to staff this Order of Battle with draftees.

[philingraham]

Any plausible tactical approach to the 'war' on terrorism would require highly specialized, trained and positioned special-ops type troops. These are not people you get in any draft. The US has about 48,000 of these kinds of troops. Figure that cross training two Marine Expeditionary units you could get another 4,800.


These groups require a great deal of training, teamwork and motivation. Dropout rate for volunteers is as high as 60%. Ordinary recruits would not do well and it is probably a waste of time and effort to staff this Order of Battle with draftees.

So, let's say we have about 53,000 such troops on hand right now. To do what Friedman is suggesting we would need about 10 times those numbers. Where do you get these people ? Just what would be their motivation, short of a massive attack on the US ? Totalitarian societies like the Third Reich can use propaganda and coercive methods to produce large numbers of superior soldiers. This not something that we can currently do unless something drastically changes.

Then there is also the question of how to pay for it. So far W's answer to the budget is to cut taxes, increase domestic spending across the board and borrow the difference. Since I can't imagine him raising taxes for anything under any circumstances or cut spending in any meaningful way then the only other alternative is to issue more Treasury Bonds. This amounts to a latter day Ponzi scheme that sooner or later foreign gov'ts will become hip to and start cashing in their old bonds with all the consequences that implies.

I'm all for blood, sweat toil and tears if we can get some leadership willing to make tough choices and sell it to the American People. So far we don't seem to have a Churchillian figure on the horizon. Will it take a massive attack on us to produce one ?

[batyah]

http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0504/dershowitz_oppression_causes_suicide_bombings.php3

http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0404/phillips_lessons_of_terror.php3

http://www.jewishworldreview.com/0904/dunetz_terrorism_not_crime.php3