A white paper on the Gaza War

[Mediocrates]

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/t...04.php?CID=318

Hamas has historically waged terror-based campaigns targeting both Israel and its Palestinian rivals, playing a spoiling role in peace negotiations between the two sides. However, much of the strength projected by Hamas is based on the military promise of the movement -- its capacity to employ force against its enemies. In December 2008 and January 2009, Hamas was tested as a military entity -- and fell short. Indeed, Israel's Operation Cast Lead posed the first serious military challenge to Hamas since the group seized power in Gaza in 2007 and probably since it emerged during the first intifada in 1988. The operation exposed substantial weaknesses in the quality of the movement's military decisionmaking and sharply illuminated its real capabilities as opposed to projected effectiveness.
In Hamas in Combat, Yoram Cohen, former deputy director of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), and Jeffrey White, a career Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, focus on the military features of Hamas that have traditionally received little attention analytically: the movement's plans, forces, weapons, doctrine, and combat qualities. This Policy Focus will be of interest to those who follow Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and to those interested in how Western military forces can confront and confound an irregular opponent.
The writers conclude that despite the violent threat it poses to regional stability, Hamas's fundamental military strength should not be overestimated.


THE AUTHORS
Yoram Cohen was a 2009 visiting fellow at The Washington Institute. He has held a variety of positions in the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), serving until recently as the organization's deputy director. Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant, Iraq, and Iran. He is a thirty-four-year veteran of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where he served in a variety of senior analytical and leadership positions. He participated in DIA operational and policy planning and wrote extensively for senior defense officials, including the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. White's recent work, on which he is actively sought out as a commentator, includes extensive analysis of the Gaza conflict, the insurgency in Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear program. His other Washington Institute publications include Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment (with David Makovsky), An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting Adversary Networks in Iraq, and Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency (with Michael Eisenstadt).

[maven]

The writers conclude that despite the violent threat it poses to regional stability, Hamas's fundamental military strength should not be overestimated.

Seems an awful waste of money and time merely to come up with the obvious.

[Mediocrates]

I believe their point is a counterweight to the lily livered souls who believe that Hamas is unavoidable because they are capable of so much material danger. In truth they are not. Something I said years ago still rings true, that 'peace' with the Palestinians is little more than finding an acceptable level of atrocities and violence.

[Tonto]

The biggest problem is that people in Hamas/Hezbulla/Fatah and a extended plethora of copy cats, is that these clowns have turned "patriotism", loyalty, religious zeal, and offended sensibilities into a very lucrative business and there is no way in the world they will ever shut it down and lose the income. Kinda like Jessie Jackson and Al Sharpton....the poverty and professional victims twins.

[dayag]

Originally Posted by Tonto

The biggest problem is that people in Hamas/Hezbulla/Fatah and a extended plethora of copy cats, is that these clowns have turned "patriotism", loyalty, religious zeal, and offended sensibilities into a very lucrative business and there is no way in the world they will ever shut it down and lose the income. Kinda like Jessie Jackson and Al Sharpton....the poverty and professional victims twins.

They could steal a whole lot more from a prosperous society at peace. If only they were smarter.

[Tonto]

Good call Dude!

[Mediocrates]

A similar summary:

From news article:

October 25, 2009: Palestinian terrorist group Hamas continues to try and put a positive spin on the beating they took during the 22 day war with Israel last December-January. Before the war, Hamas refused to renew the six month ceasefire it had with Israel. Hamas had planned to resume firing rockets into Israel, shoot down Israeli helicopters (with newly acquired SA-7 type anti-aircraft missiles) and capture more Israeli soldiers (using Iranian trained fighters and new tunnels dug under Israeli checkpoints.)

Hamas thought they were invulnerable to Israeli attack. By placing so many of their military and government facilities in densely populated residential neighborhoods, they believed any Israeli bombing or shelling would cause high, and politically unacceptable, civilian losses. But the Israelis used surprise, more precision than expected, and innovations like calling civilians in the target area and telling them to get out before the bombs hit nearby. As a result, most of the 1,300 Palestinian dead were Hamas personnel, and nearly all the damaged structures were those used by Hamas.

Since their victory plan failed, Hamas fell back on their Plan B ("Operation War Criminal.") The Palestinians cranked up the spin machine, and accused the Israelis of war crimes and genocide. Israel responded with a media campaign featuring aerial videos of Hamas fighters setting up mortars and rockets next to schools and residential neighborhoods. This didn't stop the usual alliance of leftists, anti-Semites and Islamic radicals from calling Israel names. While the mud didn't stick nearly as much as in the past, the UN sided with Hamas. The Israeli campaign was seeking to humiliate and discredit Hamas, as much as it was to destroy military and government assets. But that was seen by many as a use of excessive force. Thus the Hamas propaganda efforts did enable allies in the UN to conduct a biased war crimes investigation of the conflict which, to no ones surprise, concluded that Israel had committed war crimes. But this was a hollow victory, because Hamas was, in reality, the big loser.

Hamas took some comfort in their propaganda victory, but not with the performance of their combat forces. Hamas had over 10,000 armed men available, but most of them were useless because of poor leadership and training. There were 2,000 better trained and equipped men in the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, but these performed little better than the more numerous armed civilians. As soon as the fighting ended (with the January 18th ceasefire), Hamas began an investigation into why they lost so badly. Hamas then made substantial changes to its fighting forces. Over 40 senior Hamas military leaders have been dismissed, and hundreds more lower ranking ones retrained, and reviewed (for their suitability to leading men in combat.)

Hamas is trying to get more powerful anti-tank missiles (modern Russian models, preferably) from Iran, and train their fighters to use them against Israeli armored vehicles (especially the tank size armored D9 bulldozers). Hamas is also developing new tactics, and instituting more training for their fighters. Better communications systems are being developed, and better protection prepared for the Hamas leadership.

Dozens of senior Hamas officials were killed by smart bomb attacks during the 22 day war. The families of these Hamas leaders often died as well. Israel ignored Hamas attempts to protect its leaders by surrounding them with women and children in residential areas. What dismayed Hamas the most was Israel finding the location of their officials. Even before the ceasefire took effect on the 18th, Hamas death squads were rounding up the usual suspected (members of rival Fatah, and anyone else unlucky enough to be suspect) Israeli informants, for torture, mutilation or execution. The UN did not pay much attention to this, as it has been going on for over two years in Gaza. In that time, over 400 Fatah members have been killed by Hamas death squads, and many more Fatah (and any other Hamas rivals) tortured, wounded or jailed. Hamas apparently didn't realize that there were other ways to get target locations, besides informants on the ground. But all they understood was informants, so Hamas went after informants, and Hamas felt better after. But the bombings continued.

Israel destroyed most of the smuggling tunnels that bring weapons (particularly long range rockets for attacks on Israeli civilians) into Gaza. Israel wants Israeli or American sensors and technicians prowling the Egyptian border to detect all the tunnels, and for Egyptian border guards to destroy them. Hamas opposes this (as do many Egyptian officials, especially the ones who benefit from the bribes of the tunnel operators). These sensors recently went into operation, and the arms smuggling became more difficult.

Ultimately, Hamas found that hiding their senior leadership in hospitals or orphanages offered the best protection from Israeli attack. Weapons and key items of military equipment could also be stored there. Hamas apparently exercised some restraint, in to what degree they took over these institutions for military purposes. Someone in Hamas began doing the math, and realized that, at a certain point, a hospital full of weapons and Hamas personnel stopped being a hospital to Israeli commanders, and became a prime target. This tactic will continue.

Israel believes that Hamas had about 3,000 rockets in late December, and that during the 22 day campaign, about 600 of those rockets were fired in the general direction of Israel, while Israeli air (mostly) and ground forces destroyed another 1,300. That left Hamas with about 1,000 rockets, and dozens of functioning smuggling tunnels to Egypt through which components for replacement rockets can be moved. Iran has been shipping thousands of new (larger and longer range) rockets to Gaza. These are shipped into Sudan and then smuggled (via bribes to Egyptian border guards and police) into Egypt, then through the tunnels into Gaza. Hamas wants to kill lots of Israelis next time around, both soldiers and civilians.
Hamas claimed that Israeli bombs and troops did $1.9 billion worth of damage. It was probably closer to a few hundred million dollars. There were only about a thousand smart bombs used, and many of these were small ones (like the new U.S. 250 pound SDB, which Israel recently received). Hamas claimed that 5,000 homes were destroyed (and 20,000 damaged), along with 16 government buildings and 20 mosques. There are about 147,000 buildings in Gaza. Israel released photos of what was actually destroyed, and let Hamas try to dance away from their lies. Hamas is already the growing target for ridicule in the Arab world. If Israel was trying to get Hamas exposed as a bunch of tyrants, genocidal liars and blowhards, they seem to have succeeded. Hamas is expecting another round of fighting, and expects to do much better against the UN war criminals.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htw.../20091025.aspx

[curlyg]

The problem is that all the talk which accompanied Operation Cast Lead about a complimentary political solution never materisalised. There was talk of an international treaty to prevent smuggling into Gaza, American technology being transferred to Egypt, etc... None of it happened. It is eerily similar to the political failures of the Second Lebanon War, of which the Winograd report was so critical.