Ben-Eliezer expected Interim Peace Plan

[Gatorade]

In the Jerusalem Post today they had an article on what they think the the Binyamin Ben-Eliezer interim peace plan will look like that he will be presenting to the Labor Party central committee.

His Plan (not official but this is what expected and organized for simpliticy) :

1) West Bank

The Palestinian Authority can declare a state on 60-65% of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.

2) Settlements

Israel will evacuate all the settlements in the Gaza Strip, and all isolated settlements in the West Bank. Major settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley would remain under Israeli sovereignty temporarily.

3) Jerusalem

The Palestinians could set up a municipality in east Jerusalem, but Israel would maintain sovereignty until a final peace deal is reached. The status quo of the Temple Mount would remain in place during the interim period. The parameters of the final peace deal would be agreed upon before the interim agreement is implemented.

4) Refugees

Ben-Eliezer interem peace plan will not address the refugee issue, because he does not accept their call for the Palestinians to have a limited right of return.

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What is the ramifications of making Palestine a state? If there are bombings in the future coming from the Palestine nation, what future international issue will there be if Israel has to go back in and get the terrorists since the PA doesn't prevent them and in some cases encourages them?


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[sharonbn]

It seems reasonable plan to me.
However, I fear this will never be acceptable for the Palestinians. Thus this plan takes more of the shaps of a unilateral action than an agreement.

This does not merit the plan as not relevant. IMO, Israel should declare that peace agreement with the Palestinians is not achieveable in the foreseeable future. At least until Arafat is replaced (not by Israel! by the Palestinian people themselves) and the Palestinians foresake their "right of return" claim.

Under this declaration, Israel should draw a comprehensive, long-term (10-15 years) interim plan for the co-existence of Israel and a Palestinian authority. In this context, the so-called "Ben-Eliezer" plan seems like a good enough outline.

I would add a declaration-of-intent from Israel, saying it expects the final permanent peae agreement will be similar to the Barak-Clinton proposals of July 2000 summit. This declaration is meant to ease the worries of the Palestinians that the interim plan is intended to become the final plan.

Also, after the declaration and publishing of the interim plan, Israel should further declare that "we gave up on Yasser Arafat and his leadership. While we do not intend to impose new leadership upon a foriegn nation, we expect the Palestinian people to take action and replace him with a more reasonable person. Until such an action is taken, Israel will not negotiate on the final solution."

[Mediocrates]

Certainly in 10-15 years they would have new leadership by default. And while it's probably neither practical nor advantageous in the long run to attempt to establish a puppet PA government it IS true that the Israelis have some influence and choice in who they deal with and how. Perhaps selective carrots and sticks to specific factions who demonstrate cooperation is a better approach. They are never going to find a Palestinian version of themselves in the PA so they may as well get used to dealing with the least worst among them.

[elena_m]

"will be similar to the Barak-Clinton proposals of July 2000 summit"

have we forgotten that the PA refused to accept the 2000 proposal..

the above plan seems like more of the same

[sharonbn]

Originally posted by elena_m
have we forgotten that the PA refused to accept the 2000 proposal..

the above plan seems like more of the same

Arafat refused to accept the 2000 proposal. Once he is replaced by a more reasonable person, the negotiation can re-commence. I assume the final aggreement will be similar to the 2000 proposal.

[elena_m]

my apologies
but any sane more reasonable person would as well refuse

[Mediocrates]

Why? Because refusal is the official policy perhaps? The PLO has managed to convince the West that inaction is the same as action. Clearly the only thing that will ever bring the PLO to the negotiating table is the reality that there are no longer any other options. The PLOs collaborators in Europe and the mid east must work to convince/persuede/arm-twist the PLO that all other alternatives cannot be supported and until the PLO actually sits and bargains then the PLO cannot be supported either.

For example - some of the EU apologists here will delude themselves into believing that all EU money is accounted for and that it is used only for official purposes. OK let's have an audit of that get the EU to impose restrictions on the PLO if they are caught with their hands in the till. While it may play well with the Red Bandana crowd in the cafes I doubt seriously whether the typical EU'er wants 10 or 20% of the money they give to the PLO to be used to kill people, even if they are Jews.

For example, no matter how moderate they wish us to believe they really are there are significant factions in Iran that openly support with money and materiel terrorist armies in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. Let's impose targetted sanctions against Iran in response. Let's pressure them between the West on one side and Iraq on the other.

For example let's reduce the status of our military technology transfer operations to Saudi Arabia. They are the recipients of weapons technology that isn't even available to the US's own air force a-la the recent transfer of specially designed and built F16s. Let's hold up some maintenance material normally used to keep those fighters airworthy.

No one ever comes to bargain willingly so let's remove all other reasons not to.

At that point the Israelis and the PLO can discuss what they are willing to give up on with the full knowledge that there is no other opportunity to get up from the table. And when or if that process is signed off, make it enforceable. I suspect that even the PLO would begin to negotiate if they realized that their weapons funding was cut off and that their European and Arab masters had an interest in making them make progress.

[elena_m]

your argument being that should they be forced to the bargaining table then negotiations will occur

have you learnt nothing from the past

should a "fair" proposal be presented negotiations can occur

[NewsGuy]

Originally posted by elena_m
should a "fair" proposal be presented negotiations can occur

Most people would say that offering the Palestinians a 98% solution is MORE than fair.

The reason Arafat refused the Israeli offer, was that the offer did not include a guarantee of the destruction of the State of Israel, which is a pre-prequisite to any agreement from Arafat.

And, btw - while I support the immediate removal of Arafat from leadership, I predict that if Arafat is left alive, he will serve as the de facto policy-maker for any future Palestinian leadership, which will function merely as a mouthpiece for Arafat.

[elena_m]

July 8, 2001
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/08/op...searchpv=day01

Fictions About the Failure at Camp David

By ROBERT MALLEY





ASHINGTON — A year ago this week, President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel and the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat gathered at Camp David for what, in retrospect, many consider a turning point in Israeli-Palestinian relations. From right to left, hawks to doves, comes unusual harmony of opinion both here and in Israel: Camp David is said to have been a test that Mr. Barak passed and Mr. Arafat failed. Offered close to 99 percent of their dreams, the thinking goes, the Palestinians said no and chose to hold out for more. Worse, they did not present any concession of their own, adopting a no-compromise attitude that unmasked their unwillingness to live peacefully with a Jewish state by their side.

I was at Camp David, a member of the small American peace team, and I, too, was frustrated almost to the point of despair by the Palestinians' passivity and inability to seize the moment. But there is no purpose — and considerable harm — in adding to their real mistakes a list of fictional ones. Here are the most dangerous myths about the Camp David summit.

Myth 1: Camp David was an ideal test of Mr. Arafat's intentions.

Mr. Arafat told us on numerous occasions that he had not wanted to go to Camp David. He thought that Israeli and Palestinian negotiators had not sufficiently narrowed the gaps separating their positions before the summit, and once there, he made clear in his comments that he felt both isolated from the Arab world and alienated by the close Israeli-American partnership. Moreover, the summit occurred at a low point in Mr. Arafat's relationship with Mr. Barak — the man with whom he was supposed to strike a historic deal. A number of Israeli commitments, including a long-postponed Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and the transfer to Palestinian control of villages abutting Jerusalem, remained unfulfilled, and Mr. Arafat believed that Mr. Barak was simply trying to skirt his obligations. It also took a genuine leap of faith — for Mr. Barak as for the United States — to imagine that the 100-year conflict between Jews and Palestinians living in this region, with roots going back thousands of years more and tens of thousands of victims along the way, could be resolved in a fortnight without any of the core issues — territory, refugees, or the fate of Jerusalem — having previously been discussed by the leaders.

Myth 2: Israel's offer met most if not all of the Palestinians' legitimate aspirations.

Yes, what was put on the table was more far-reaching than anything any Israeli leader had discussed in the past — whether with the Palestinians or with Washington. But it was not the dream offer it has been made out to be, at least not from a Palestinian perspective.

To accommodate the settlers, Israel was to annex 9 percent of the West Bank; in exchange, the new Palestinian state would be granted sovereignty over parts of Israel proper, equivalent to one-ninth of the annexed land. A Palestinian state covering 91 percent of the West Bank and Gaza was more than most Americans or Israelis had thought possible, but how would Mr. Arafat explain the unfavorable 9-to-1 ratio in land swaps to his people?

In Jerusalem, Palestine would have been given sovereignty over many Arab neighborhoods of the eastern half and over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. While it would enjoy custody over the Haram al Sharif, the location of the third- holiest Muslim shrine, Israel would exercise overall sovereignty over this area, known to Jews as the Temple Mount. This, too, was far more than had been thinkable only a few weeks earlier, and a very difficult proposition for the Israeli people to accept. But how could Mr. Arafat have justified to his people that Israel would retain sovereignty over some Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, let alone over the Haram al Sharif? As for the future of refugees — for many Palestinians, the heart of the matter — the ideas put forward at Camp David spoke vaguely of a "satisfactory solution," leading Mr. Arafat to fear that he would be asked to swallow an unacceptable last-minute proposal.

Myth 3: The Palestinians made no concession of their own.

Many have come to believe that the Palestinians' rejection of the Camp David ideas exposed an underlying rejection of Israel's right to exist. But consider the facts: The Palestinians were arguing for the creation of a Palestinian state based on the June 4, 1967, borders, living alongside Israel. They accepted the notion of Israeli annexation of West Bank territory to accommodate settlement blocs. They accepted the principle of Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem — neighborhoods that were not part of Israel before the Six Day War in 1967. And, while they insisted on recognition of the refugees' right of return, they agreed that it should be implemented in a manner that protected Israel's demographic and security interests by limiting the number of returnees. No other Arab party that has negotiated with Israel — not Anwar el- Sadat's Egypt, not King Hussein's Jordan, let alone Hafez al-Assad's Syria — ever came close to even considering such compromises.

If peace is to be achieved, the parties cannot afford to tolerate the growing acceptance of these myths as reality.

The facts do not indicate, however, any lack of foresight or vision on the part of Ehud Barak. He had uncommon political courage as well. But the measure of Israel's concessions ought not be how far it has moved from its own starting point; it must be how far it has moved toward a fair solution.

The Palestinians did not meet their historic responsibilities at the summit either. I suspect they will long regret their failure to respond to President Clinton — at Camp David and later on — with more forthcoming and comprehensive ideas of their own.

Finally, Camp David was not rushed. It was many things — inadequately prepared for, perhaps; too informal, possibly; lacking proper fall-back options, without a doubt — but premature it was not. By the spring of 2000, every serious Israeli, Palestinian and American analyst was predicting an outbreak of Palestinian violence absent a major breakthrough in the peace process. The Oslo process had run its natural course; if anything, tackling the sensitive final status issues came too late, not too soon.



The gloss that is put on the past matters. The way the two sides choose to view yesterday largely will determine how they choose to behave tomorrow. And, if unchallenged, their respective interpretations will gradually harden into divergent versions of reality and unassailable truths — that Yasir Arafat is incapable of reaching a final agreement, for example, or that Israel is intent on perpetuating an oppressive regime. As the two sides continue to debate what went wrong at Camp David, it is important that they get the lessons right.

Robert Malley was special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs to President Bill Clinton from 1998 to 2001. He is joining the Council on Foreign Relations as a senior fellow.

[Mediocrates]

Originally posted by elena_m
your argument being that should they be forced to the bargaining table then negotiations will occur

have you learnt nothing from the past

should a "fair" proposal be presented negotiations can occur

That's nonsense. That's what bargaining is. A common misconception among the PLO's apologists is the "everything, instantly, NOW" syndrome. This is manifest in the view that the PLO really only has to make unilateral demands and sit back and wait for compliance. That is not negotiation. Other than "everything, instantly, NOW" what exactly has the PLO proposed? Another common mistake of the PLO's view of the world is to confuse the goal with the process. The PLO sees no process only the goal. And the goal is absolute. Except of course for the FIRST UN resolution, the one guaranteeing a Jewish state. If you can GUARANTEE a Jewish state then we can negotiate. If not, if you simply resort to table pounding and making vague threats of Palestinian hegemony then I guess you'll continue to sit in squalor. I'm sorry if that offends your delicate Canadian sensibililities, but there it is.

[elena_m]

"NOW"... I suggest you reread the Robert Malley piece

the picture isn't as preety as you'd like to depict

as for your "canadian sensibilities" comment....do you expect a similar childish rebuttal on my part?

[NewsGuy]

Originally posted by elena_m
July 8, 2001
[url]Fictions About the Failure at Camp David
By ROBERT MALLEY

I think that something you will learn very quickly is that when you copy-and-paste an opinion piece like the one above, then there is always another opinion piece that supports the opposing point of view.

Here's Dennis Ross who was also there, at the center of the Camp David talks, who tells the press in a live interview about the lies and myths spread by the Palestinians about what happened. Of course, Ross' account shows your article to be entirely false.

Myths of the Intifada
by Fred Barnes
Weekly Standard

"PALESTINIAN and other apologists for Yasser Arafat have propagated three myths about his failure to reach peace with Israel. And only now--two years after Israeli-Palestinian peace talks collapsed because of Arafat's intransigence--is the truth becoming known. This is mostly thanks to Dennis Ross, the Middle East negotiator for both the first Bush administration and President Clinton...

Arafat said no and didn't make a counteroffer. Instead, in September, he started a violent new intifada, or insurrection, against Israel. But the myth, persistently voiced by such Arafat sympathizers as James Zogby of the Arab American Institute and the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, is that this was the final peace proposal. It wasn't...

In December 2000, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were brought to Washington. And on December 23, President Clinton presented a new plan to them. The Palestinians would get 97 percent of the West Bank, Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem would become the capital of the new Palestinian state, refugees would be allowed to return to Palestine but not Israel, and a $30 billion fund would be established to compensate refugees. This was the final offer: The cantons were gone and a land link to Gaza was included...

"Then he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things he was supposed to give," Ross said. He rejected the idea Israelis would have sovereignty over the Western Wall in Jerusalem and other religious sites. He rejected the scheme for refugees and what Ross called "the basic ideas on security . . . So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him, he rejected." How can Ross be so sure of that? He was in the room with Clinton and Arafat when it happened...

But by late 2000, Ross said, Americans had learned Arafat's negotiating style. Any formal offer would be taken as the floor for further negotiations requiring more Israeli concessions...

Ross stayed behind to make certain the Palestinian negotiators had gotten "every single word." They had. A footnote: Ross insists the Palestinian negotiators were ready to accept the offer. They "understood this was the best they were ever going to get. They wanted [Arafat] to accept it." He refused. Why? Ross believes Arafat simply doesn't want to end the conflict with Israel. His career is governed by struggle and leaving his options open. "For him to end the conflict is to end himself," Ross said.

What's important about the history of peace talks in the Middle East is what it tells us about Arafat. The inescapable conclusion is that he will never reach a settlement with Israelis leading to two countries, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace. The Israelis? An honest recounting of the Clinton-led peace talks shows they were willing, though hardly eager, to make substantial concessions to reach a settlement."

[Gatorade]

Setting the Record Straight

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/ross.htm

Dennis Ross who was there has some interesting quotes

"In the case of the Palestinians, the Palestinians actually said they thought the Israelis could go into the low 90s, in terms of percentage of territory, and they talked about Israel needing the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem."

" Arafat did make a request for more time to prepare, but then he would not do anything to make preparation possible. He would reveal nothing to us, on the one hand, and his negotiators all hardened their positions during this very period of time, on the other hand."

"[Arafat] met frequently with the President alone, and in those meetings, he wouldn't reveal himself. He would repeat all the old formulas, or in some cases, unfortunately, he created new mythologies.

One of his new mythologies that he created at Camp David was, "There's no temple in Jerusalem. It's only an obelisk." When you question the core of the other side's faith, that is not exactly an indication that you are getting ready to try to end the conflict."

It is a long article and to be fair I cannot do justice by quoting a couple short quotes.

[Mediocrates]

elena

I think we can all agree that prior agreements are largely dead. Resurrecting them is fruitless and certainly dredging them up to assume one can point fingers is utterly a waste of time.

My point is that typical PLO stances are very simple to summarize. They amount to "give us everything we've ever demanded and don't come back until you do. In the mean time we'll escalate the pressure by attacking you and then claiming there is nothing we can do to stop it."

In the past, Sharon demanded quiet periods before negotiations and then retracted it. Now the Israeli government has stated a willingness to negotiate with someone however Sharon has said emphatically that the Israeli government cannot trust and cannot neogiotiate with Arafat under the current organization of the PA. It is incumbant on the PA to do two things:

1) Decide to negotiate credibly
2) Find someone who can and will negotiate credibly

National leaders, representative or otherwise don't necessarily have to be the bodies around the table - that's what professional diplomats are for.