PCPSR survey #5: Palestinian opinions about bombing, intifada, Israel...

http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p5a.html



Shouldn't shock anyone, more of the same in the same relative ratios. Still a good if you are patient:

Public Opinion Poll # 5

WHILE SHARPLY DIVIDED OVER THE CEASEFIRE AND BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS, AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY SUPPORTS POLITICAL REFORM BUT HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE PA'S INTENTIONS TO IMPLEMENT IT

18-21 August 2002

These are the results of opinion poll # 5, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 18-21 August 2002. The poll deals with the public attitudes toward the peace process and reconciliation, armed confrontations, evaluation of the PA performance, political reform, and the popularity of Arafat, Fateh, and Islamist groups. The total sample size of this poll is 1320 from Palestinians 18 years and older, interviewed face-to-face, in 120 locations in the West Bank (814) and the Gaza Strip (506). The margin of error is 3%.

Table of Contents:

Peace Process and Reconciliation

Jordanian Obstacles to Travel and the Desire to Emigrate

Palestinian Political Reform

Perceptions of Corruption and Democratization

Elections, Popularity of Arafat and Political Affiliation
Main Results





MAIN RESULTS:

I. Peace Process and Reconciliation


48% support, and 50% oppose, the gradual implementation of a ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal from PA areas

43% support, and 53% oppose, internal Palestinian efforts aiming at ending bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel

31% support, and 65% oppose, a security role for Egypt and Jordan in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Only 16% expect return to negotiations and an end to violent confrontations

70% believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not

52% support, and 46% oppose, bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel, but more that 90% support armed attacks against soldiers and settlers

73% support reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples after reaching a peace agreement and the establishment of a Palestinian state

More than two thirds of the Palestinians (70%) continue to believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not. The impact of this belief is seen in the sharp division within the Palestinian society over the gradual implementation of a ceasefire and an Israel withdrawal from PA areas with 48% supporting and 50% opposing it. It can also be seen in the majority opposition to internal Palestinian efforts that seek to build a consensus around the need to put an end to bombing attacks against civilians inside Israel with 53% opposing and 43% supporting such efforts. The results show also that 52% still support bombing attack

against civilians inside Israel. This result is identical to that of our last poll in May 2002. Support for attacks against Israeli civilians reached 58% in December 2001. Support for attacks against soldiers and settlers remained unchanged at 92% and 91% respectively.

Support for the continuation of armed confrontations can also be seen in the opposition of almost two-thirds (65%) to the deployment of Jordanian and Egyptian security trainers in the Palestinian areas. This large opposition may be due to Palestinian belief that the purpose of the deployment of the trainers is to enforce a ceasefire if the need arise. However, despite the efforts to arrange a ceasefire and to deploy Egyptian and Jordanian trainers, only a small minority of 16% expects to see an end to violence and a return to negotiations soon.

Despite the hard-line attitude regarding the ceasefire and the targeting of civilians and despite the low expectations regarding return to negotiations and cessation of violence, almost three-quarters of the Palestinians are still supportive of reconciliation between the two peoples after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state is established and recognized by the state of Israel. However, this commitment to reconciliation, based on a two-state solution, does not mean that all three quarters believe it will actually happen. Indeed, 43% of all Palestinians believe that reconciliation will never happen. Moreover, while support, as in all previous polls, is very high for open borders between the two states (84%) and for joint economic institutions and ventures (68%), only one-third supports taking legal steps to prohibit incitement against Israel (33%). Moreover, only a minority of 22% supports the formation of joint political institutions (aiming at the establishment of a confederation between the two states), and even a smaller minority (8%) supports the adoption of school curriculum that recognizes the state of Israel and does not demand the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians. It is clear that support for reconciliation is motivated by purely cost-benefit calculations.

Support for the gradual ceasefire and Israeli army withdrawal increases in the areas of Jerusalem (60%), Tulkarm (57%), Jenin (56%) and Ramallah (54%) and decreases in Deir al Balah (34%), Bethlehem (41%), Hebron (45%) and Rafah (44%). It also increases in towns and villages (51%) compared to refugee camps (42%); among non-refugees (50%) compared to refugees (45%); among women (53%) compared to men (43%); among illiterates (56%) compared to holders of BA degree (46%); among housewives (54%) compared to professionals (25%); and among supporters of Fateh (57%) and nonaffiliated (52%) compared to supporters of Hamas (40%) and PFLP (30%).

Support for the efforts to create a consensus prohibiting the targeting of Israeli civilians is strongest in the West Bank (48%) compared to the Gaza Strip (37%); in the areas of Jenin (55%), Hebron (54%), Ramallah (53%) and Gaza City (53%) compared to areas of Rafah (24%), Deir al Balah (25%), Khan Younis (29%), Jabalia (35%) and Bethlehem (36%). Support also increases in cities (47%) compared to refugee camps (32%); and among supporters of Fateh (50%) compared to supporters of Hamas (31%).

II. Jordanian Obstacles to Travel and the Desire to Emigrate


31% believe that Jordan is right, and 66% believe it is wrong, in putting obstacles making it difficult to travel from the West Bank to Jordan

19% say that current conditions forces them to seek permanent emigration from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

The results show a clear rejection of the Jordanian position regarding Palestinian travel across the Allenby bridge. Two-thirds believe that Jordan is wrong in putting obstacles making it difficult for Palestinians to travel to Jordan. The survey question pointed out that Jordan imposes such obstacles for fear of Palestinian mass emigration to Jordan. The opposition to the Jordanian policy may be due to the fact that only a minority of 19% thinks of permanently emigrating from the Palestinian areas. For this reason, the majority sees no justification for the Jordanian move. Previous polls conducted before the intifada, between 1998 and 2000, showed that a percentage between 21% and 26% thought of permanently emigrating from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The belief that Jordan is right in putting obstacles to Palestinian travel across the Allenby Bridge increases in the Gaza Strip (41%) compared to the West Bank (24%); among refugees (36%) compared to non-refugees (27%); among illiterates (37%) compared to holders of BA degree (23%), among retired persons (57%) compared to students (21%) and farmers (20%); and among supporters of Fateh (34%) compared to supporters of PFLP (23%) and Hamas (30%).

Desire to emigrate increases among the young (26%) compared to the old (4%); among residents of cities (22%) compared to residents of refugee camps (16%); among men (21%) compared to women (16%); among holders of BA degree (28%) compare to illiterates (5%); among professionals (38%) and craftsmen (30%) compared to farmers (3%); among those who work in the private sector (25%) compared to those working in the public sector (13%); among the unmarried (30%) compared to the married (16%); and among the least religious (38%) compared to the most religious (11%).