Saddam Hussein told Netanyahu in '98 he would not attack Israel

[L@mplighterM]

snip:

Sep. 11, 2002
Saddam Hussein told Netanyahu in '98 he would not attack Israel
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS


Former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said Wednesday he exchanged secret messages with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Netanyahu said that in 1998, it was thought that Saddam might launch a missile attack on Israel, as he had done during the 1991 Gulf War.

Netanyahu said the Iraqi ruler sent a secret message assuring Israel that he had no such intention.

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satelli...=1031666139451

Trust me I’m a doctor!

Whoopeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee! Hussein told Netanyahu that he wouldn’t send Scuds into Israel.

What utter nonsense! Hussein is forking over 25 Grand to suicide bombers and yesterday he (through an agent) was handing out $ 10,000 checks to Palestinians that had been affected by the IDF. This was just a ploy to buy the support of the Palestinians I mean lets get real does Hussein really give a **** what happens to anyone (save some of his family members)?

Put away your gas masks, fill up your fall out shelters and throw away your iodine pills. Don’t worry be happy! This is really going to make the average Israeli sleep better at night.

[DanStrat]

L@mplighterM - Compelling article from Stanly Kurtz - NR. http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz091602.asp

Why we must invade Iraq.

The real reasons for our invasion of Iraq have been — and will be — only partially spelled out by the administration. The president triumphed at the United Nations by proving that, even on the U.N.'s own legal and multilateral terms, an invasion is justified. But we are not going into Iraq to protect the credibility of United Nations resolutions. We are going into Iraq to stop Saddam Hussein from passing weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who will use them against the United States.

But President Bush did not explain the full extent of the danger. Nor will he. For to really explain the danger of unchecked proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states like Iraq, it is necessary to say a whole series of things that the world is uncomfortable hearing. The full explanation of our move against Iraq demands a frank acknowledgment that the United States has become the hegemonic power on which the peace and stability of the world depends. It then becomes necessary to admit how profoundly our seemingly overwhelming military might — and with it, the peace of the world — are threatened by the proliferating technology of mass destruction.

In, "The Future Is Now." There I argued that, even the non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction that Saddam now possesses have the potential to neutralize the armed might of the United States. It isn't necessary for Saddam to pass his chemical or biological weapons to terrorists, or to mount them on intercontinental ballistic missiles. With only the capacity to use his biological and chemical weapons locally, against attacking American troops, Saddam comes close to achieving sufficient deterrence against the full strength of the United States military. That explains a lot about why our military is already reluctant to attack Iraq.

It also explains why it is so urgent that we do attack Iraq. For if we do not, every rogue regime in the world will know that a modest stockpile of chemical and biological weapons will suffice to keep the United States at bay. So the truth is that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction have already succeeded in making an invasion of Iraq riskier than the administration wants to admit. Yet that risk cannot compare to the deeper danger of allowing ourselves to be scared off. For to back down now will start a race among developing nations for weapons of mass destruction that will set the world spinning into chaos.

For a window onto the true and precarious nature of our current situation, there is no better place to turn than Marc Trachtenberg's important (and frightening) article, "Waltzing to Armageddon?" in the Fall 2002 issue of The National Interest. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons" A Debate Renewed, by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. In that book, Waltz claims that the spread of nuclear weapons to developing nations will actually make for a more peaceful world. Sagan disagrees.

Waltz believes that nuclear weapons proliferation to states like Iraq is to be welcomed. Why? Because, once the entire world achieves a balance of terror, all-out-war will come to an end. In a fully nuclear world, war simply becomes too dangerous for any nation to contemplate.

Waltz's argument is obviously flawed, but he makes important points. Waltz notes that the possession of even a limited stockpile of nuclear weapons makes disparities in conventional power effectively meaningless. Even a few primitive nuclear devices would allow Saddam to hold off the U.S. military, no matter how much more powerful we are in strictly conventional terms. Waltz notes that, had Saddam possessed nuclear weapons when he invaded Kuwait, the United States would have had to call off an invasion and confine itself to an economic embargo. (We know how effective that would have been.)

So Waltz thinks that global proliferation would actually stop wars — by creating a kind of massive Mexican standoff.

Sagan counters Waltz by arguing that the balance of terror will eventually break down. Nuclear accidents (including actions by rogue military officers) might lead to an exchange, while the vulnerability of a small nuclear stockpile to a preemptive attack might actually provoke a nuclear first strike. And of course, there is the possibility of a regime secretly passing weapons to terrorists.

All of this is possible. For a potential accident, Sagan points to a Iraqi nuclear device discovered by inspectors in the early nineties. The bomb was so primitive that it might have gone off just by falling off the table. Then there's the possibility of Islamist officers getting their hands on Pakistan's bomb, and either using it directly, or passing it to al Qaeda.

But Trachtenberg points out that Sagan doesn't go near far enough in exposing the fallacies of Waltz's optimistic view. Implicitly, Sagan accepts Waltz's idea that, if a small nation's nuclear forces were both invulnerable to outside attack and protected by a fail-safe command and control system, the balance of terror would in fact bring peace. But Trachtenberg shows that this is not so.

Waltz maintains that no nation facing the balance of terror would dare to start a war. But in the real world, it's hard to say who really starts a war. Often times, two sides threaten each other in protection of their interests, and in the hope or expectation that the other side will eventually back down. War often happens when these calculations go awry, the expected stand-down does not take place, and each side is dragged into a conflict it may not have sought.

It's true that the balance of terror paradoxically worked to keep the peace during the Cold War, but we definitely had some close calls. India and Pakistan face each other directly, and have already been much closer to the nuclear brink than the U.S. and U.S.S.R. ever were - Exception Cuban crisis.

The upshot is that nuclear proliferation does two things. First, it neutralizes conventional might — most especially the overwhelming conventional power of the United States (upon which world peace and stability currently depends). Second, nuclear proliferation both dampens and encourages risk-taking, rewarding states that successfully push to the brink of nuclear war, and frightening the rest into submission. That dynamic, in turn, is deeply dangerous, precisely because it tempts megalomaniacal dictators like Saddam Hussein into playing with fire. Sooner or later, someone like Saddam is bound to miscalculate by taking an aggressive action that provokes a nuclear exchange.

Although the subject has been nuclear proliferation, chemical and biological weapons are already driving us toward a similar dynamic. Simply having the capacity to attack an American invading force with chemical and biological weapons already goes a long way toward neutralizing our conventional advantage. In effect, that has already put this country into the sort of bind, a choice between brinksmanship and intimidation.

Milton Viorst's New York Times article argued against an invasion by painting a worst-case scenario: Saddam hits Israel with chemical weapons; Israel nukes Iraq; Musharraf is overthrown by Islamists, who nuke India. Viorst's piece shows how the existing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction tends to discourage the weak-willed from action, thus rewarding bold brinksmen like Saddam.

The trouble with Viorst is that he only envisions the "worst-case scenario" of an invasion of Iraq. He says nothing about the worst-case scenario that would be provoked by a failure to attack Iraq. Not only would such a scenario involve terrorists using Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on the United States, it includes the impetus that an American retreat would give to the world wide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To stand down now, is to signal every dictator in the world that a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons suffices to neutralize America's conventional might.

So the invasion of Iraq is a test of nerve that we must pass.

The larger point is that the world is entering into an enormously dangerous new era. The end of the Cold War has freed up rogue nations from the need to ally with a major power. That newfound freedom, combined with technological advance and the consequent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adds up to a potential nightmare for the world. If we don't take out Iraq now, the nightmare will quickly engulf us.

This frightening new world has already arrived. Although America's conventional might still counts for much, the existing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is already tending to neutralize our power and throw the world into chaos. It is a mistake to think that the president has recklessly ushered in this change. The administration's doctrine of preemption simply recognizes the reality of proliferation in an unstable environment that has been slowly building since the end of the Cold War, but which has only recently burst upon us with force.

It is clear that an invasion of Iraq is the last best hope for securing a significant delay in the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The closer we get to that world, the more fully we shall be plunged into a balance of terror far more unstable than any during the Cold War era. The world likes to think in terms of multilateral treaties and international law, but the harsh reality of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and the transformation this is working upon the worldwide balance of power, is the real reason why we are invading — and must invade — Iraq.

[gregg]

Dan nice post

[DanStrat]

Originally posted by gregg
Dan nice post

Greg,

Just some rather compelling information to add to the topics and concerns discussed here recently. The thought is to broaden the overall perspective of just how serious these issues are.

[L@mplighterM]

Yes nice post Dan!

It?s good to know that there?s individuals in the world that know exactly what where the dangers lie.


I favor attacking Iraq from the air, ground troops can come at a later date. Preferably it would be one big bang but I guess I?d settle for a whole lot of smaller ones.

[Mediocrates]

Waltz's argument is predicated on cold war era balances of fear based on mutual knowledge of each other's capabilities. Until the late 1950's the US had no credible second strike capability. And this gap is what lead to the development of MAD because it was a assumed that first strike would be met with counterforce before it's effects could be fully realized. And this lead to automated protocols that guaranteed that outcome eg. 'failsafe'. A second strike capability is based on not relying on that immediate counterstrike and absorbing all or most of the first strike.

That kind of confrontation with Saddam breaks down rather quickly if we only think we know what he will do and not what he has. And his motive toward a first strike even a defensive one is murky as well. What would Saddam strike first to protect?

Now the case of bio chem agents in the field; they simply haven't been employed against modern troops prepared against them. They are still the domain of choice against civilians (with the exception that Egypt used them against Yemeni troops 1961-2). So it it not at all clear what their effect will be.

We talk about how the potential of bio chem agents is like the poor man's nuke but that is only against civilian populations in their own countries. Against protected foreign troops in your own country that reality breaks down. An attack on your own soil against foreign troops using bio chem agents will slow them down and probably stop their advance but isn't that tactics and not results?

We have to go back to the prior question - what losses would Saddam absorb on his own soil before doing this, given the dubious outcome of doing it? And that speaks to Waltz's argument of transparency - if we know what Saddam knows we know then the tactics lay themselves out. If not then there is no benefit to Saddam in threatening to use them. If Saddam had WMD in 1991 then it would not have changed the US intent unless he actually used them.

[DanStrat]

Originally posted by L@mplighterM
Yes nice post Dan!

It?s good to know that there?s individuals in the world that know exactly what where the dangers lie.


I favor attacking Iraq from the air, ground troops can come at a later date. Preferably it would be one big bang but I guess I?d settle for a whole lot of smaller ones.

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Indeed I am glad to run across articles like this too. Gives me hope that our Administration has some other bright people surrounding them with the ability to provide some common sense information.

I don't think we will have to resort to a too terribly difficult military resolution with these goobers. A half dozen tank divisions, the navy just off shore, the Air force based Kuwait, some Apache Helicopters, fighter air cover and hundreds of small groups of Marine and Army soldiers would be very, very flexible, fast moving, hard to target by the enemy and I think highly successful. Remember, we could also call this force our "Inspection Force". Any time they fire at our guys we simply clean house and keep the circle closing in on Baghdad and Saddam and his rats. Once close enough, we annihilate him and his Republican Guard. By that time his citizens will probably offer him up to us on a flaming stick.

However, as I mentioned in one of my previous posts I still think that President Bush should go world wide with the statement that we will turn Mecca and Medina into molten glass within 30 minutes if the U.S. is attacked with any form of WMD and we will then turn our military might on the nation or nations responsible for such an attack, or that supported the dogs that made it happen. Currently there is no consequence for terrorist activity; they are all just laughing at us.

[DanStrat]

Originally posted by Mediocrates
Waltz's argument is predicated on cold war era balances of fear based on mutual knowledge of each other's capabilities. Until the late 1950's the US had no credible second strike capability. And this gap is what lead to the development of MAD because it was a assumed that first strike would be met with counterforce before it's effects could be fully realized. And this lead to automated protocols that guaranteed that outcome eg. 'failsafe'. A second strike capability is based on not relying on that immediate counterstrike and absorbing all or most of the first strike.

That kind of confrontation with Saddam breaks down rather quickly if we only think we know what he will do and not what he has. And his motive toward a first strike even a defensive one is murky as well. What would Saddam strike first to protect?

Now the case of bio chem agents in the field; they simply haven't been employed against modern troops prepared against them. They are still the domain of choice against civilians (with the exception that Egypt used them against Yemeni troops 1961-2). So it it not at all clear what their effect will be.

We talk about how the potential of bio chem agents is like the poor man's nuke but that is only against civilian populations in their own countries. Against protected foreign troops in your own country that reality breaks down. An attack on your own soil against foreign troops using bio chem agents will slow them down and probably stop their advance but isn't that tactics and not results?

We have to go back to the prior question - what losses would Saddam absorb on his own soil before doing this, given the dubious outcome of doing it? And that speaks to Waltz's argument of transparency - if we know what Saddam knows we know then the tactics lay themselves out. If not then there is no benefit to Saddam in threatening to use them. If Saddam had WMD in 1991 then it would not have changed the US intent unless he actually used them.

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Mediocrates - Let me get back to you on this. Some good thoughts, but I have been summoned to a meeting. Will get back to you.

[DanStrat]

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mediocrates...Your Post #6
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Clearly I am no military expert or strategist, just a guy with some common sense. I do however think you bring up some good points relative the article from Stanly Kurtz - You're comment -"The balance of fear based on the mutual knowledge of each other's capabilities breaks down "if we only think we know what he will do and not what he has. And his motive toward a first strike even a defensive one is murky as well. What would Saddam strike first to protect?"
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Good questions; things like this happen at the spur of the moment and are constantly changing on a day by day basis during such confrontations. You are right, it would be real nice to "know what he has" and it would be nice to also know what he will most likely do if he were to attempt a first strike, and what would he most likely strike first to protect. My suspicion is that he will most likely do what has worked for him in the past, he will try to scare the hell out of his neighbors, lob a couple of scuds, but this time try to deliver Chemical or bio warheads when he feels his goose is cooked. In as far as a complete first strike at the U.S. I think there is no doubt that he would use a proxy source to deliver a WMD to the shores of the U.S. and quite frankly this could be easily done, even if we knew the day of arrival. One has to think like a mad man in order to calculate his potential actions.

I think you are pretty much correct in your assessment on his use of bio chem. agents in as far as their effectiveness is concerned used against a military force. Makes things a bit more complicated, but maybe most of the danger is in the fear factor, and our military is learning fast how to cope with this threat in the theater of war. Used on us over here could be a little different story however. The choices are many and I am not sure if the guys on the deck of the Kitty Hawk aren't safer than we are back here.
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Your question; "what losses would Saddam absorb on his own soil before doing this, given the dubious outcome of doing it?"
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Realistically I think Saddam only has a concern for himself and about 200 people within the entire population of Iraq and that number would not even include all his immediate family.