Iraq, the Constitution and the Fate of a President

[Mediocrates]

Iraq, the Constitution and the Fate of a President
By George Friedman

The elections scheduled in Iraq for Dec. 15 have generated what is becoming a permanent feature of Iraqi politics. The process of establishing a constitution has become the battleground among the three major ethnic factions over the nature of political arrangements in Iraq, the distribution of power, the character of the regime and, of course, how oil revenues will be shared. Each milestone on the road to a constitution has become an occasion for intensifying both the negotiating and military process, with no milestone becoming definitive. Thus, the Oct. 15 referendum will give way to December's general elections, and today's negotiations set the stage for the next round of negotiations.

All of this can be taken two ways. One way to view it is that the Iraqi situation is fundamentally insoluble, that the various parties cannot achieve a permanent resolution to the problem. Another way of looking at it is that this process is the permanent solution: Iraq will be an endless reshuffling of a finite political deck, with no end in sight. There are other countries that live this way, and the solution is that they muddle through: politics and the state are devalued, while the rest of society -- clans, families, corporations, organized crime -- are emphasized. An Iraq with eternally shifting politics is not incompatible with the notion of a functioning society.

This assessment, of course, ignores a number of things. First, Iraq is occupied by U.S. troops. Second, there is a war going on in which the Sunnis are fighting the occupation. The Iranians are in the wings -- actually, on the stage -- trying to dominate Iraq as much as possible. A border war is raging along the Syrian frontier. A broader war involving the United States and jihadists is still sputtering along. Therefore, any hope has to be viewed through the prism of this violence, and the question is simple: can the emerging political process ultimately reduce -- "eliminate" is too much to ask -- the level of violence? Put another way, from the U.S. side, can the present political process solve the problems of occupation while yielding the political goals Washington wanted? From the jihadist side, can the uncertainty of the political process be exploited to create the conditions for what Ayman al-Zawahiri described in a recent letter: the jihadist domination of Iraq? Or, will the conflict between political goals undermine the process and create permanent war instead of permanent instability?

The core difference between this milestone and the last -- the generation of a proposed constitution for consideration by the legislature and, through this referendum, the public -- is that, whereas the last round of negotiations ended in an inability of the Shia and Kurds to reach an agreement with the Sunnis, this one has ended in an agreement of sorts. That agreement frames the situation, inasmuch as it is less an agreement than a framework for ongoing negotiations.

Some Sunni leaders have opposed any agreement or participation in the constitutional referendum; others have supported participation with a "no" vote. What appears to have been crafted between the Shia and negotiating Sunni groups is this:

If the constitution is approved, it will be a temporary, not permanent, constitution.

After a general election on Dec. 15 that would be based on this constitution, a committee of the National Assembly would review the document once again.

The new parliament would have four months to complete changes to the document.

A new vote would be held to ratify that final constitution.



In other words, the agreement that has been reached here between the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds is simply that all sides will focus on the constitutional negotiations.

That's not a bad deal, if the negotiations can encompass a large enough spectrum of each group's leadership and if everyone agrees to put other issues on hold. You can spend a lot of time debating the rules under which you will debate the issues, and you can defuse other issues if that is what everyone wants to do. The problem here is that it is not clear that this is what everyone wants.

A major Sunni organization -- the Iraqi Islamic Party -- has agreed to these rules. Other groups, at least as or more important than the Iraqi Islamic Party, have not. Neither the Association of Muslim Scholars nor the Iraqi General Conference appear at this moment to have changed their position, which is that Sunni voters should reject the new constitution. That in itself is not as alarming as it appears. The Sunnis, and other factions, are represented by several groups, and these groups sometimes play "good cop, bad cop" very effectively. The signal the Sunnis are giving is that they are not rejecting the constitutional process out of hand, but that they will need serious coaxing before the vote comes about. They are taking it down to the wire, which is the rational thing to do under the circumstances.

Three serious pressures are converging on the Sunnis. First, simply refraining from participating in the Oct. 15 referendum could free the Shia and Kurds to set up a regional federal system that would leave the Sunnis as the weakest player -- and the one with least access to future oil revenues. At the same time, the traditional Sunni leadership, deeply complicit in the Baath dictatorship, has substantial reason to fear the jihadists. The jihadists are not part of the traditional leadership and are, in fact, ideological enemies of Baathism. If the jihadists grow in strength, the traditional leadership might find itself displaced by them over time. On the other hand, agreeing to participate in the country's political process would open the Sunni leadership up to charges of being, not only lackeys of the United States, but also stooges to the hated Shia. More than any other group in Iraq, the Sunnis need for the jihadists to be defeated. On the other hand, they know they can't count on the Americans to deliver this defeat. They are under pressure to find a political solution, but also under powerful pressure not to find one. So, they churn around, generally heading toward a solution but never quite getting there.

The position of the Shia is simpler, and they have more ways of winning. If the constitution leads to a simple federalist government, the Shia will dominate southern Iraq and can deal with the Sunnis at their leisure. If a centralized government is created, the Shia will be -- with the Kurds -- the majority. The only thing the Shia can't live with is the one thing the Sunnis want: a constitution so contrived that the Sunnis can block major initiatives by the Shia.

The Kurds can live with a lot of solutions and can create informal realities based on geography and their own military strength and American backing. Their interest is less institutional than geopolitical -- they want Mosul and Kirkuk. More precisely, they want to dominate the northern oil fields and trade, and to exclude the Sunnis as far as possible from these interests. Whether that is accomplished through constitutional or business means is of less interest to them than that it be done.

[Mediocrates]

The form of the constitution, therefore, matters most to the Sunnis. They need it to be written a certain way, and then to have guarantees that its provisions will be respected. At the moment, this coincides with the American interest. A radical federalism that creates a de facto Shiite state in the south is not at all in the American interest: It would have the potential to expand Iranian power in ways far more significant that a nuclear weapons program, by bringing a Shiite force -- perhaps Iraqi, or perhaps Iraqi and Iranian -- to the borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The specter of a Shiite force inciting Shiite populations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia has always been a fear, but the possibility of the Iranian army taking up positions on the frontier would change the balance of power in the region decisively.

The countries in the Saudi peninsula are no match for the Iranians. Add in the Syrians, who long have been allies of sorts to Iran, and you get a situation in which the United States would have to retain a presence in order to protect the regional balance of power. The Saudis do not want U.S. forces in the kingdom, to say the least, and the United States does not want to be there -- it would generate even more jihadist threats. Therefore, Washington does not want to see the federal solutions favoring the Shia come into being, nor does it want to see a centralized government dominated by the Shia. Having used the Shia to contain the insurrection in the Sunni regions, the United States now finds itself aligned with the Sunnis and with the former Baath Party.

These things happen in war and geopolitics. But there are two problems here. First, the United States has made it very clear that it will be withdrawing its forces -- at least some of them -- from Iraq in 2006. Second, everyone reads U.S. polls. President George W. Bush is in political trouble in the United States and, now, within the Republican Party itself. As with Nixon and Ford found in Vietnam, following Watergate, the threat posed by the United States declines as the president's political weakness grows. And with the decline of the U.S. military threat, there is a decline of U.S. influence. Last week's discussion of air strikes inside Syria -- and the leak that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice opposed such strikes -- is an example of the problem. Where the administration had had credibility for action before, that credibility has now decreased.

The administration's political weakness does not seem to be reversing. Should Karl Rove be indicted in the Valerie Plame affair -- and at the moment, the rumors in Washington say that he will be -- the president will have lost his chief aide, and the administration will have been struck another blow.

At this moment, it is possible to make the constitutional process into a container for diverse Iraqi interests. It is also possible to see a point where the Sunni Baathists would turn on the jihadists in order to protect their political position. But all of this hinges on the guarantees that are provided by each side, and the ability and willingness of the United States to compel compliance with those guarantees. The paradox is that the most likely path to a successful withdrawal from Iraq is the perception that the United States is going to stay there forever -- and can do it. But as Bush weakens in Washington, the ability of various Iraqi factions to rely on U.S. guarantees declines.

Geopolitics teaches the interconnectedness of events. The current American strategy requires sufficient stability to be generated in Iraq to permit a U.S. military withdrawal. That requires that the United States must be taken seriously as a military force. But the weaker Bush is -- for whatever reason, fair or not -- the less credible becomes his pledge to stay the course. There are few parallels between Iraq and Vietnam save this: the political climate in Washington determines the seriousness with which American power is taken on the battlefield.

It would seem, then, that Bush has two problems. The first is whether he can stabilize and increase his power in the United States. The second is whether he can extract a clear strategy from the complexity of Iraq. The answer to the second question rests in the answer to the first. At the moment, the Iraqi constitutional talks seem to be saying, "Bush is not broken, but we aren't committing to anything until we see the polls in December."

Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

© Copyright 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

[karthik]

It is astonishing to note that there is a possibility of Shiites in Iraq inciting Shiites in neighbouring Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The terrorist insurgency in Iraq, until now, has been driven by Sunni sympathisers of the Saddam regime, former hardcore Baathists. Now with this referendum, things could become worse.

By all indications, the minority Sunnis wont be able to vote out the draft constitution, as the overwhelming Shiites and the suppressed Kurds would want to take over power which has long been denied to them.

This Sunni disenchantment is likely to deepen, as even moderate Sunnis feel the heat. This is the last thing that Iraq needs at the moment. It will give a new impetus to the terrorist dingbats and more bloodshed is in the offing.

Combine this with the plans of George Bush to pull some of the troops out of the country, and we have a receipe which is fraught with danger. In short, this could be catastrophic for Iraq and the region.

Noble as the supposed intentions were - to free Iraq and bring democracy there, the appalling planning and judgement by the White House has meant that we are in a quagmire of more violence. This is very unfortunate and sad.

[Ray]

The Iraqi Constitution and the wrangling have deeper connotations than what meets the eye.

It is reported that the US is desirous that the contentious issues be shelved with a caveat that they are discussed after the passing of the Constitution. This would act as a face saver for the US that it has the basic trappings of “Freedom and Democracy” in place and yet at the same time keep the leverage to act as the Honest Injun amongst the warring factions, which is bound to happen whenever these issues are addressed for resolution.

Prima facie, the contentious issues can never be resolved since they are the fundamental in character and address the Gordian knot of the very survival of the three major communities that constitute Iraq.

The diktat to pass the Constitution and address these contentious and fundamental issues thereafter is indeed a clever ploy wherein while there would be an Iraqi government, the infighting and jockeying for supremacy would continue in perpetuity and may even adopt a form of “peaceful” armed hostility between the warring factions.

This would, in turn, ensure that there is always a US presence in Iraq to act the Honest Broker!

The contemporary example of this type of chicanery is the British example of dividing India based on nebulous and yet highly moralistic principles of allowing the Princely States to decide their affiliation and merging into either Nations of India or Pakistan. The resultant is the horrifying imbroglio that remains a thorn in the side of both the Nations and yet at the same time permits the international Powers that be to have their finger in the pie, and depending on the flavour of time, pit one against the other to suit their strategic interests.

The Shiaite spread is from East Saudi Arabia to West Afghanistan and from Azerbaijan in the North to South Iraq. Throw in Syria and Kuwait (to some extent).

If one notices this Shia spread is where the oil is. Thus, the economic clout of the Shia community and their leverage in the international field can be well understood.

It is also true that some of the oil bearing areas while in the Shia belt, has governments that are Sunni.

Into this cauldron, throw in the historic Shia Sunni theological hatred and internecine warring!

The chemistry is ideal for confusion and international meddling.

But, the worry point is that neither the Sunnis nor the Shias can be taken for granted since their supreme allegiance is to Islam.

In such a scenario, it would be in the interest of the US to keep the area "on the boil" whereby the US presence in the area is guaranteed and thus crank in the chicanery similar to the Indo Pakistan imbroglio.

The connection between the US partial withdrawal in 2006 and the withdrawal of US involvement in actions (excepting the high profile operation [quite different for local actions] that is required for the international and more importantly, the domestic opinion) should be read.

The actions of the US may appear to be knee jerk, but it may not be so. There is a method in the "bumbling". In this connection, the US Defence Policy Guideline (DPG), The US National Energy Policy and the US Congressional Hearing on the Central Asian Republic, NIC 2020 should be read. The last document also throws light on the US interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The movement of the quick change artist Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad is also interesting in the context of US interest in the area from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan as also Iran and Azerbaijan. Khalilzad was a consultant to UNOCAL, the US Oil Giant.

One may browse the link below for details regarding Khalilzad.

http://www.democracynow.org/article..../04/07/1343234

[karthik]

The appointment of the ambassador is a pointer towards the American policy in Iraq now.

The logic enunciated above has unadorned US designs in Iraq. The constitution and the referendum is yet another effort by Washington to ensure that the Shias emerge to the positions of ascendency in Iraq.

Indeed, oil appears to be a primal factor in the scheme of things. Oil is where the interest lies, and Shias are the ones with whom the oil lies. Installing a Shia power base in Iraq means controlling the oil supplies with preposterous ease.

And while the Sunnis fight back and the country slips into a cold civil war, the Shias will increasingly count on Washington's support to cling on to power. And to garner that support, the Shia political parties will use oil as a barter !

Pitting Shias and against Sunnis, for oil. Yet another country falls into this Western trap that is the paradigm of divide and rule !

Also, another theory behind this divisive US policy is that when the Shias and Sunnis are busy fighting each other, they'll have less resources and energy to vent their ire at the US. The current occupant of the White House can then claim to have 'defeated the terrorists'. Ha !

The referendum that is going to take place is anything but a referendum. Large parts of the country are still grappling with horrible violence.

[atricnorth]

The appointment of the ambassador is a pointer towards the American policy in Iraq now.

The logic enunciated above has unadorned US designs in Iraq. The constitution and the referendum is yet another effort by Washington to ensure that the Shias emerge to the positions of ascendency in Iraq.

Indeed, oil appears to be a primal factor in the scheme of things. Oil is where the interest lies, and Shias are the ones with whom the oil lies. Installing a Shia power base in Iraq means controlling the oil supplies with preposterous ease.

And while the Sunnis fight back and the country slips into a cold civil war, the Shias will increasingly count on Washington's support to cling on to power. And to garner that support, the Shia political parties will use oil as a barter !

Pitting Shias and against Sunnis, for oil. Yet another country falls into this Western trap that is the paradigm of divide and rule !

Also, another theory behind this divisive US policy is that when the Shias and Sunnis are busy fighting each other, they'll have less resources and energy to vent their ire at the US. The current occupant of the White House can then claim to have 'defeated the terrorists'. Ha !

The referendum that is going to take place is anything but a referendum. Large parts of the country are still grappling with horrible violence.

true.

does the US want to create another war?

disputes with iran is a stalemate

this would further create a state with more shia control in iraq and iranian influence.

do we want a nuclear reactor in iraq, made by iranians?

we will have another vietnam.

more sunni insurgency, more iranian influence for south iraq.


sunnis are not the only ones saying "no" in the referendum.

assyrians christians are saying " no" in the referendum.


assyrians christians vote "no"

[takeo]

Sunni's rejected the constitution, either by abstaining or by voting against the constitution. It will remain a shiite-Kurd constitution rejected by the Sunni's. Meanwhile the shiites themselves are radicalising, both against the sunnites as against the Western troops, such as the latest incidents between Iraqi and Brittish troops in Basra proved. Iranian influence is growing among the shiite population and the government, The sunnites on the other hand despise both the shiites as the Americans. It's a very uneasy threesome... (not taking in consideration the christians, Kurds and Turkmens in the northern fringes of Iraq who all have there own aspirations, most christians as the sunnites were benefitted by the old regime, the Kurds have a temporary marriage with the shiites but ultimately they have there own independance plans which are no secret) (Also not taking into consideration the division among the sunnites who are divided in Baathists and islamists). The "libanisation" of Iraq caused by the foreign aggression is no longer a threat but a fact.

[MGB8]

I think there is some massive overthinking going on.

First of all, the idea that the current situation will stay the same is a pretty big assumption.

Second, there is, in Iraq, significant clan overlap between Kurd, Sunni, and Shia.

Third, we have one post above that says that it is in the US's interest that the Shia's are "supreme" and/or seperate, and another that says its antithetical because of Iran. What that suggests is that it is far from clear what is in the US's interests here.

Fourt, NO MATTER WHAT, the Shia WILL DOMINATE Iraq, because they are 60% or the population. However, as noted above in the analysis, Syria, a predominantly Sunni country, has been for a long time an Iranian ally? How can this be?! So what does that mean to a Shia dominated Iraq?

Fifth, in the end, the insurgency is doomed. Why? Because, if it becomes too succesful, it will lead to civil war, and the Sunnis, outnumbered and outgunned, will lose and lose badly. They know this. That doesn't mean that they won't fight for a while, but in the end, they ARE dead-enders. Oh, they'll put up one hell of a fight... but, the fact that they are talking about the political process, etc., means that the beginnings of the transition of the Sunni population from rejectionism and war to acceptance is occuring.

[takeo]

I think there is some massive overthinking going on.

First of all, the idea that the current situation will stay the same is a pretty big assumption.

Second, there is, in Iraq, significant clan overlap between Kurd, Sunni, and Shia.

Third, we have one post above that says that it is in the US's interest that the Shia's are "supreme" and/or seperate, and another that says its antithetical because of Iran. What that suggests is that it is far from clear what is in the US's interests here.

Fourt, NO MATTER WHAT, the Shia WILL DOMINATE Iraq, because they are 60% or the population. However, as noted above in the analysis, Syria, a predominantly Sunni country, has been for a long time an Iranian ally? How can this be?! So what does that mean to a Shia dominated Iraq?

Fifth, in the end, the insurgency is doomed. Why? Because, if it becomes too succesful, it will lead to civil war, and the Sunnis, outnumbered and outgunned, will lose and lose badly. They know this. That doesn't mean that they won't fight for a while, but in the end, they ARE dead-enders. Oh, they'll put up one hell of a fight... but, the fact that they are talking about the political process, etc., means that the beginnings of the transition of the Sunni population from rejectionism and war to acceptance is occuring.

It is indeed far from clear what the US interest is in this conflict which has gone beyond the pro- and anti-US or even pro- and anti-war arguments.
The shiites are not always pro-US, rather on the contrary they are more pro-Iran, while their allies the Kurds are pro-American for the moment being. It is clearly in the US' interests that unrest in Iraq doesn't overspil to other Arab nations such as Saoudi Arabia or Egypt, it is however also in Syria's interest that islamist unrest doesn't spil over to Syria. Syria and Iran have always been unlikely allies, Syria mostly sunnite country ruled by a non-religious upperclass of shiite origins, the alawites, Iran being a theocratic shiite country. The secret behind their strong alliance is that they have common ennemies: both the US, Israel, Saddam, and al-Quaida or other sunnite Islamists are sworn ennemies of both countries. I think Syria doesn't support the insurgeancy, they have nothing in common with the insurgeants except perhaps anti-Americanism, which is also plenty in the new Iraqi government. Syria supports the new government, as Iran does, and was one of the first Arab countries to register Iraqi refugees in Syria for the vote.

Sunnites are on their own in Iraq but they can handle that they have always been the elite and most energetic part of Iraqi society. They are also the richest and best organised, a legacy of their long supremacy, they can last for years and of course they have the support of Al-Quaida and international Islam. They know if they lay down arms now they will loose so they want to get the best before laying down the arms, which means participation in any new regime. If the American occupiers leave perhaps there will be room for a settlement with the shiites, they have one thing in common, islamic fervour...
As you can see in Egypt as well without even holding power the resistance has set the agenda of the government and society, the power they have now they would never have trough elections. Also it is a tradition in Arab countries that minorities rule the majority, Turkish mamluks ruled Egypt for many centuries.

[karthik]

I think there is some massive overthinking going on.

First of all, the idea that the current situation will stay the same is a pretty big assumption.

Second, there is, in Iraq, significant clan overlap between Kurd, Sunni, and Shia.

Third, we have one post above that says that it is in the US's interest that the Shia's are "supreme" and/or seperate, and another that says its antithetical because of Iran. What that suggests is that it is far from clear what is in the US's interests here.

Fourt, NO MATTER WHAT, the Shia WILL DOMINATE Iraq, because they are 60% or the population. However, as noted above in the analysis, Syria, a predominantly Sunni country, has been for a long time an Iranian ally? How can this be?! So what does that mean to a Shia dominated Iraq?

Fifth, in the end, the insurgency is doomed. Why? Because, if it becomes too succesful, it will lead to civil war, and the Sunnis, outnumbered and outgunned, will lose and lose badly. They know this. That doesn't mean that they won't fight for a while, but in the end, they ARE dead-enders. Oh, they'll put up one hell of a fight... but, the fact that they are talking about the political process, etc., means that the beginnings of the transition of the Sunni population from rejectionism and war to acceptance is occuring.

Fair points there, but the insurgency has shown no signs of abating, and even if anything, is on the upsurge.

If the clan overlap between the Kurds, Sunnis and the Shias is strong enough to avoid a civil war, then that is good for Iraq.

Your views on the appoinment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to Iraq, and his ties with UNOCAL?

The number of American troops who've lost their lives in Iraq has crossed 2000. Do you think that at least a partial troop withdrawal is in the offing now? That is not great news for that insurgency stricken country, surely.

[MGB8]

I do not think a major troop reduction is coming, but I do believe that some troops will be withdrawn as a token before the 2006 elections.

As for the insurgency, I disagree with your take. As I have noted before, attacks now come in waves as opposed to every day. We're in the middle of a little wave right now... which will likely tone down over the next several days and then we'll have another lull, and then another wave. The waves will get further and further apart.

Things take time. Longer than what we hoped. But progress is being made, albeit slowly.

Read: http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/

[Peter Stitt]

Returning from my domestic problems I have seen two messages that I simply must reply to.

Takeo, you are based in France which always opposed the war, possibly because of outstanding contracts and unpaid debts from the Iraqi regime (ala Russia) and you are using Gallup polls to support your argument. In 1992 we had an election in the UK and in one corner we had the most inept Prime Minister since Neville Chamberlin (John Major) and Gallup and everyone else said he was going to lose said election. He won. In effect, reverse Gallup's prediction and it would have been right. I am a market researcher and I know the way these figures are arrived at, it is deeply flawed.

Aside from this I am currently involved in an immigration case here where the main issue is the source of the British Home Office's information on the security situation in Iraq (British and US governmental press releases!). Do you really think some middle class English Gallup employee wandered into Fallujah with his clip-board and started asking Iraqi nationals "How satisfied are you with the occupation, very? slightly? or not at all?" The Gallup people are all sat in offices in London, saying what they think people in the UK want to hear, I can assure you of that.

Among my friends are Iraqi Arabs, Sunni and Shia, and they universally welcome what is happening politically in their home country. They and I all agree that this is the worst planned "nation building" project in history and Britain and America should be ashamed for their governments' lack of vision. To be perfectly honest I was shocked by the lack of planning for the post-fighting Iraq. It has been a disgrace and has cost too many lives, in actual fact one life would have been too many so precious is life.

This brings me to the border issue that Mediocrates (brilliant name but not appropriate to you cos you're too damned clever!) brought up. The terrible planning from the Whitehouse dismantled the existing security forces in Iraq and rendered the borders with Iraq and Syria totally porous. I have friends who have been visiting all three countries, backwards and forwards as though they were crossing a road. The policy of disbanding the security forces simply sent a green light message to Jihadis.

The Kurds are not concerned with Mosul but Kirkuk is different with a strong Kurdish history. I also believe that, shoud Kirkuk fall into the Kurdish sphere of influence, Turkoman and Arab will be treated as equals. I do not see bitterness over the past in the Kurdish conscience, just a hopefulness for the future.

Should Iraq break into three different states? Is this a bad thing? I refer to my previous entry regarding artificial borders. I do not pretend there were no ethnic tensions during the Saddam years (he played on them: "divide and rule") but the fact is that Kurd, Arab (Sunni and Shia) and Turkoman have traded together, lived together for centuries. If, in eight years time, the Kurds vote for independence I think you will see them engaging more with their neighbours. Similarly we keep hearing reports that the Shia in the South are influenced by Iranian fanatics. They are not. They welcome material help from wherever it comes but the Iraqi Shia population generally just seem to want freedom whilst their leaders seem more pragmatic than the Iranian theocratic leadership.

We are academics discussing these matters on a website, almost like people playing a game of chess where the stakes are high but the player does not suffer, the people do. If I were not so close to the people involved it would be easy to be dispassionate about everything but, as far as I am concerned every human who dies in these ridiculous conflicts, be they Christian, Moslem or Jewish or whatever, I can only see it as a terrible waste.

I really am not a pacifist and, had I been around in 1939, I would have rushed to sign to fight the Nazis. I just think that most of the conflicts we have going at the moment are based upon misunderstandings, pride and arrogance. There has been a brilliant series on BBC2 in England for the last three weeks, "Israel and the Arabs" and, at the risk of upsetting some people, I must say that two people came out of the programme with credit: Ariel Sharon, for his political shrewdness, and Abu Mazin, for his understanding of the need to crack down on people like Hamas (thwarted by Arafat). Like I always say there are good and bad people from every nation and people have different talents in different fields.

Life is hard and there are many difficult problems for us to solve but at the end of the day I thank God for this opportunity to live, especially at this time when so many things are changing. We are living in a time of opportunity, let's make the most of it. I think for the first time ever we have a real opportunity for a true exchange of ideas because circumstances have shown us that we have to engage in dialogue across religious and national boundaries. I welcome that.

Again I have to say thank you for the messages of support for my son, you are wonderful and I really appreciate it.

Thank you,

Peter

[MGB8]

There have been massive criticisms of that BBC documentary. For example, Dennis Ross, the chief US envoy, is not interviewed, in favor of Arabists who contradict what he and Clinton (and several other of the major players) say.

In addition, the fact of the matter is that the Al-aqsa intifadah was pre-planned. That has been admitted on various occassions - check MEMRI translations of Arab interviews, etc. (the Western Media is loath to report this fact, it messes up their narrative!) The only relation it had to Sharon's visit to the Mount is that a hated Jew going onto the Mount was a good excuse to start it.

Meanwhile, Abbas has had all the opportunity in the world to "crack down" on militiants, even "just" the ones who killed the 3 US envoys... and has done pretty much nothing. Not out of weakness - HE has the World Money; HE has 60,000 troops on payroll. But, the Pal Arab population as a whole does not support peace (due to the constant incitement against Israel, also not shown in the documentary) and thus they will not take steps to stop the terror. At most, they will exercise "self-restraint" for a time - and most of the time that is due to the pressure of an all-out Israeli assualt (or fear of it.)

ps - Takeo is not only a Frenchman, but he is also a proud Communist. Everything comes from that perspective with him - as long as you can keep that in mind, takeo (and his beliefs) will "make sense."

[Ray]

Two states have voted No for the Constitution (one in the West and one which is Saddam's state), but nonetheless it has passed muster.

The Sunnis are now left in the middle and without any control of the oil wealth and instead will be at the mercy of the Federal Government, which will axiomatically be Shia dominated.

It will be up to the Shia dominated Federal Govt, which is bound to come to office after the December election to ensure a fair deal to the Sunnis......

Or else, one wonders if that will happen since the Shias - Sunni divide is historical and Saddam's oppression of the Shias is legend. Would a neglect or imagined neglect be a spark that ignites the fire?

Iraq, with all the current instability, is a ripe plum to be picked by the either the Sunni or the Shia interest and Nations that dominate the Arab world.

Thus the internal problem, compounded by the external interest and influences that are rife and will become stronger after the Election, does make the issue volatile. One doesn't know which way the cat shall jump! It is only the US presence that prevents overt interference in Iraq by either the Sunni or the Shia nations of the Arab world.

In the event if the National Election and the government formed does not address the problems fairly, the possibility of the Sunnis rising en masse cannot be ruled out. The carrot that Sunnis can initiate Constitutional Amendments which will be law if a two third majority passes is another case of a political con since it is but a will o' the wisp.

If there be civil war in Iraq, it will encourage refugees going across the borders encouraging the historic Shia - Sunni divide to surface, leading to immense political and social tubulence from North Africa to Pakistan and even possibly the whole Islamic world. Its effect on the world economy because of oil can be well understood and once the genie is out of the bottle, it will be difficult to restore status quo ante.

To be sure, the ascendancy of the Shia powerhouse in Iraq has not been taken too kindly by the Sunni Arab nations, no matter what the overt political posturing might be, encouraged by a fear of displeasing the US.

In this cauldron, churn in the potential of the Sunni terrorists vigorously activating itself, secretly nudged by the Sunni Arab nations cannot be ruled out, nor the possibility of the Shia nations challenging the same through their terrrorist organisations. This will lead to a veritable political, military and social inferno.

In the Shia Sunni struggle, it would open up the window of opportunity for the Kurds to form their own country. Would that unite the Shias and Sunnis of Iraq? One wonders.

However, the political and military dimension of any Kurd movement towards independence cannot be overlooked. It will draw in Turkey, Iran, Armenia and Syria since it would also affect its territorial integrity.

The political, social, military and quasi military flux thus created by the Sunni Shia armed struggle and the Kurds edging for an independent nation, would be ideal for the Shias to extend the same instability and turmoil to Lebanon and Syria and there is nothing to prevent the Shias to extend it to the Saudis of the East where the Saudi oil wealth is.

The above represents some situations that could develop; but it does not mean it will.

Yet, it is worth consideration.

[karthik]

The Kurds' move towards indepenence is unlikely, as Turkey will forever oppose that move. Although the Kurds in Iraq may mount some sort of resistance, an independent Kurdistan is a non starter.

The new government is Iraq will almost certainly be Shia dominated. Handling the insurgency and the return of normalcy to public life will be an acid test for the new government.

Of course, the insurgent scumbags would want to thwart that notion.

I think the situation in Iraq is mired in utter pandemonium, and the issues are very complex. These signs are not very good, which is sad IMHO. These signs don't augur well for the White House either.